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Mutual Aid in the Welfare State is divided into four parts.
The first part outlines the idea of organizational form as the
way that the people in an organization are organized, and
distinguishes three types of voluntary organization: the third of
these is identified as voluntary organizational form. After a
discussion of the role of values in Social Science, the
organizational tradition of Anarchism is explained, as being the
most suitable way of looking at mutual aid groups and voluntary
organizational form. As well as an exposition of the classic
anarchist theorists, the development of anarchist organizational
forms in Spain before the Civil War is used as a practical
illustration of how anarchist organization theory has developed
and works.
The second part of the thesis turns to sociology. It was observed
in the first part that although anarchist theory was
comprehensive enough in its dealings with federalism, the
mutualist elements of the theory were under-developed. This gap
in mutualist theory is filled by a consideration of community and
organizational sociology, which are both criticized for the
rationalist bias that intrudes in the way they have developed.
The main sources used are Tonnies and Weber. A theory of mutual
aid is then developed from a consideration of what mutual aid
groups are not. This is then linked in with the theories of
Habermas and writings from modern feminism. The second part
concludes with a criticism of the oligarchical theories of
Michels, which have up till now been the main sociological
paradigm for voluntary organizing.
The third part of the thesis introduces cases from the literature
on voluntary groups in an expansion of the ideas of mutual aid
which were developed theoretically. In the course of this,
distinctions between different types of mutual aid group are
drawn, together with an analysis of different problems faced by
each type. Distinctions between mutual aid groups and some
commonly overlapping categories of organization are drawn also.
The third part concludes with an examination of the relationships
between the state and mutual aid groups.
The fourth and last section of the thesis is devoted to a more
detailed examination of the Scottish Pre-School Playgroups
Association. SPPA has the classic organizational form laid out in
anarchist organization theory, illustrates many of the points
made about mutual aid groups in other parts of the thesis, and
manages to co-exist with the state. The argument of the thesis is
that one example is all that is needed to show that mutualist and
anarchist organization is a viable alternative to hierarchical
organization which people are typically more used to. SPPA is
that example, and consequently serves as an empirical
illustration of the rest of the thesis.
In accordance with Regulation 2.4.15 of the University
Regulations, I hereby declare that this thesis
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One problem encountered throughout social science is that many of
the words and concepts used have commonsense rather than precise
'scientific' definitions. When physicists talk about gravity,
when chemists talk about compounds, and when biologists talk
about sexual reproduction there is an invariable assumption,
usually justified, that the reader has the same idea of what the
words refer to as the writer has in using them. Social scientists
who attempt the same stratagem usually end up using so much
jargon in an attempt to avoid ambiguities that they become
virtually incomprehensible to anyone else: and while nobody
really expects ordinary people to benefit from reading advanced
texts in nuclear physics, social science is commonly regarded by
all concerned as being somewhat more accessible. Indeed, many of
its practitioners might hope that non-academics would fruitfully
consume what they produce. Unfortunately, the ways in which
social scientists use language is often not at all ordinary, and
the observation with which we began - that the words a social
scientist uses have both specialized and ordinary uses - means
that any assumption to this effect, that the reader does in fact
have the same understanding of words as the writer possesses, is
liable to be wrong. To be precise in what one says and at the
same time avoid using jargon is a project fraught with
difficulty.
A major area full of these difficulties is the study of
organizations. Everybody knows the word 'organization', applies
it and uses it to their own and everybody else's satisfaction.
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Not even a social scientist would ordinarily quarrel with this
normal use of the word. But to use a word doesn't necessarily
imply that anyone has to be able to define what it means -
Wittgenstein pointed out that knowing the use of a word is
knowing its meaning. Furthermore, a word might not be possible to
define in such a way as to cover all and only the situations in
which it can be used. Wittgenstein says:
"Consider, for example, the proceedings that
we call 'games'. I mean board-games, card-
games, ball-games, Olympic-games, and so on.
What is common to them all? - Don't say:
"There MUST be something common, or they would
not be called 'games'" - but LOOK and SEE
whether there is anything common to all. - For
if you look at them you will see not something
that is common to all, but simi liari ties,
relationships, and a whole series of them at
that I can think of no better
expression to characterize these simiIiarities
than 'family resemblances' And I
shall say that 'games' form a family"
(Philosophical Investigations, '66-'67)
It is therefore quite possible, if they too are a family, for
there to be no one clear definition of what organizations are.
However, this possibility has not deterred social scientists
from proceeding on the assumption that a comprehensive definition
of organization is both possible and desirable. But the numerous
conflicting versions testify to the difficulty of framing such a
definition, and also to the hazards of taking any definition of
this type as a statement about what the usage of the word
actually is. This arises because it is often less than clear
whether a definition is an ostensive derivation or a
stipulation. The difference between the two is the way they are
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established. We establish an ostensive definition by saying or
indicating how a word is used; we point out instances of the
term we are defining until the meaning is made clear - when our
audience begins to use the word correctly, for instance. We can
easily define even 'family' words like 'game' in this way, as
well as more scientific concepts like flowers or clouds. The
great virtue of an ostensive definition is that it is not merely
compatible with, but is in fact derived from, the ordinary use of
the word. Its disadvantage is that it is almost impossible to use
such a definition as a basis for analysis. This is because our
defining process relates to the totality of what goes to make up
whatever we are talking about, whilst analysis proceeds by
isolating and exploring facets of this whole.
Stipulative definitions are statements as to how a word or
concept shall be used. They are prescriptive, not arising from
experience, but imposing themselves on reality. The classic
exponent of this type of definition was Lewis Carroll's Humpty
Dumpty, who said "words mean what I want them to mean, no more,
no less". Such a procedure is by no means illogical, especially
when inventing new words. But the disadvantage of stipulating
one's definitions is that no relation has been established
between such a definition and reality. All too commonly this
results in what Flew has called 'The no-true-Scotsman fallacy' -
we define a Scotsman as someone who wears a kilt, and prove from
this that Boswell was no true Scot because he wore trousers. This
is a result of stipulating a definition, and then using it
ostensively (as if it had been derived from a list of all those
people agreed to be Scotsmen).
This begging of questions by using stipulative definitions
as if they were ostensive ones was a fault of many of the classic
social scientists, or their later interpreters. Popper devoted a
large part of his time to castigating both Marx and Freud for the
supposedly totalitarian sin of forcing reality into a stipulated
model, and we shall devote space later to the problems arising
from Weber's influential stipulations. More clearly, Lukes
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castigates Durkheim when his
"very definition of religion as uniting its
adherents into a single moral community
presupposes one of the central theses of the
work, while his hypothesis that collective
effervescences generate religious beliefs and
rites presupposes those very beliefs and
rites, since the effervescences are
expressions of them"
(S.Lukes, 'Durkheim', p.31)
But Lukes also points out his opinion that this vice (of 'petitio
principii') was 'more damaging to the presentation of his ideas
than the value of his explanations'. This brings us to a related
difference between ostensive and stipulative definitions; the
former are either correct or incorrect, whilst the latter are
either useful or useless. We judge their worth differently. For
example, we can define the concept of a religion ostensively, by
listing religions - Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Shinto and so
on - and then saying that what they have in common is what
makes a religion a religion. If our list included
Antidisestablishmentarianism and Cynicism though, it might be
judged to be incorrect by other users of the word 'religion'. Or
conversely, our list may be too narrow rather than too wide. If
we only included Catholicism, Anglicanism, Mormonism,
Presbyterianism, Methodism and Baptists, it might be judged
incorrect because of the implication (which may have been
deliberate) that only varieties of Christianity are religions. A
stipulative definition of religion, on the other hand, might be
that all religions have some statement to make as to Humanity's
place in the universe and our relationship with forces greater
than those of this world. Now this may have been arrived at by a
derivation, after due philosophical reflection, from the list
generated by the ostensive process carried out above, in which
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case its acceptability is empirically determined. But for the
sake of argument, let us regard it as a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Depending on our interests, it may be
either useful or useless.But it cannot be termed either correct
or incorrect as a definition as long as it doesn't pretend to be
anything more than a stipulation. Durkheim, had he presented his
definition as a stipulation, would not have been guilty of
logical error in its use. And that is why it can be said the
damage was one of presentation only.
Clearly, it is important to realize what sort of definitions
we are working with, because that determines the use to which
they can be put. A stipulation is of quite a different nature to
a statement derived from an empirical ostensive list, and the two
must not be confused.
TYPOLOGIES
A common way of getting around these problems is through the
use of a typology (or scheme of classification) of some sort
rather than a strict definition. A typology has the great
advantage that it need not necessarily deal with the entire scope
of a concept, and can therefore be used to tackle the 'family'
type of concept referred to earlier, for which no definition may
be possible. Typologies also combine many of the advantages of
both ostensively deduced propositions and stipulations. They
share with the former the advantage of having direct links to
common usage, and with the latter they share the rather useful
property of being neither correct nor incorrect, neither true nor
false, but only useful or useless. For example, we can easily
construct a typology of games: there are card games, ball games,
board games and so on. A typology of this sort may be only
partial, or incomplete, in which case it can be completed by the
simple expedient of adding a residual category consisting of all
games which are neither card games, ball games or board games. Or
else it may be left incomplete, which may not make it any less
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useful, as long as its limitations are understood clearly. A
typology is simply a tool for analysis.
Incompatible typologies need not necessarily conflict (unlike
incompatible definitions). For instance, we can easily divide
games into competing team games, individual competing games, co¬
operative games and solo games. Whilst this is a completely
different typology to the first one we constructed, being based
on modes of participation rather than kind of equipment, it is
apparent that the two have different uses depending on
circumstances, or the features most of interest to us - if we are
selling games, the first is of more use, whilst the second is
better if we are investigating use of leisure time.
A third advantage of a typology is that it can be made up of
ideal types. In this case, we don't even have to expect that any
of the cases we use to ostensively illustrate our typology exist
in reality at all. The types are one-sided accentuations of
reality, whose aim is to facilitate our understanding of what
does happen by comparing the ideal type with reality - a sort of
platonism stood on its head. (For Plato, reality was an imperfect
reflection of ideal types whilst for modern social theorists,
following Weber, ideal types are an imperfect reflection of
reality.)
Our attention is focused on the theoretical dimension used
to construct the type. A good example would be the division of
political systems into democracies, dictatorships, totalitarian
states, and so on. The perfect democracy never has existed - both
the ancient Greeks and Thomas Jefferson owned slaves - but we
recognize the usefulness of the ideal-typical concept of a
democracy without a qualm. But as with all typologies, this one
is either useful or not. It is always possible that there is some
dimension of reality which a typology of any kind does not
properly bring out. We can then try and construct an alternative
to supplement or replace our existing tools.
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ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
The reason why we've been discussing these issues of
typologies and of different kinds of definitions and their
limitations is because they are basic to an understanding of the
scope of what we will try and do. We'll be talking about
organizations, but with the intention of bringing out some
aspects of organization which are not within the scope of any
organization theory in wide use. The intention is to develop a
framework which is capable of giving previously unexplored
aspects of organization the primacy they need, in order to be
able to successfully analyze organizations presently relegated to
the 'residual' category we discussed earlier. Such a theoretical
framework will have its limitations, and cannot pretend to
encompass every possible issue in an equally fruitful way. So
when we generalize about organization, we shall take it as read
that any such generalization is likely to be useful in some
circumstances and not in others. In the rest of this thesis, the
qualifications we have just made regarding all such frameworks
and typologies will not be repeated. One, because it would be
boring; and two, because purely stylistically, it does no good at
all to be continually pointing out deficiencies or inadequacies.
The framework being developed applies to a particular form
of organization, though it might well be useful in understanding
aspects of any. The word 'form' is used deliberately here,
because the common alternative to it, 'type' is too vague in its
uses. As we have seen, a typology can be constructed about almost
any criterion - there are typologies of organization based on
types of authority (Weber), types of coercion (Etzioni), types of
beneficiary (Blau and Scott), types of input (Vickers), types of
function (Katz and Kahn) and so on. One of the consequences of
using types is that the criterion used as a differentiator within
one can so easily be taken as a fundamental characteristic of
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organization generally, especially when presented in an imposing
manner with a suggested definition attached. Many organizations
may on some classifications be of different types, whereas they
may appear as the same type on others. Let us apply this
consideration to organizational form.
For instance, the British Army and the Salvation Army may
well appear to be different types of organization - one is an
organ of the State, the other is not, one is spiritual (but
teetotal) and the other is not (twice!). On other typologies,
they may appear of the same type - both are non-profit making
organizations, for example. Yet none of these criteria say
anything about the form of the organization - about the
relationship between the individual parts - in this case, the
persons involved. Though I've never been a member of either of
them, the form appears to be the same: indeed, the Salvation Army
was modelled on the British Army, so this is not entirely
unexpected. The distinction between form and content is a fairly
old one, but hasn't been properly applied to organizations
before. The form of an organization is nothing to do with the
products, inputs, or other contents of an organization, but is
about the relationship between the parts that make up the whole.
The reason why form is fundamental to an organization is because,
unlike any other criterion, it is about the way it is organized.
To use an obvious analogy, the form of two buildings may be
identical, whilst the uses to which they are put, the colour,
age, methods of construction and condition might all be
different. Simmel wrote that:
"Any social phenomenon or process is composed
of two elements, which in reality are
inseparable; on the one hand, an interest, a
purpose or a motive; on the other, a form or
mode of interaction among individuals through
which, or in the shape of which, that content
attains reality."
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("The Problem of Sociology" in Simmel's "On
Individuality and Social Forms", ed. Levine,
p.24)
It all depends on what you are interested in really: but if you
are interested in the organization of Organizations, you have to
look at the form. Some people might be happier with the word
'structure' in this context rather than 'form' - the two perhaps
are interchangeable. (Mathematicians might prefer to talk about
'organizational topology', which is in many ways more exact.)
One thing which must be made clear is that this notion of
form is in no way related to the idea of a 'formal organization'.
This is usually taken to be the prescribed (legally)
relationships of power, authority and discipline, promotional
procedures, hiring, firing and so on - a formal organization is
one with such binding discernible forms built in. Informal
organization is usually taken to be the unprescribed and
unanticipated patterns and networks which emerge between people
in a formal organization. Neither is formless though; the
distinction between form and content is separate from that
between formal and informal. To be philosophical for a while, the
formal/informal distinction is not one which matters to an
organization qua organization. The relationships the distinction
is concerned with are peripheral to its nature in a logical
rather than a practical sense. Whereas the relationships which go
to make up the form are of the essence of the organization. They
are the skeleton on which the people, their rules, habits and
relationships are hung. Not that the form can exist independently
of people (except in an abstract sense) since they must
internalize it as the basis of their behaviour for it to exist.
The form of an organization is the relationships between people
not as individuals, but as members, and their relationship with
what they see as the collectivity comprising their organization.
(It's worth noting that in an organization with formal and
informal relationships, it is perfectly possible for the form of
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those different aspects to be different also. The child who comes
bottom of the class may be the informal leader of the classroom).
To continue this point, it is obvious that in the initial
stages at least (that is, reading the preceding paragraph once
only) reference to different forms rather than types doesn't
necessarily make understanding any easier. There is no reason to
expect the same form to appear in everything an organization
does. Forms are not static. School prefects don't mark exams, and
an army in the field is very different to one in the barracks at
peace. Whether or not this indicates change in organizational
form is something which can only be determined by subsequent
analysis. The form of an organization can change as easily as (or
at least with no more difficulty than) its content; but the form
is about the way it is organized, not what it does or even why.
The form-content distinction which is being developed here
is clearly related to many others. The ancient Greek form-
substance springs to mind, but there are also clear affinities
with Chomsky's competence-performance distinction in linguistics,
which may well run deeper than is apparent. Gregory Bateson's
context-content one also is strikingly similiar.
"Message material, or information, comes out
of a content into a context Here the
focus is on the internal state ... as a
context into which the information must be
received."
(From the Comment on Part III of 'Steps to an
Ecology of Mind', p.370)
The information we can accumulate about an organization's work,
as welt as the information it may itself work with, is mediated
by the form the organization has, the way the individuals are
organized. Clearly, a form isn't the same as a type, though a
taxonomy of forms is certainly possible. There has been
surprisingly little attention paid to the distinction. Weber's
16
pioneering classification of organization (at the beginning of
'Wirtschaft und GeselIschaft') was one of forms, but even he
never made the distinction very explicit. Indeed, the very
possibility of more than one organizational form is often denied
- an organization is assumed to be a pyramid, of hierarchical
form. As the ubiquitous Humpty Dumpty said: "The question is who
is to be master, that's all". Herbst tells how, when giving a
talk on alternatives to hierarchies, "one of the queries raised
was 'surely, what you mean are flat hierarchies'". Perhaps this
blindness is caused because current political fashions are
closely related to both the state of mind in which we approach
such questions, and, particularly, to any current paradigms
within social science. If we discuss alternative ways of
organizing, the possibility of there being alternative ways of
organizing a society is an application which threatens, by
definition, all vested interests and establishment values. Most
of the works which have been about organizational forms neither
recognize what they are about nor develop the wider political
content - Burns and Stalker's otherwise excellent 'Management of
Innovation' is a good example of this. Conversely, Lewin's famous
work on organizational forms in boys' clubs does develop this
connection with politics, but only because it was seen by both
Lewin (a refugee from totalitarianism himself) and his public
(with their own political preoccupations of a similiar nature) as
proving what a Good Thing Democracy Is (because we now have
experimental proof that it works best!) There are some people who
have tried to develop this in the reverse direction, and say
things about organizational form starting from a wider
social and political perspective (for instance, Geoffrey Vickers'
"Freedom in a Rocking Boat", Donald Schon's "Beyond the Stable
State" and Gordon Rattray Taylor's "Rethink", to name but a few).
However, such attempts haven't succeeded in developing a
framework suitable for discussing organizational forms; indeed,




This brings us back to the language problems with which we
started. Had we tried at the very beginning to discuss voluntary
organizations, almost anyone would have thought they knew what
was meant. But having seen the hurdles which are in the way of
using ordinary language concepts, we are now in a position to
take them one by one. Clearly, the term 'voluntary organization'
is part of an implicit classification scheme for organizations,
and as such is either useful or not. But its meaning is fuzzy and
imprecise; it is used in at least two acknowledged ways, and a
third is implied often enough to engender even more confusion.
Our attention is therefore not directed to one main feature of
the organization under discussion, and various conjuring tricks
(which are conscious) or confusions (which are not) can easily
manifest themselves.
One of the two major ways in which the term 'voluntary' is
taken is in opposition to 'statutory'; a voluntary organization
in this sense is one which has neither been set up by government
statute, nor is directly responsible to any organization or
institution which has been so set up. Statutory organizations are
a part of government, and are (in theory at least) accountable to
the general public through their elected representatives. In this
sense, statutory is often used in conjunction with 'authority'
whilst voluntary is not.
The second main way in which the term 'voluntary' is used is
in opposition to 'paid'; a voluntary organization in this sense
is volunteer-based. Often nowadays there are voluntary (unpaid)
workers in the statutory sector, but this would not blur the
distinction. A voluntary organization in this sense would have to
consist almost entirely of people who were unpaid, not employees,
and not doing their work for a living. This is quite clearly a
different usage of the term even though some groups may qualify
under both headings. We ought to note here that both these senses
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of voluntary deal with content rather than form.
There is a third sense of the word 'voluntary' which is
implied in the senses discussed above, and which does relate to
the form of an organization. In the Wolfenden Report on 'The
Future of Voluntary Organizations' (which is mostly concerned
with the statutory-voluntary opposition) reference is made to the
ability of voluntary organizations to
"share much of the spontaneity and flexibility
of informal relationships, attract the support
and loyalty of the groups affected and react
quickly to changes in demand."
There's a formal distinction being touched on here (i.e. one of
form). The implication is clearly that there is some difference
in the way the groups are organized, but no attempt is made to
say precisely what it might be. One may frequently find other
commentators, each week in New Society for instance, making
references to the 'voluntary nature' of an organization. It is
with this often implicit, less articulated sense of voluntary
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that we are concerned. The distinction to be drawn is between a
voluntary and a compulsory organization. In a voluntary
organization of this third kind, people do things because they
want to, or choose to; whereas in a compulsory organization they
do things because they have been told to by someone else.
"It seems that I and everybody else around me
exist only to follow commands. The other day I
had a shocking experience. In a conversation I
had with one of the office workers, neither of
us could remember the last time we did
anything that was genuinely voluntary
Our society is divided into order takers and
order givers."
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(Kirke Comstocke, 'Letter from the Mayor', in
'Reinventing Anarchy' ed. Ehrlich et al.)
Voluntary organizations are systems of free choice, perceived
need - systems of expressive rationality. Compulsory
organizations are systems of duty, coercion and authority -
systems of instrumental rationality. Or to put things in a
simpler way, the key question in a voluntary organization is why
people agree, and the key question in a compulsory organization
is why people obey. The very stuff of which organizations are
made is different in each. The relationships between members and
between individuals and the group are qualitatively different in
each case, so this third distinction is one of form. There is no
obvious reason why a statutory organization should differ
qualitatively from a non-statutory one, and whilst pay is
undoubtedly a major incentive for much work, it is conceivable
that an organization could drop the link between money and work
and still keep the same form. However, the form of a compulsory
organization must (and this is a stipulative definition) enable
orders to be given and taken, responsibilities to be formulated
and assigned, and sanctions to be held in reserve to keep
everything in equilibrium. Contrariwise (as Tweedledee would put
it) a voluntary organization must be built around the ability of
people to make and take their own decisions, perceive and accept
their own responsibilities. The quality of relationships - and
their context - is different. We have a difference of form.
The difference of form is somewhat complicated by the fact
that most of the best examples of voluntary organizational form
are voluntary in all the other senses too. We could mention
playgroups, weightwatchers, women's groups of various kinds (rape
counselling, consciousness-raising, battered women's aid),
housing co-operatives, tenants associations, claimants unions:
all are non-statutory and mostly unpaid. In fact, much of the
usefulness of concentrating on the voluntary form arise from its
ability to analyse the tensions arising in such a form of
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organization when it also has statutory connections and paid
employees. A further complication lies in the fact that most
people associate such voluntary organizations with human social
services: and, as a matter of fact, that is where they are most
concentrated. There is a reason for this. It is due to the fact
that whatever their other merits may be, voluntary organizations
seem to be less efficient at generating profits. This is a
phenomenon which is easily enough explained by anyone with a
nodding acquaintance with Marxist analysis - since surplus labour
value has historically been the major source of profit, any
organization in which people work voluntarily will have less
surplus labour value because we would not expect people to agree
to their own exploitation. In any event, this disadvantage at
generating profit makes voluntary organizations less competitive
with other organizational forms in capitalist economies, so they
are relatively more abundant in the social service sector as it
is furthest removed from commercial considerations such as profit
margins, cost-benefit analyses and so on. So if a reader supposed
that this thesis was about voluntary social services, they might
not necessarily be disappointed; but this need not have been the
case. The fact that that is the sector with the densest
concentration of voluntary organizations doesn't necessarily
imply that they cannot, in principle, thrive anywhere else, and
equally doesn't imply that voluntary organizational form has
anything but a contingent link with social services.
ORGANIZATIONS AND MORALS
There is a further reason why social service organizations
are the most suitable areas for an analysis of voluntary forms of
organization. This is because health, education, welfare, housing
and all the other areas of social provision are more often the
subject of the kinds of moral judgements and ethical
considerations which more commercially productive activity is
generally immune from. Moral philosophy is an area of much debate
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even (or especially) among philosophers: but one thing which most
people agree on is that right or wrong actions, and assigning
praise or blame, is very closely linked to the free will of the
actor. There is an extensive philosophical literature on the
concept of action and intentionality related to this. When
Oedipus killed his father and married his mother, he didn't
actually know what he was doing, and though views on the murder
may have changed, he would probably not be convicted by a modern
jury of incest. When someone in Wilkie Collins' book 'The
Moonstone' stole the aforementioned gem whilst sleepwalking under
a medicinal overdose of laudanum, no culpability attached to the
theft because he wasn't conscious of what he was doing.
Similiarly, Lt. Calley of the United States Army was only
convicted of the massacre at My Lai in Vietnam because he was an
officer. Had he been able to show that he had only been obeying
orders rather than actually bearing the responsibility for giving
them himself, he might well (however inappropriately) have been
acquitted. In other words, an action is only good or bad if the
person performing it could have acted otherwise.
Even though we've observed that social services are often
the subject of moral judgements - about Tightness and wrongness -
(going to visit old age pensioners is usually considered to be
a good and worthy thing to do) it is clear that there is nothing
especially holy about it if the person doing the visiting is a
social worker with such a person on their caseload. This is
because they are doing their job, under orders from their
organizational superior, and haven't any choice in the matter.
They could not have acted otherwise, in their organizational
capacity - possibly they can't stand old age pensioners and given
a choice would much rather visit approved schools instead.
Perhaps becoming a social worker in the first place, or
continuing to be one under atrocious conditions and low pay, is a
good action: but there is nonetheless a paradox here. The sorts
of action we attribute worth to are carried out in compulsory
organizations, which precludes the attribution of moral standards
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to individual actions to the extent that they are in line with
the call of duty (though we reserve the right to judge when that
duty is exceeded, and, as mentioned before, can judge the
acceptance or continuation of a duty when a person has a right to
terminate it) . Society often congratulates itself for
appointing people to do the job in the first place. After all, we
didn't use to have social service departments.
Voluntary organizations, by definition, do not de-moralize
such work, since their essence is the individual choice of, and
responsibility for, actions. Compulsory organizations do not
allow for this: they are essentially about individuals fulfilling
pre-ordained roles the content of which they are not responsible
for. Employees do not as a rule write their own job
specifications. It has even been put forward as a definition of
organization that it is
"a social unit where individuals ....
legitimate their co-operative activities
primarily by reference to impersonal goals
rather than moral standards."
(Martin Albrow 'The Study of Organizations -
Objectivity or Bias ?' in the Penguin Social
Science Survey 1968, ed. Gould, p.162)
Employees of compulsory organizations surrender their ability to
act morally; unless, as employees, they break rules or bend them.
In such cases they aren't acting as members of their
organization, and would probably be disowned if found out. They
can regain their independence only by acting outside the
organization. (This view is extreme: but see below for the ideal-
typical nature of compulsory and voluntary as applied to
organizations).
Studying voluntary organizations can therefore bring out
more clearly the differences between it and the compulsory form,
because the organization is a pooling of individual free wills,
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with choices at all times open to its members. They may not
always make decisions on moral grounds, but since they are
individually responsible such actions could be morally evaluated.
Clearly, voluntary organizations do have rules in many cases: but
our analysis of the form is only just beginning. The differences
the rules make can only be worked out when we know our area
better, and would in any case be difficult to generalize about.
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AS A HEURISTIC PARADIGM
For now, it is clear that we are working with an ideal form - an
ideal-typical construction used to accentuate the aspects of the
organization we are most interested in. (See Weber's discussion
of ideal types in 'The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization', or any of the commentaries thereon for background
on ideal types). This brings us back directly to what
organizational form precisely is. Whilst we've mentioned already
that definitions of organizations are risky to attempt, a
necessary condition (as one can see from any list) would seem to
be that organization is co-ordinated activity by human beings.
Clearly, this is by no means a sufficient condition; it includes
two people dancing, playing chess or making love as well as
comprising the workforce of British Rail. But it does provide us
with a starting point of analysis, and it is probably best to
leave any further conditions to common sense. Focussing on
organization as one type of co-ordinated human activity, we can
begin an analysis by identifying the method or methods of co¬
ordination. Now we don't need a full typology of forms - playing
the typology game to its limit would be a red herring as we are
only interested in one type of organization - or rather, one
form. But for the sake of clarity, we can identify two polar
methods of co-ordination. They are imperative co-ordination, and
voluntary co-ordination. The former is ultimately rooted in
coercion, and the latter in agreement. It is the second type of
co-ordination in which we are interested.
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The first form of co-ordination has in any case been
analysed in detail, beginning with Max Weber, who used the term
'Herrschaft', variously translated as imperative control or as
authority. Weber categorized organizations on the basis of the
kind of legitimation used for this imperative co-ordination, and
his tripartite division into traditional, charismatic and
rational-legal kinds of authority is both well-known and
influential. All organizations covered by this type of analysis
ought to be of the same form, being compulsory organizations
needing legitimation of their compulsion. Our problem here is
that the very language we use and the way we think about
organizational sociology is biased in the direction of this form,
and is not only inadequate in discussing organizations of a
voluntary form, but is also downright misleading, as authority
isn't a central issue for them.
The need to be aware of the inadequacies of ordinary
language, with which we opened, also extends itself to the
inadequacies of sociological language as far as this is
concerned. In order to minimize this problem - that traditional
organization theory assuming authority and based on content is
inapplicable - we can amend our own usage by bringing in some
general categories. The category of organization with imperative
co-ordination is a hierarchy (someone must exert the authority
over others) and the category of organization with voluntary co¬
ordination we shall call a mutual-aid group. General categories
are blunt instruments, and aren't at all exact, and tend to be
inaccurate in hard cases. What we mean by them is simply and
crudely this. All organizations are put into one of two baskets;
one is labelled 'HIERARCHY' and the other one bears the legend
'MUTUAL-AID GROUP'. Any organization can be put into any basket;
all the ones where we are mostly interested in the control,
discipline, aims and goals are assigned to the hierarchy basket,
and will be analysed as if they were based on imperative co¬
ordination, using the whole battery of tools developed by classic
organizational and management theorists. Someone else - not me -
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can have that basket. The ones where we are most interested in
the agreements between the individuals and how they go to make up
an organizational whole will be put in the mutual-aid basket, and
analysed as if they were based on voluntary co-ordination, using
tools which can only be developed with an adequate theory of
mutual-aid groups. We hope to develop that later on.
An analogy will make this clearer. The medical profession
deals with (mostly) pathological states of the human organism in
a roughly similar fashion. Doctors have their two baskets,
labelled 'diseases' and 'conditions', the former being caused by
agents (bacteria, viruses) and the Latter by injury or infirmity
or nothing in particular (they don't know). Contrast measles and
broken bones if this is unclear. There are some phenomena about
which doctors know very little, like multiple sclerosis, eczema
or cancer. Whether these are diseases - have causal agents
susceptible to elimination - is unclear. Some medical research is
carried out on the assumption that cancer, for example, is caused
by something - cancer is assigned to the 'disease' basket. Other
researchers assign it to the 'condition' basket and proceed along
different lines. The treatment of these things by doctors in our
example is analogous to our treatment of organizations, which can
be treated either as hierarchies or as mutual-aid groups. And
just as western medicine is more developed in one direction - it
deals almost exclusively in the pathological model - organization
theory is too. The assumption that there is a disease is easier
for most doctors to work with. Indeed, the criticism of some
remedy which doesn't look for a causal agent as treating
symptoms, not causes, has passed from medicine to many other
disciplines. It may be valid in some cases, but it is quite
possible that the person being criticized is working with a
different conception of the form of the problem, in which there
are no treatable causes, only symptoms.
Our notion of an organizational form thus assumes the status
of a heuristic paradigm rather than a theory or typology. We can
only justify it by comparing the insights it gives us with those
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afforded by alternative paradigms. Unlike Chomskyan linguistics,
we cannot look at an organization as if it were a sentence and
discern beneath all the garbage what its form really and truly
is. I leave it to others to generate a generative grammar of
human organization. In talking about mutual-aid groups as a
distinct organizational form, the intention is that there should
be a clear disjunction of meaning and theory behind the words we
use.
For any organization, there will be some parts which are
better understood if the organization is looked at in
hierarchical terms: this applies in some respects to voluntary
organizations, and in those respects our concentration on one
kind of analysis only is bound to appear deficient. But equally,
in any organization there will be some aspects which are better
understood by viewing them (as far as those aspects are
concerned) as voluntary organization - and this applies to the
most authoritarian organizations too. Most organizations
inevitably will partake of both natures. If this sounds
schizophrenic, it only reflects reality. Historically, the
voluntary aspects of organizations have been dubbed 'informal'
organization, and can easily be seen as an irritant which stops
the 'real1 parts of the organization from functioning. Far from
being an irritant, they represent those voluntary aspects of the
organization which are not easily subsumed in a managerial model.
So when we consider our own experiences of organizations, the
parts that don't fit neatly into one analytic form do not
invalidate it: they merely are best looked at under a different
one.
MUTUAL AID AND MUTUAL BENEFIT GROUPS
Thus the disjunction, though clear in theory, is a matter of
perspective in practice. Again we find that words we wish to
reserve for our own use have been partially pre-empted by social
scientists in a different context. The term 'mutual-benefit'
27
group has already achieved a certain popularity through the work
of Blau and Scott. This use of the term is as part of a typology
based on the criteria 'cui bono', who benefits. Four categories
of beneficiary are identified: owners, as in business concerns;
clients, in service organizations; the public, in commonweal
organizations; and members in mutual benefit groups. The
criticism has been made by others that it is often an open
question as to who precisely the prime beneficiaries of an
organization are, but our concerns are different. The typology is
clearly one of content rather than of form, and the categories in
it can be of either of our forms. A business concern is of
voluntary form when it is a workers' co-operative, as are many
commonweal organizations such as lifeboat services. And mutual
benefit groups in Blau and Scott's sense are by no means always
mutual-aid groups in ours. The prime beneficiaries of a trade
union are supposedly the members, but a trade union not only has
a clear hierarchy and system of disciplinary sanctions, but is
also not necessarily joined as an act of will by individuals
(which is not meant to be a political criticism of the closed
shop, but merely an observation relating to the organizational
form). Service organizations are a more difficult category, for
insofar as they involve professionals and clients, they are
intrinsically hierarchical. To run a service organization as a
mutual-aid group involves radically altering the idea of what a
profession is on all sides - women's self-health clinics are a
good example of all this entails. As Illich has pointed out, in
their present form, professions are intrinsically disabling.
Authority and authoritativeness become easily and disastrously
mixed up.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Our disjunction between hierarchical and mutual-aid groups
is thus not equivalent to a typology of content, whether it
appears to involve the same terms or not. Further, it is not
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empirically derived, but theoretical - we have two perspectives
rather than two types (though we shall be using them as if they
were types). This may seem to be just an exercise in hedging
bets, but in reality we are steering a narrow course between
various obstacles. We do have something new to discuss but it
isn't universal in its relevance. We don't want to invent totally
new words, but at the same time we don't want to fight
misconceptions as to prior use of our terms in different contexts
with different meanings. And while we are making a distinction of
sorts, it can't be applied everywhere. Our form is like listening
to a short-wave radio with a bad aerial - the station comes
through but with low selectivity, so you have to concentrate to
pick out the station you want and filter out the noise. The other
stations are still there, but unless you ignore them, you cannot
understand anything at all.
To repeat: look at the way something is organized to find
out its organizational form, look at the way people co-ordinate
their activities. If this is achieved by voluntary agreement,
analyse it as a mutual-aid group; if it is achieved by people
obeying instructions, analyse it as a hierarchy.
The discussion of voluntary and compulsory forms in this
introductory chapter is genuinely introductory: the area is
essential enough to what follows to warrant the fullest
treatment, but by the same token it is also an area we will take
for granted in future. The concept of organizational form is one
we will henceforth use - and ideally, if this chapter has done





RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RESEARCH AND VALUES
Research can often be divided into two types; descriptive
research, which is factually oriented; and evaluative, or value
based research. Descriptive research is supposedly concerned
merely with describing reality, whilst evaluative research is
also concerned with judging what is good or bad about reality,
what works and what does not. A census is as good an example of
descriptive research as any; it consists of simple head counts,
and is thus purely descriptive. Examples of evaluative research
are to be found in criminology. To investigate the causes of
juvenile delinquency, for example, will inevitably assume that it
is a Bad Thing, and in practice, one tends to look for causes and
explanations not simply for their descriptive value, but because
they facilitate intervention. Once the causes of crime are known,
crime can be abolished. Descriptive research is considered to be
objective in its entirety, whilst evaluative research has
definite subjective elements built in.
This distinction is crude, and in the form that has just
been sketched is probably not held by many people today, if
indeed it ever was. The accepted view is that all research, and
indeed all social science, is bound to incorporate subjective
elements for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously, the
model of descriptive research outlined above is nonsensical. In
order to describe anything, one must decide what to describe, and
this entails a choice. Pure descriptive research without such a
choice is impossible to envisage, and a choice is a subjective
element. Descriptive research is thus not pure and simple
description. It is an impossibility. To describe the way people
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might be fraudulently claiming social security benefits, for
instance, is not entirely a value-free project. Even granted that
someone might do it truthfully, and with no bias, the political
and social implications of the research are significant enough
for most people to speculate about the motivations of the
researchers involved. Why, some might ask, did the researcher not
include any figures on unclaimed benefits as well? In the same
way, a newspaper might be factually correct in all its reports,
but by its selection of which facts to report, it may (and
usually does) attempt to induce certain political views in its
readers. The full coverage of the atrocities of only one side in
a war would inevitably induce an innocent and otherwise
uninformed reader to assume that the other side was entirely
innocent of any such misdeeds (especially when the other side is
British). And the full frontal coverage of female bodies, in the
absence of any other competitive reporting, induces readers
to regard women as sex objects and nothing else. And the examples
of biased research and reporting I have decided to include here
no doubt contain their own bias too.
Going back to our census after that brief digression into
journalism, the hypothetical descriptive researcher behind it may
well ask people what colour their skin is, but avoid asking them
what colour their eyes are. Whilst it is a matter of fact that
skin colour happens to be vastly more important than eye colour
in the world today, the point is that this global importance is
what has been used in deciding which parts of the human body
carry socially significant pigmentation, and subjective cultural
notions about skin colour find their way even into this
descriptive survey. The first question to be asked about any
researcher establishing, or reporting, facts is: why these facts
and not others; why do you think this is important; why did you
decide to do this, in this way; in short, we must ask what values
motivate them.
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Another way in which values enter into social science is in
the language used to discuss the research and frame its
categories. For example, the criminologist might choose to talk
about 'convicts' or 'criminals' rather than simply about people
in prison. It is clear that the emotive content of the former is
far greater than that of the latter - both convict and criminal
carry subjective meanings, associations with guilt and innocence,
good and evil. The fashionable word to use nowadays is
'offender', which I suppose is used to avoid emotive reactions.
Many of the words we use to describe reality also incorporate a
view of it, and an evaluation of worth, and not all of them are
adjectives. Sometimes we do this deliberately and sometimes
unconsciously. But this added content is always going to be
there. There are thus at least two ways in which values intrude
into even the most impeccably descriptive piece of research, and
into the peccable kind as well. None of it is immune.
Additionally, much descriptive research does try and suggest
various causal chains, as well as simply describing what occurs,
and in such cases there is a clear subjective element.
Speculation is valuable, but has to be biased.
Evaluative research is sometimes quite open about the values
which necessarily motivate it; this is an area of historic
concern in sociology, and social scientists are brought up with
problems of value-freedom from an early stage in their education.
But the recommended Weberian solution of acknowledging and
admitting the values involved is not always done, especially when
they are taken for granted as the audience is expected to share
them. For instance, John Bowlby's famous study of forty thieves
assumes that the reader shares the same reverence for private
property, and the abhorrence of stealing he does: the conclusion
that the maternal deprivation which his cases shared is harmful
(notice the emotive content 'deprivation') rests on the unstated
value as much as on any fact. Bowlby simply assumes that stealing
is wrong. A society which lived by pilferage would probably
decide that maternal deprivation was as conducive to the
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maintenance of its own social order as it seems detrimental to
ours.
A more complicated case brings out more aspects of this
phenomenon. Imagine a researcher investigating whether probation
was an effective sentence - whether or not it made people more or
less likely to reoffend and come before the courts again. Within
these limits, someone might well claim to have established
certain facts, for example that 60% of all people put on
probation were arrested again within two years, whereas only 40%
of those given light custodial sentences were rearrested within
two years of release. The conclusion that prison was more
effective than probation would then be presented as a proven
fact. Assuming most people were satisfied as to the controls on
type of offences, people, courts and so on, the conclusions would
be accepted, and lobbying would probably begin for more custodial
sentences. But the researchers may have been so biased in favour
of the assumption that some sort of punitive measure be given
that they failed to uncover the fact that only 20% of a similar
group given discharges reoffended! This fact would, were it
known, lead to a whole new set of conclusions. And even the
researcher may be unaware of this undiscovered fact,and the bias
towards punishment of some kind in the work being done. We must
assume that even in overtly evaluative social research, covert
values remain undisclosed.
The conclusion that all social science research (as well as
social aspects of physical and biological science) is
ineradicably evaluative is neither new nor controversial. Yet
value free social science is still held by many people to be a
desirable end, even though values and motivations are subjective
elements necessary to begin anything at all. Furthermore, unless
values are attached to the end product, nobody would begin any
enterprise of any kind. If something is not worth doing, it isn't
worth doing well. At the same time, of course, communication,
which is the ultimate goal in any public endeavour, does imply
objective (or at least agreed) standards or parameters, means and
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methods. For this reason, Weber's well tried and generally
accepted solution to the problem - the statement of my own
motives and values - is going to be adopted here, as the least
confusing course of action.
A DECLARATION OF VALUES: WHAT WE MEAN BY ANARCHY
Normally, of course, it is considered neither necessary nor
desirable for anyone to feel they have to indulge in
methodological arguments such as the ones above in presenting
either theory or empirical evidence. The reason why I've done so
is to ensure that these old issues and basic questions concerning
the relationships between research, practice, facts and values
are going to be in the forefront of the reader's mind, and that
the essential tolerance demanded in the need to reach the
Weberian compromise will be extended here.
Most research in the social sciences, and in social
administration in particular, is firmly based in the values and
political ideologies current in the Welfare State. These are well
enough understood for people to say that they are social
democrats, fabians, marxists, socialists, liberals or even
monetarists, and they will be understood and accepted - with
reservations perhaps, but accepted nonetheless. The same cannot
be said of Anarchism. (Shock! Horror! Bombs! Riots! Sabotage!
Death, Destruction and Chaos! Rape, Pillage and Burn! The End Of
Civilization As We Know It!) Anarchism is mostly feared and
seldom understood, is used as a synonym for chaos and the absence
of any order, and the admission of a belief in Anarchism is still
considered to be evidence of guilt in political trials even
today. Hopefully, the preceding discussion should have been a
preparation for the acceptance of what is to follow, rather than
a rejection on the flimsy grounds of unorthodoxy - it would,
after all, be most unfair to agree that I ought to state my
values and then reject them out of hand.
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There is no point in spending pages on a dissertation about
anarchist theory and practice, because the basic elements are
easy to state and to comprehend. Anarchism is not chaos or
terrorism. Its central thesis is that social life is both
possible and desirable without centralized and coercive
authority, and that in practice all centralized and coercive
systems, especially states, serve only to maintain inequality,
war, violence, misery, suffering and oppression, and the human
race would be better off without them. They can be replaced with
some form of ordered but decentralized and voluntary
individually-based communal co-operation. This will come about
not through violent revolution, since that creates its own rigid
counter-revolution, but through eventual popular understanding of
and increased practise at anarchist living. Anarchism is not
coercive (many if not all anarchists profess some sort of
pacifism for the reason that violence is coercive) and holds that
people free of coercive authority would not be nasty, brutish and
short but would act in general harmony. Anarchists do not reject
all and any organization, only certain forms of organization.
There is no clear blueprint for an anarchist society, since each
person or group of people would be free to combine with others to
live as they chose. It is conceivable that an otherwise anarchist
world might contain an enclave of diehard monetarists dedicated
to borrowing from each other at high interest rates in order to
keep down their internal inflation rate. Many anarchists have
speculated and experimented and there is a general consensus
among them that an anarchist society would consist of federations
and autonomous groups, linked in interlocking networks of
voluntary association and mutual aid. There is a fairly
substantial literature on the sort of social system anarchists
would like to live in, as well as literature on what they dislike
about most existing societies.
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THE PLACE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND ORGANIZATION IN ANARCHISM
This emphasis on voluntary association is central, in
precisely those words, in the writings of virtually all the
classic anarchist thinkers. Tolstoy asked -
"Why think that non-official people could not
arrange their life for themselves, as well as
government people can arrange it, not for
themselves but for others?"
and he went on to answer his own question -
"We see on the contrary that in the most
diverse matters people arrange their lives
incomparably better than those who govern
arrange things for them."
(From 'The slavery of our times', Tolstoy,
rep. in 'The Anarchist Reader', ed. Woodcock,
p.306)
And Kropotkin wrote in his article on 'Anarchism' for the
eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica,
"In a society developed along these
(anarchist) lines, the voluntary associations
which already now begin to cover all the
fields of human activity would take a still
greater extension so as to substitute
themselves for the state in all its
functions".
(Reprinted in 'The Essential Kropotkin', ed.
Capouya and Tompkins, p.108)
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And point six of Malatesta's 'An Anarchist Programme' speaks of
the
"Organization of social life by means of free
association .... created and modified to the
wishes of their members to which
everybody, convinced by a feeling of
overriding necessity, voluntarily submits."
(Reprinted in 'Malatesta: Life and Ideas',
ed. Ri chards, p.1 84)
The same emphasis is apparent in contemporary anarchist writers.
For example, Colin Ward writes that
"The very growth of the state and its
bureaucracy, the giant corporation and its
privileged hierarchy are also giving
rise to parallel organizations, counter
organizations, alternative organizations which
exemplify the anarchist method".
(from 'Anarchy in Action',by C. Ward, p.137)
And Kirke Comstocke, the ex-Mayor of Palo Alto, California who
(as we related earlier) couldn't remember the last time he did
anything truly voluntary, concluded in his cri-de-coeur
"It is only as free individuals that we can
come together in voluntary association
and thus create a genuine community of social
individuals."
(in Ehrlich, op.cit p.368)
The voluntarist theme occurs over and over again in anarchist
literature. It should be obvious by now what the inspiration of
this research is. The reason for looking at mutual-aid groups, at
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voluntary forms of organization, is because of the central place
they occupy in anarchist theory. The principles of voluntary
organization and their opposition to hierarchical ways of
organizing is similarly a crucial concept. We must remember,
with the Quaker activist George Lakey, that the way of
organization is as important, if not more important, than simple
independence from the state.
"Service associations, veterans' groups,
churches, unions - these and other
organizations are part of the social fabric
that supports the status quo in most oppressive
systems."
(Lakey, 'Strategy for a Living Revolution',
p.80)
The possibility of an anarchist society, and the coherence of
anarchism as political theory, depends almost entirely on the
assumption that people can voluntarily associate and organize for
their own mutual benefit. Malatesta even goes so far as to
announce that -
"were we to believe that organization was not
possible without authority, we would be
authoritarians, because we would still prefer
authority, which fetters and impoverishes
life, to disorganization, which makes life
impossible"
(from Richards op.cit. p.270)
Malatesta defined anarchy as 'society organized without
authority' in the same passage. So, contrary to the popular image
of anarchists as being opposed to any and every organization, we
can see that anarchism is actually dependent on a particular view
of what kind of organization is desirable.
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The insistence on the possibility of organization without
coercive and centralized authority is possibly the most central
and crucial argument that anarchism makes. In this sense, anarchy
as a political and social philosophy is clearly distinguishable
from the vulgar use of the word as a synonym for disorganization
and chaos so beloved of leader writers for the press. But
although much of the opposition to anarchism stems from this
failure to appreciate what it means to anarchists themselves,
this isn't true of every critic. Many who have taken the time and
the trouble to understand the philosophy of anarchism have based
their rejection of it on the assertion that it wouldn't work, is
totally impractical, and Kropotkin was an incurable and
unrealistic optimist like every other person who believes in the
possibilities of anarchism. George Bernard Shaw wrote an article
entitled 'The Impossibilities of Anarchism' along these lines.
Whatever view one takes, the nexus of the argument is clearly the
word 'possible' - which is to say, the question should rightfully
be regarded as an empirical one. Our subject matter thus becomes
of vital importance.
If it can be demonstrated that mutual-aid groups and
voluntary organizations on anarchist lines do, as a matter of
fact, exist, then the possibility of an anarchist society must be
given serious consideration. On the other hand, even if we cannot
find any, this doesn't prove that anarchism is impossible: we may
have been looking in the wrong places, or not looking hard
enough, or our conceptual categories may be so unused to dealing
with an anarchist organization that we might not be able (or
might refuse) to recognize it if we fell over it. The logic is
that of a political anthropology. To prove the possibility of a
different form of social organization, it is necessary to find
just one case in which it works - only one, that would be enough.
Sizes of samples, statistical breakdowns of data and all the
paraphernalia of quantitative sociology are irrelevant and
unnecessary in this context, for we are dealing with a
qualitative, existential question - one of ontology, of existence
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or nonexistence. On one level then, we address ourselves to this
problem. If one group of people can be found who organize an
activity in such a way, then others can do it in other areas.
Bearing in mind the conceptual problem we touched on briefly
- that we may not be able to recognize an anarchist organization
as an organization even if one were in front of us - we will also
find it necessary to clarify our socio-perceptual tools (or our
theoretical spectacles). This is a prerequisite to the task.
VOLUNTARY GROUPS IN CURRENT SOCIETIES
On a totally different level of interest though, it is obvious
that we don't live in an anarchist society, or even in anything
approaching one - despite the view of Colin Ward, who opened his
argument in 'Anarchy in Action' by asking
"How would you feel if you discovered that the
society in which you would really like to live
was already here, apart from a few little
local difficulties like exploitation, war,
dictatorship and starvation? The argument of
this book is that an anarchist society, a
society which organizes itself without
authority, is always in existence like a seed
beneath the snow, buried under the weight of
the state "
This view isn't necessarily wrong. Colin Ward simply isn't
looking at society with the same perspective as everybody else.
Most anarchists can see what he means, since they share his
perspective, but lots of people are bound to think he is not
making much sense. In L. Frank Baum's Oz books, the Emerald City
was only green because the Wizard locked a pair of green-tinted
spectacles over the eyes of anyone entering the gates. It is to
those people who aren't sharing a common anarchist perspective
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that the second Level of this piece of research might
nevertheless appeal. We might discover that mutual-aid groups and
voluntaristic organizations do in fact exist. Clearly, whilst
conceding that in theory this means that anarchism isn't
wholly Utopian, the vast mass of people might still maintain that
it is an unlikely eventuality - that though not impossible in
principle, it is in reality improbable. The question still
remains for those who take this line as to the place of
anarchistic groups and organizations which do function in an
otherwise state-governed system. Is it possible to have a kind of
mixed society with a centralized state and multinational
corporations co-existing with well-developed mutual-aid groups,
or is the situation one which is inherently unstable due to
incompatible philosophies? It is perfectly possible for the
patterns of individual and group behaviour in such mutual aid
groups as do exist to be so radically different to the behaviour
of the same group of people in the rest of social life as to
result in the absorption of such groups back into the prevailing
social structure. The process could be conceived of as being the
same type of phenomenon as the disintegration of tribal and other
indigenous cultures under the impact of western inspired mass
culture and industrialization, dried baby milk, agribusiness,
motor cars and transistor radios (not to mention tanks and
rifles). On the other hand, it may be the case that both mutual
aid groups and large institutionalized bureaucracies can not only
co-exist, but do so symbiotical ly like the birds that perch on
crocodiles and elephants and eat their ticks at the same time.
So we shall also be looking for the role of any mutual aid
groups we may find, at how they develop and grow in our welfare
state. Will they become dependent on the state, or will it co-opt
them? Is co-existence possible between authoritarianism and
voluntarism, or is tension and strain inevitable? Perhaps the
distinction will turn out not to be a useful one to try and
draw. Questions such as these are as important in the current
social context of the breakdown of the popular consensus as to
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what the welfare state really is, whether it will continue in its
present form, and what might replace it as the paradigm of social
reality. Even people who neither believe in nor are committed to
anarchism may believe still that mutual-aid groups and
voluntarist organizations on the lines anarchists advocate have
an important and valuable role to play in any society. And, as a
matter of fact, it is very rare for any members of the sort of
groups that anarchists like to point at as being the sort of
thing they would like to see spread, to profess to be anarchists
themselves. For example, Kropotkin was fond of pointing at
lifeboat services as an example of anarchy in action, despite the
fact that neither he nor anyone else discovered (or ever expected
to find) the lifeboat crews putting out to sea in gale-force
winds wearing black and red jerseys and singing about Joe Hill or
the Chicago martyrs. The point is that it doesn't matter to the
nature of the group - on the contrary, to prove the possibility
of an anarchist society the more different such people are from
the prototype anarchist of popular imagination - or the prototype
anarchist of anarchist imagination for that matter - the better
evidence the case will be.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND VOLUNTARIST ORGANIZATION THEORY
I think that I've now made clear the values and motives which
inspire the ideas I'm presenting, and that the usefulness of the
results that they give can be appreciated without having to agree
with those values. As far as the way I present them is concerned,
it should be obvious that (going back to the distinction with
which we began) this research is essentially evaluative rather
than descriptive. That is to say, the phenomena I'm concerned
with and the concepts to be developed are not dealt with for
their own sake (even though they may well be of intrinsic worth
also) but in connection with issues and problems which I think
are important in a wider context than an academic one.
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It is quite probable that as well as bringing these declared
commitments and values into the work, I'm bringing in some
unconscious ones as well. For this I can only apologize - by
definition it is not done on purpose. In mitigation of this
possible fault, I might point out that were a similiar piece of
work as firmly rooted in liberal pluralist or social democratic
values as this is in libertarian ones, nobody would even notice
the need to explain any values held at all. Only because
anarchism is impossible to conceal (for the anarchist model of
organization is the most appropriate body of theory we could work
with) has it been necessary to pin my heart on my sleeve - the
lack of such a declaration would result in a severe case of
academic or political culture shock. (For instance, My God! Is
this fellow an ANARCHIST?)
It can't be helped if, after this introduction, the
framework is later found to be unfamiliar to the extent of making
the mind boggle. I don't think that it will, though: despite the
prevailing ignorance of the details and strains of anarchism, I
suspect that most people find the basic ideas both simple to
understand and easy to apply. Anarchism is far less complicated
than marxism or capitalism. This makes it even more surprising to
me that organization theorists have paid so little attention in
the past to any other model of organization than the essentially
hierarchical one. The most obvious explanation of this phenomenon
that I can think of is the result of the impossibility of a
value-free and unbiased social science with which we began. The
fact that such a model of organization has remained under¬
developed could well be due to the fact that most organization
theorists, sociologists and other people who might have developed
one have not been anarchists. We are so used to equating anarchy
with chaos; and whenever anarchism is taken seriously, it poses
immediate threats to the philosophical foundations and political
legitimation of organized political parties, industry,
institutions of all sorts, governments and so on - in short, it
threatens most of the things on which the people who might have
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been expected to develop a proper theory of organization depend
on for their livelihood. The values and interests threatened are
seldom questioned, and can be found incorporated into almost any
organization theorist's work.
So the development of an anarchist perspective ought to be
elevated from an incidental part of the work to a third level of
relevance in addition to the two already discussed. We are
concerned with developing a theoretical understanding of the way
voluntary organizations and mutual-aid groups work in practice.
It might seem a tall order to tackle ideological, theoretical and
practical problems all at the same time, but in reality they are
all part of the same problem. This is why they can be referred to
as levels of relevance, and it isn't really possible to
concentrate on just one of them and take the others for granted.
It should be obvious why this cannot be done. The possibility of
anarchism is a matter of contention, and the use of anarchist
sources in mainstream social science is infrequent and therefore
unfamiliar; the role of mutual-aid groups in the welfare state is
problematic to say the least; and the theory of such groups is
embryonic, piecemeal and undeveloped as a branch of organization
theory. We couldn't really ignore any of them even if we wanted
to. As a matter of fact, they do fit quite well together. There
is no real reason why all three shouldn't be tackled together,






ANARCHISM AS THEORY AND METHOD
The distinctiveness of Anarchism lies in the fact that the
values implicit in the criticism of the state as coercive,
authoritarian, and over-centralized are reflexively applied to
anarchists' own theory and practice. It is worth looking at this
in slightly more detail than simply asserting the fact, since an
understanding of it is basic to an appreciation of the
development of anarchist organization theory and its
applications, which grew from precisely this reflexive
application of first principles.
There can be said to be three parts to any philosophy of
social change, whether it is a reformist, radical or a
revolutionary one. The first element is a critique of and an
analysis of the existing institutions, history, and economic and
social arrangements of societies. The second part is some
conception of what a 'better' society might took tike, with the
criteria for what is better usually implicit in the first part.
Third, and last, there is some strategy for the attainment of
this ideal condition; a technique of social change. It is this
last component, the one most concerned with political practise,
which is the best guide for distinguishing one theory from
another. Different varieties of marxism, leninism, trotskyism,
socialism, democracy, Christianity, fascism and unionism have all
used different strategies at different times, as has anarchism in
its various manifestations; they all use different tools and
different methods, or the same tools and methods in different
ways. This isn't a treatise on comparative political philosophy
so we shan't try to discuss all of the possibilities here - that
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requires a book of its own. The only point we want to bring out
is the way the third component of a political philosophy - the
practical one - relates to the other two components.
For example, in so far as most marxists adhere in some
fashion to the doctrine of the 'withering away of the state' as
Marx himself developed it, their vision of the future comes
remarkably close to the anarchist one of federated networks of
autonomous groups; and there are similarities between these two
visions and the laissez-faire minimalist reduction of the state
to purely administrative and co-ordinative functions only.
At the same time as sharing this ultimate goal, however,
most philosophies find it possible to hold that there are good
and adequate reasons why the values used to judge the goal a
desirable one should not also be used to decide what sort of
means are appropriate to reaching that goal. The classic marxist
doctrine sees the 'withering away of the state' as being preceded
by a 'transitional period', during which the dictatorship of the
proletariat will replace the state as it is now; a socialist
state is thus the means of abolishing the institution itself.
Modern-day laissez-faire capitalists seek to use the power of the
state to enforce the reduction of planning in the economy, and
the intervention of government in the free market. Anarchists
don't believe such attempts as these - which seek to use the
state as an instrument in its own diminution - are either
possible or logical; Anarchists' own ends and means are
consistent both with each other and with their critical analysis
of society. It is this characteristic belief - that ends cannot
be used to justify means - which has made it possible to identify
an anarchist organization theory. And this same characteristic is
the reason for the fact that the way anarchists have organized
themselves remains the best historical example we have of how
this theory of organization both is conceived and works in
practice.
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The Logic behind this theory, and its Links with the other
component parts of the phiLosophy of Anarchism, can be seen most
cLearLy in the SonviLLier circuLar of 1871. We observed that
Marxists and Anarchists have simiLar goaLs. At one time, they
both worked under the same umbreLLa in the First InternationaL,
untiL Bakunin and Marx feLL out. Marx removed the seat of the
InternationaL to New York, but the Anarchists who remained (they
stiLL in fact exist, as the InternationaL - in Sweden, I beLieve)
issued the SonviLLier circuLar to express their own view of how
their own organization ought to work.
"We regard it as perfectLy naturaL that the
schooL whose ideaL is the conquest of
poLiticaL power by the working cLass shouLd
beLieve that the ..... organization be
transformed into a hierarchicaL organization
guided and governed by an executive We
must nevertheLess fight against them in the
name of 'Emancipation of the workers by
the workers themseLves' independentLy of a L L
guiding authority we demand that the
generaL counciL return to its normaL
function, which is to act as a statisticaL and
information bureau it must reject any
principLe which may tend towards
authoritarianism and dictatorship."
(quoted in 'Anarchism', George Woodcock,
p.229)
It is apparent that the organization theory implicit in this
circuLar is inseparabLe from the poLiticaL struggLe between the
two opposing camps in the InternationaL. But the reasons why the
best statements of the theory are fuLL of poLiticaL issues and
struggLes of the era which some may find irreLevant and sectarian
is because, as we have observed aLready, the means, ends and
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tactics of anarchism comprise a total philosophy which developed
in the course of the historical problems anarchists faced. We
shall see later that a course in anarchist history is also the
best education in anarchist theory.
As well as showing the links between means and ends in
anarchist thought, the Sonvillier circular shows quite clearly
that any theory of non-authoritarian and non-hierarchical
organizing, which we need to develop and use in the study of
voluntary organizations, derives much of its coherence and force
from its political anarchistic origins. For the vast majority of
organizations, the theory (if any) which is used to structure the
organization is a kind of extra ingredient tacked on the back of
whatever else the organization is doing: this is especially true
of most political parties, at least the major British ones. One
need only look at the conflicts engendered when the Labour party
tries to turn its own organization into an issue of principle to
see the truth of this. But the theory of anarchist organizing
wasn't a luxury of this sort which could be considered when
convenient, shelved at other times, and taken out to be dusted
down when efficiency, innovation, democracy or profits had to be
improved, but was and remains an essential prerequisite if the
basic values of anarchism were ever to be retained in practice.
As a result, anarchist organization theories consist of the
visualizations and partial realizations of co-operating and
organizing in such a way as to promote autonomy and self-
government amongst the membership, and avoid coercive authority
and oligarchy.
The result isn't a prescriptive method. As Malatesta said,
if anyone is looking for a rule book "it means we have failed in
our attempt to explain what anarchism is all about"
('Anarchy',Malatesta, p.47). All we could possibly have is a set
of principles, recommendations and warnings: and although these
may look vague and fuzzy at the edges when compared to textbooks
or training manuals, this is not the sort of criticism which can
be remedied. Even so, purists might well accuse me of
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oversimpLifying issues and distorting sources. Before going into
detail on the evolution of anarchist ideas, it must be pointed
out that this last objection has some substance to it.
ANARCHISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
What I've done is to take elements from anarchist thinkers
and writings of the last century and a half, and welded them into
a coherent and continuous framework for my own (disreputably
academic) purposes. I don't intend to go into the diversity or
ramifications of different varieties of anarchist thought: I'm
blithely disregarding the fact that my sources are a mixture of
mutualist, collectivist, syndicalist, anarcho-communist,
pacifist, feminist and so on: I apologize to anyone who knows
enough to find this irritating, or who may subsequently discover
that the ingredients are not homogeneous but merely homogenized.
The justification is that our concern is with the theory of
voluntary organization and mutual aid from a sociological, not a
historical or biological perspective, and most certainly not with
the theory of insurrection, revolution or revolutionary
organizing, political philosophy, social criticism or polemics.
There is no reason why such an undertaking should be thought
either dishonest or invalid, distasteful though it may seem to
some whose interests lie elsewhere.
At the same time, it cannot claim to be definitive either:
all it represents is an attempt to come to terms with theoretical
problems in the study of voluntary organization. Consider the
following statement -
"Human beings will spontaneously
associate themselves into groups for mutual
aid, will voluntarily organize an economy
which ensures the satisfaction of their needs.
This is the principle of mutual aid
Apply this principle to the existing state of
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society by taking the voluntary
organizations which already exist trade
unions, syndicates, professional unions,
academies etc We come to the conclusion
that there are no essential functions which
could not be transferred."
(Herbert Read, 'Anarchy and Order',p.132)
There is no indication that any attempt has been made to think
about the blanket term 'voluntary organization' along the lines
we have been doing here. We quoted George Lakey earlier when he
observed that Trade Unions were hardly libertarian. Of Read's
other examples, professional unions include the B.M.A., the Law
Society and other grouping not noted for their contribution to
social change. The habit of taking structures of mutual aid for
granted had an illustrious exponent in Kropotkin, that prince
among Anarchists. In his book entitled 'Mutual Aid', he
aggregates consumer co-operatives, lifeboat services, cyclists,
gymnasts and religious charities and then states quite baldly
that they are all shining example of mutual aid at work, along
with wolves, ants and bees. Now we all owe a lot to Kropotkin,
and whilst it is true that he wasn't concerned with organization
theory as much as with countering social darwinist ideas, he did
take mutual aid as being a fundamental - and therefore
irreducible - tendency. Whether or not it happens to be true that
there is a basic tendency towards mutual aid, it does not mean
that there is no need to look at the way it works in detail.
Other human drives, such as the sexual ones, have had
encyclopaedias written on them. And if there isn't a mutual aid
drive in any real sense, then the need to look further is even
greater. Attempts are long overdue.
Perhaps one reason why anarchists have not developed this is
because the very attempt requires a degree of detachment which
(though it is the rule in academic establishments) seems to be
impossible for activists. A theoretical study of any
52
organization's form must involve relating the sort of activities
people do to why they do them. That this will involve both
strategic and tactical considerations follows inevitably. Look at
a trade union, for example, in relation to union bureaucracy. The
ideal of an anarchist union (such as the CNT, which was the major
anarchist union in Spain before the civil war there) is
decentralized, federal and has no need of much central
bureaucracy. The more usual structure of social democratic unions
is compartmentalized, centralized and bureaucratic. We have
already noted the reason for the contrast: it is that anarchist
values are reflexively applied. In this particular instance
though, the fact that the Spanish CNT followed the tactic of
direct action whilst the more usual tactic for a social
democratic union is one of negotiation is strikingly relevant.
For activists in any voluntary organization, the tactics and the
strategy of the organization cannot be considered separately from
the form. The two are intertwined. Concentration on the
relationship is usually considered to be a symptom of political
extremism in Britain, where relationships between forms and aims
aren't widely appreciated as being important. On the other hand,
any member of an anarchist organization would be bound to
consider the question of form to be part of the whole question of
strategy and aims, and would not in practice consider it
separately. So nobody, whether in an anarchist or hierarchical
organization, ever has the necessary detachment to look at form
alone. Either it is seen as irrelevant, or part of a total
picture. In a little while, we'll look at the history of the CNT
in more detail, from an organizational point of view. We shan't
be concerned with whether syndicalism is the road to revolution
or not, or if the general strike is the best weapon for workers
to use. But we shall be concerned with the way each of these
aims, or any other aim, relates to the form and structure of the
organization which seeks to achieve them. This type of reasoning
is a luxury which an active member of a group would not usually
indulge in - certainly nobody did before the late 1960's, when
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consciousness-raising began to make an impact in womens' groups
and started a spread of similar techniques.
To continue this digression further: McLuhan has
popularized the notion of 'the medium is the message'. Though it
may seem that a case is being made out here for saying that the
medium - the form - is all, this is not strictly speaking the
case. In the theoretical context we are operating in, it makes
perfect sense to say that the organizational medium, the form,
affects the tasks of an organization profoundly. It is because
this relationship is so important that it is imperative to
understand how it works, and the least understood part of it is
the notion of form. In a very real sense, it is the form which
determines the content in a voluntary organization. This is an
insight we owe to modern structuralists. Its political extension
is that if only we get the structure right, then the content will
look after itself. The central question of politics becomes not
what we are doing, but how we are doing it: by doing things in a
different way we are bound to achieve different results, and it
is at least as important to attach blame to the structure we work
through as to attach it to our policies when things go wrong.
There is a balance in this, as in all things, and when we
concentrate on form here it is to redress that balance rather
than to create a new one.
PROUDHON AND THE GENESIS OF ANARCHIST ORGANIZATION THEORY
Let us return now to an anarchist theory of organization. It
cannot claim to be definitive in any way, and our sources would,
were they alive, most certainly be unhappy to be used in such a
way as to present a system which would stand forever.
"I have no system, I will have none, and I
expressly repudiate the suggestion. The system
of humanity, whatever it be, will only be
known when humanity is at an end My
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business is to find out where humanity is
going, and to prepare for it."
(Proudhon, quoted in M.Buber 'Paths in
Utopia', p.24)
George Woodcock aptly called Proudhon a man of paradox, and
despite what he wrote above, he certainly wasn't averse to a
little bit of system building himself. But even at his most
systematic, he would still have agreed that he was developing
only one possible theory about the way some sections of humanity
are going. It is to the main set of Proudhon's ideas that we turn
first. It has been said that Proudhon's thought rests on the two
pillars of mutualism and federalism, and those are indeed the
foundation of anarchist organization theory also. We'll look
briefly at each of them.
Mutualism isn't so much a theory as a vision and an ideal -
the ideal of mutual aid and co-operation as the social glue which
binds people together. This is an idea which (it has been said)
Proudhon may well have developed from Condorcet, and the notion
of small scale groups replicated thousands of times in a whole
society owes much to Robert Owen and Fourier too. Both the latter
saw the small size of their ideal communities as being one of
their essential features. It was Proudhon, though, who brought
the mutualist idea of free association with the emphasis on
groups into anarchism. Up to 1851, when Proudhon published his
'General Idea of Revolution', nobody had developed the ideas of
the abolition of the state and the evils of authoritarianism in
conjunction with the possibilities of small groups as the basis
of a new society. Previous anarchists such as Godwin and Stirner
were individualists in the tradition of Leibnitz, and saw groups
as individuals coming together, without creating anything more
than the sum of their parts. Those who had influenced the
formation of small groups along Owenite or Phalangist lines were
not committed to the abolition of the state, and lacked much
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awareness of what could be different in their groups apart from
the size and the newness. Proudhon was the first to properly
combine the two -
"The importance of their (associations') work
lies, not in their petty union interests, but
in their denial of the rule of capitalists,
usurers and governments."
(quoted in 'Proudhon: Life and Work', George
Woodcock, p.170)
If mutualism is the glue which binds individuals into
groups, it is federalism which binds groups together into an
organization or a society. Proudhon's type of federalism wasn't
anything like that expounded by the Americans such as Jefferson.
It most certainly wasn't a theory as to how a state ought to be
constructed, but was concerned instead with what the state would
be replaced by. The development of federalism as a substitute for
the state was once again a Proudhonian innovation. He wrote -
"Divide everything which can be divided,
define everything which can be defined,
allocate among different organs everything
which has been so divided: leave nothing
undivided."
(Proudhon, 'Principles of Federation', p.49)
He called this the principle of organic separation, and combined
it with the formation of small sovereign groups, and a third
principle which clearly set out the relation between the groups
and the federation into "the whole science of
constitutions."(ibid.)
Mutualism without federalism doesn't solve the problem of
state power and its abuse. Federalism without mutualism doesn't
solve the problem of how coercive authority can be replaced with
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co-operation. But when combined, the two dovetail together
beautifully to form a genuine and practicable alternative to any
existing state: and on a more limited interpretation, an
alternative to large hierarchical organization. Such hierarchies
could be replaced with federations of mutual-aid groups to form
anarchist organizations capable of operating complex and
sophisticated tasks. Malatesta has put this into words better
than anyone else.
"An anarchist organization must allow
for complete autonomy and independence, and
therefore full responsibility to individuals
and groups; free agreement between those who
think it useful to come together for co¬
operative action, for common aims; a moral
duty to fulfil one's pledges and to take no
action which is contrary to the accepted
programme. On such bases one then introduces
practical forms and the suitable instruments
to give real life to the organization. Thus
the groups, the federation of groups, the
federation of federations, meetings,
correspondence committees and so on. But this
must be done freely, in such a way as not to
restrict the thoughts and initiative of
individual members, but only to give greater
scope to the efforts which in isolation would
be impossible or ineffective Congresses
... are free from authoritarianism in any
shape or form because they do not legislate
and do not impose their deliberations on
others. They serve to maintain and increase
personal contacts amongst the most active
members and their decisions are not
binding but simply suggestions, advice and
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proposals to submit to all concerned, and they
do not become binding and executive except for
those who accept them, and for as long as they
accept them. The administrative organs they
nominate have no directive powers, and do not
take initiatives except for those who
specifically solicit and approve of them."
(From 'Life and Ideas', op. cit. p.87)
DEFICIENCIES IN THE THEORY
At the same time as noting how concise and logical this is,
it is not difficult to appreciate that taken by itself, this
description raises more questions than it answers for anybody
interested in how an organization really works. The statement of
anarchist principles, of the mutualist and federalist currents
converging into the organizations of a new society are clear
enough. But apart from one stipulation, the description is
lacking in detail. That stipulation though, that a federation
exists only by the will of its members and only in order that
they may act in concert when acting alone is not feasible, is
important itself. However hard we look, no statement or
suggestion of how this is to be achieved appears anywhere.
Anarchists usually hide behind the twin assertions that in the
first place, people have to work this out for themselves: and in
the second place, once the state is abolished and everyone is
free to act, the natural tendency of human beings will be to form
federations and groups on the correct lines out of instinct and
innate political canniness. Whether or not these assertions are
correct doesn't alter the fact that there exists an enormous
credibility gap between the sometimes Utopian vision of a
stateless world, and the inability of many people to see
precisely how they can exist without government, even when they
are assured that it is indeed possible. (And I have seen enough
tension, anger and cussedness in mutual-aid groups to make me
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believe that if there is an instinct, it is deeply buried - to
start a mutual-aid group from scratch needs either training,
advice or experience. Instinct is not enough.) This deficiency is
most apparent in the mutualist pillar: not only is the
federalist pillar far more articulately set out (in documents
such as the Sonvillier circular), but federations of all sorts
are far more visible as evidence than are basic mutual aid
groups. This deficiency is also apparent in the classical
anarchist writers. Kropotkin was and is highly susceptible to
charges of naivety, and to putting too much of his faith in
optimism. Bakunin's organizational plans - he had a fatal
weakness for secret societies and conspiracies - drifted so far
from anarchist ones that they were (embarassingly) taken over as
a blueprint by the Bolsheviks in pre-revolutionary Russia. And,
in a masterly analysis of Proudhon's thought, Martin Buber says:
"We find here no adequate answer to the
question 'how must the units be
constituted so that they can federate into a
genuine popular order, a new and just social
structure'. Thus Proudhon's socialism lacks
one essential.".
(from 'Paths in Utopia', p.37)
Going back to Malatesta, perhaps the most realistic and
honest of the great anarchist pioneers, we can find some
references which point the way to an explanation of the lack of
detail in the mutualist idea. For example, in relation to
leadership in anarchist organizations, he says:
"If it is true that organization creates
leaders; if it is true that anarchists are
unable to come together without submitting to
an authority, this means that they are not yet
very good anarchists, and before thinking of
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establishing anarchy in the world, they must
first think of making themselves live
anarchistically. The remedy does not lie in
the abolition of organization, but in the
growing consciousness of each individual
member The origin and justification for
authority lies in social disorganization."
(ibid, p.86)
And when describing the major step in becoming committed to
anarchist principles, he writes that a person
"must begin to feel the solidarity that joins
him to his comrades, and to learn to
co-operate with others in defence of common
interests, and that (they) could manage
by their own efforts. And when he has
understood this, he is an anarchist even if he
does not call himself such."
(ibid, p.90)
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ANARCHIST IDEAS
Malatesta wrote the above in 1897, and the previous quotation in
the same year. Proudhon had written 'Du Principe Federatif' in
1863, Bakunin was dead by 1876, and Kropotkin published 'Mutual
Aid' in 1902. The social sciences were in their infancy, and
social psychology virtually non-existent. The issues of group
identity and interpersonal dynamics which Malatesta begins to
discuss in the passages we just quoted weren't taken seriously by
social scientists until the second world war. In this light, the
fact that the nineteenth-century anarchists saw no need to say
much on the mechanics of mutualistic groups is no more simplistic
than, say, the assumptions of Taylor and the Scientific
Management movement a few years later. It is only since the
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revival of interest in anarchism from the 1960's on that the
concepts and tools to plug the holes in mutualist theory have
been available to the right people at the right time and that the
theory needed has been developed at all. Malatesta could put a
finger on part of the problem without appreciating its dimensions
fully.
There is another factor, also to do with the history of
ideas, which partially accounts for the deficiences in Mutualist
theory, and this most clearly emerges in the writings of
Kropotkin. Echoes of it can be found in most libertarian thinkers
who believed with him that mutual aid was an instinctive tendency
in all forms of life. Kropotkin thought that
"Anarchism owes its origin to the
constructive, creative activity of the people,
by which the institutions of communal life
were developed in the past, and to a protest -
a revolt against the force which had thrust
itself on those institutions".
(from Kropotkin's 'Modern Science and
Anarchism', rep. in 'The Essential Kropotkin',
ed. Capouya and Tompkins, p.58)
He also wrote at some length on the medieval city, which he saw
as being in many ways the nearest historical manifestation of a
non-statist social system, and saw the basic unit of a future
mutualist and anarchist society in his early work as the
'obschiny' or rural commune. This was able to draw on the vast
potential for mutual aid which ordinary people possessed. Even in
later life, the urban communes he envisaged were simply
transplants of this concept to city life. He tells how in a
revolution, the people would "take possession of all the wealth
accumulated by past generations in the name of the whole
community". But he had no analysis of what form the 'obschiny'
would take in the real world, because he didn't really need one.
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Like Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin and Malatesta, Kropotkin was born
in an essentially pre-industrial society, and lived during the
process of industrialization and urbanization in Europe. The
concept of community, of neighbourliness, and of the self-
contained and self-sufficient commune didn't need to be spelt out
because everyone, it would seem with hindsight, knew all about it
at first hand. The problem wasn't to describe it to those who
knew perfectly well what he was talking about, but to elevate
mutual aid into the new basic unit of a future society and show
how this could be done. It was much easier to say that a wrong
turning was being taken when the audience was still within sight
of the missed signpost and could still, maybe, see a little way
down the other road.
Probably Kropotkin had underestimated the extent to which
industrialization had changed the centuries-old pattern of life
in Europe. It seems quite certain that none of the classical
anarchists had really appreciated the extent to which the basis
of folk-culture mutualism, with which they were planning to erect
a new order, had been fatally undermined in both its content and
transmission mechanisms by technology, new occupational patterns,
increased mobility, universal schooling, and the whole
generalized impact of the industrial revolution. Again in
retrospect, the hole in mutualist theory could have been plugged
(perhaps) with an analysis of what a community was, what made
people feel mutually inclined, and how and why those qualities
were disappearing. Giddens has pointed out that most classical
sociology, including the work of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, can be
seen as an attempt to come to terms with the industrial
revolution and its impact on European society. Anarchism in the
same period can be seen in the same way. (A discussion of the way
social scientists have tried to define the essence of
'community', and whether these ideas can be incorporated into
anarchist ideas will have to be postponed till later).
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At this stage, it is sufficient for us to have identified
the gap in the classic conception of mutualism, and to see that
we must try and develop an anarchist theory of mutual aid
organizations to fill it. The theory of community will have a
part in this. The nostalgia for a lost past of which anarchists
are often accused is a response to the part community plays in
anarchism - nostalgia appears to be an important motivating force
in such work. Both planners and dwellers in high-rise tower
blocks have been known to idealize back-to-back slum dwelling for
precisely this reason. It is far easier to bemoan the loss of a
quality which is visible through retrospectacles than it is to
look for the reason why it got lost in the first place, and its
absence in the present.
TRANSITION TO THE NEXT CHAPTER - SPAIN
Our next staging post will be Spain - no anarchist work is
complete without it. To put this in the context of our discussion
here, the appeal of anarcho-syndicalism (the making of a
revolution through trade union activity) both as a tactic and a
theoretical short-cut lies in the fact that mutual theory is less
important for unions, in that the mutualist base clearly arises
from the fact that all members are workers.
Combine this with the historical background of
industrialization in Europe we discussed above, and the reasons
why the lack of theory inhibited the growth of anarchism less in
Spain than elsewhere in Europe begins to be more explicable.
Spain was less industrialized than the rest of Europe, so the
type of rural mutualism which was supposedly practised in
Kropotkin's rural communities may well have survived longer
there. Combined with the syndicalist nature of Spanish anarchism,
the gaps in Proudhonian mutualism do not threaten the edifice
with collapse. Both in the rural communities of Andalusia and in
the new working class in Catalonia (the two main centres of the
63
movement), the basic units of mutualist groups could develop in
the absence of an adequate understanding of its theoretical base
because the intuitive understanding assumed by the early
anarchists was that much more real. This certainly isn't supposed
to be a full explanation of the fact that it is only by looking
at the Spanish case can we begin to see the development of large
scale federal groupings which really worked. But it does provide
us with some background before we take a look at the history of
anarchism in Spain. We shan't really help develop the mutualist
part of the theory but we will be able to see some ways in which
the federal and conceptual parts worked in a practical context -
a context in some ways far removed from voluntary organizations
of today, but one which in other ways has a lot we can learn
from. Additionally, for those who are relatively unused to the
train of thought we have begun to explore here, some exposure to the
history of what remains an essential part of anarchist history
will be a useful piece of acclimatization in unfamiliar terrain.
The problems remain to be sorted out regarding the ways in which
we can understand how people combine into mutual aid groups,
though we will be in a better position to answer the questions
this involves when we have first seen the flowering of anarchism





HOW ANARCHISM CAME TO SPAIN
In spite of the fact that he was the first person to fully
articulate the twin principles of mutualism and federalism,
Proudhon wasn't a great organizer himself. He viewed the basis of
mutual-aid groups not in organizational terms, but as networks of
individual contracts, mutually binding in themselves and needing
nothing more than good will to keep them all working. The lack of
any emphasis on group dynamics meant that when his ideas were
translated into Spanish by Pi y Margall in the 1860's, they gave
rise to little in the way of organizational activity. Despite
Proudhon's own condemnation of par Iiamentarianism and
disillusionment with politics after he was elected to the French
Assembly in 1849, Pi y Margall adopted a parliamentary strategy
to put his federalist ideas into practise. While he met with the
ultimate in political success when he eventually became President
of Spain - elected - during an interregnum in 1873, Pi isn't
remembered today as one of the great political figures of the
nineteenth century. No lasting results ever came from the
political success, the presidency of Pi, the first and only
democratically elected anarchist (of sorts) head of state, who is
relegated to one of history's footnotes. Perhaps the most lasting
legacy of Pi was the fact that Proudhonian influences in Spain so
quickly gave way to more revolutionary strategies being developed
by Bakunin.
In contrast to Proudhon, Bakunin was fascinated by
organizational strategies - we have mentioned his especial
fascination by wide-ranging plots of an international and
subversive nature, which would infiltrate existing workers
organizations and convert them to anarchist ideas. The popular
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conception of anarchist organization owes more to Bakunin than to
anyone else, especially as dramatised by writers such as Conrad
('The Secret Agent) and Chesterton ('The Man who was Thursday').
Bakunin's most successful variation on this theme was the
International Alliance of Social Democracy - how little names
change in even a century. It had seven articles in its programme
: it was atheistic: it stood for sexual equality: for common
ownership of the means of production: for the rights of children
to a full and free education in science, industry and the arts:
for the replacement of states by free federations: it was
against patriotism: and believed in the universal association of
local associations through freedom. Unlike the International
Brotherhood, which was its Bakuninist predecessor, or the World
Revolutionary Alliance, which was its phantom successor, the
Social Democratic Alliance actually made An Impact. Bakunin's
plan was for autonomous sections to develop all over Europe, and
to further that end he sent one Giuseppe Fanelli to Spain in
1969. Fanelli was Italian and spoke not a word of Spanish, but
his visit had an immediate and lasting impact on Spanish
Anarchism, which dates its existence as an organised movement
from his visit, graphically described, in an oft quoted passage,
by Anselmo Lorenzo, a member of the audience - "Cosa Orrible! Spa
entosa!" (see e.g. Brenan 'The Spanish Labyrinth', p.1 39)
PHASE ONE: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
In fact Fanelli, though he must have been an orator of
considerable ability, appears to have been Bakunin's emissary by
virtue of his possession of a free railway pass, and either
misunderstood or ignored the more conspiratorial parts of
Bakunin's programme. Though the Alliance was actually meant to be
a secret elite, controlling and directing unsuspecting members of
front groups which Fanelli was really supposed to set up, he went
and set up a section of the Alliance instead. It managed quite
well through over fifty years of evolutionary change with no
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direction or control at all. Which goes to prove something, I
think. The Alliance set up its first Congress in Barcelona in
1870, and the supposedly top secret documents Fanelli left behind
him were the basis of its resolutions, which in their turn set
the pattern for all subsequent incarnations.
"1. In every locality, workers of each trade
will be organized in special sections.
2. All sections of trades from the same
locality will federate (for) matters of mutual
aid, education etc.
3. Sections of the same trade belonging to
different localities will federate.
4. Local Federations will federate to
constitute the Spanish Regional Federation,
which will be represented by a federal
counciI.
5. All federations, as well as the
regional federations, will govern themselves.
6. All workers will decide themselves,
through the intermediary of their delegates,
as to the method of action and development of
the organization."
(quoted in G.Leval 'Collectives in the Spanish
Revolution' p.20)
By the 1872 Cordoba congress of the Alliance in Spain, the
functions of the Regional Committee had (as specified in the
Sonvillier Circular) been defined solely as a correspondence and
statistical bureau. At that same congress, the Alliance confirmed
the anti-parIiamentarian stance of non-involvement in all
established political institutions. The issue arose in connection
with Pi y Margall's federalists: the congress "refused to give
general support to the federalist movement, but raised no
objection to local groups or individual members
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co-operating."(Quoted by Horowitz in 'The Anarchists', p.370)
The flexibility and general outlines of subsequent Spanish
Anarchism find their first distinctive expressions here. Brenan
comments that from the Cordoba Congress emerged the
characteristic -
"that all movement which develops in it
comes from below. What happens is this: at
some critical moment, let us say, a congress
of Spanish federations is called to consider
the possibility of revolutionary action. The
delegates of each district will arrive at the
assembly with a full knowledge of the wishes
and capacities of the workmen they represent.
Each will get up and say what the men of his
province and district are able and prepared to
do. No district will be urged to take any
action for which it does not feel itself
morally and materially prepared no group
has ever been overruled by another group or
had pressure put on it to act against its
private convictions Spanish anarchists
have insisted on basing their movement on the
free and unfettered impulse of their
adherents, organized in local groups, and have
not allowed themselves to become enmeshed in
the deadening and life-destroying net of a
party bureaucracy."
(Brenan, op.cit. p.146)
This may well sound like an idealized version of decision-making,
but there is no doubt that it worked successfully over a long
period of time.
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There are many other characteristics of the organization
emerging at this time which are well worth noting, and find their
first expression in the activities of the Alliance. The planned
federations of 'sections of the same trade from different
localities', or national single-trade unions as we know them in
Britain today, never emerged. The area organizations for all
types of workers became the sole functioning part of the
organizational communication net. Later on, single-trade unions
on a national basis were seen as being intrinsically counter¬
revolutionary and divisive, and were positively discouraged. Of
greater significance, and worth considering in some detail, are
the relationship which had begun to be assumed - firstly between
the organization and the activists, secondly between both of
these and the non-active membership, and lastly, how all these
three interrelate and work to various intermediate goals.
Obviously, the goal of the Spanish Anarchists was the
fomenting of a revolution which would abolish the State. Equally
obviously, these goals are not necessarily ones which are going
to be held by any group adopting the same organizational
structure. The question which may, and probably will, be asked is
this: what is the point (for any non-anarchist individuals or
groups) in looking at the history of an organization like the
Alliance or the C.N.T. when its goals are so radically different
from any which are held by the majority of people involved in
voluntary organizations. However, part of the argument we've been
putting forward is that a typology based on goals is not
necessarily the most useful way to categorize an organization,
and doesn't necessarily shed any light on how it works. The point
of taking the Spanish anarchists seriously, as an example, is
because of the light it sheds on problems faced by any
organization having the same form, but with different objectives:
not having similar goals is not a valid criterion for assuming a
completely different structure.
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PROBLEMS IN THE ALLIANCE
The problem with which we shall be concerning ourselves is
not what the goals of an organization may be, but what the
relationship is between the mutualist composition, the commitment
of the members to the goal, and relationships with the wider
society. We've already noted that some of Bakunin's
conspiratorial theories were incorporated into Bolshevism: and
that Fanelli mistakenly set up the first anarchist groups in
Spain with the supposedly secret articles of the International
Alliance of Social Democracy. The first problems the new
organization encountered were caused by the influence of the
Bakuninist conspiratorial model which had, via Fanelli, been
incorporated into the organization. The Barcelona labour unions,
which affiliated to the First International via their membership
of the Alliance, were the first recruitment and power base of
Spanish anarchism. However, "there remained a kind of shadowy
organization of leading militants which, though it had no
official existence, virtually controlled the pol i cy."(Woodcock,
op.cit p.341). This is not an unfamiliar situation in any
organization. The people in the Alliance in this position were of
course Bakuninists, who adopted a manipulative, elitist, and
paternalistic role within the Alliance. Whilst since the Russian
Revolution the perils of such a course have been an article of
faith amongst libertarians, at that time there appeared nothing
really unacceptable about such a way of organizing.
The paradox involved, which makes the whole structure
unsound, was not appreciated at the time. With hindsight, we can
see that mutualism and federalism should complement each other in
an anarchist organization. In the Spanish case, however, the
anarchists who started the movement incorporated the craft unions
of Barcelona into their organization, which were not only non-
anarchist groups, and were not organized on anarchist lines, but
were also not committed to anything apart from the welfare of
71
their membership construed in the narrowest material sense.
Instead of the two parts of the AllianceCthe existing craft
unions and the Fanel I i-inspired anarchists) forming a unified
whole, all the craft unions wanted to do was to win specific
victories for one part of the working class only. The anarchists
cast themselves in the role of educators now, later to be a
vanguard: but they increasingly found that their conception of
the organization as a staging post to a revolution was at odds
with the reformist demands of the craft unions for material gains
now. Bakunin assumed that the workers would want to fit neatly
into his vision: predictably enough, they turned out not to.
The enduring discovery made in the earliest days was that
for a federation to succeed, the constituent mutual-aid groups
must agree on what the federation is for. The anarchists, in
their first enthusiastic attempt at revolutionary organizing,
came to see their union confederates as being at the best
irrelevant, at the worst counter-productive, and in any case only
there to be used. One of the audience at Fanelli's first historic
talk was Anselmo Lorenzo, one of the most prominent and active of
the early pioneers of the movement. Later on in his life, he
remarked:
"How much better it would have been if,
instead of manipulating agreements and
solutions, the Alliance had undertaken the
task of education and teaching that would have
led to agreements and solutions based on free
and reasoned discussion."
(quoted in Peirats 'Anarchists in the Spanish
Revolution', p.239)
It was this same Lorenzo who resolved to leave Spain and
undertake teaching and education elsewhere. He went on an
'apostolic journey' through Andalusia, in the hills of southern
Spain, where 'the idea', as anarchism became known, quickly took
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root amongst the peasants and Landless labourers of the hills.
The Alliance was in fact suppressed in 1874, as a general wave of
repression swept Europe, but by the time it re-emerged in 1881
(under the new name of 'The Federation of Workers of the Spanish
Region') Andalusia had overtaken the Catalonian anarchists as the
largest contingent. The problems built in to the old Bakuninist
form of organization came to the fore in an aggravated and
divisive fashion as a result of this new development.
PHASE TWO: PROBLEMS IN THE FEDERATION
The Barcelona unions wanted (as has been said) immediate
gains for their members: the anarchist activists had come round
to the idea of slower, non-parliamentary, educational work
preparing for revolution: and the Andalusians wanted to put the
ideas of Anarchism into practise immediately without waiting for
any preparatory or educational work. With this threefold,
mutually contradictory idea of what the organization was all
about, it could clearly not survive for very long in that form.
During the 1880's there also crystallised a theoretical
shift in anarchist thought. Whereas Bakunin had seen the building
of workers' organizations as the main task of anarchists, his
ideas began to be replaced as the main inspiration of Spanish
Anarchist thought, and Kropotkinian ideas - if we can call them
such - began to predominate. The slogan of Bakuninist
collectivism was 'From each according to his ability, to each
according to his work': and it was on this basis that the
Barcelona craft unions joined first the Alliance, and
subsequently the Federation. This conception of the workers as
both the people who would build the revolution and also benefit
from it was characteristic of Bakunin's ideas. This conception of
social justice was giving way to anarchist communism (as
Kropotkin called it - he was the inspiration). The quite
different slogan of the anarcho-communists was not 'to each
according to his work' but 'to each according to his needs'. The
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analysis of the economic evils of society had been broadened to
cover not simply the inequitable division of fruits of labour and
control over the means of production, distribution and exchange,
but now included the wage system itself and the whole concept of
renumeration for labour. The basis of Kropotkin's ideal society,
the commune, would share out wealth on the basis of need, not on
the basis of work put in directly on the production of wealth.
As Kropotkin himself wrote,
"Even Col lectivists suspect that a man of
forty, the father of three children, has
greater needs than a youth of twenty. They
suspect that a woman who is suckling her child
and spends sleepless nights by its cot cannot
get through the same amount of work as a man
who enjoys tranquil slumber is (the wage
system) to be the outcome of the revolution?
It cannot be so. For on the day when the
ancient institutions splinter into fragments
before the axe of the proletariat, voices will
be heard shouting: Bread for all! Lodging for
all! Rights for all to the comforts of life!"
(From 'The Wage System' in Capouya and
Tompkins, op.cit. p.105-7)
We've observed the reflexive way that anarchists tend to apply
their ideas: the application of this principle here is clear. If
it is in fact not just the workers who will form the basis of a
new economic order, then it cannot be on the basis of exclusive
worker organizations that the Revolution can be built. Anarchists
therefore should not organize in the type of union which derives
its solidarity from the fact that all the members are also
workers, but should instead form groups based on the fact that
all the members are dedicated to the same idea. Clearly, if
workers are the basis of the existing economic order then it
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follows that they will have a special role to play, on that
basis, in its overthrow, but this is certainly not an entitlement
to have the only say in determining what shall come after.
When Kropotkin's ideas were translated into Spanish in the
1880's, they were to have a crucial role in forming the mould
from which the organizations of the Spanish anarchists were to be
cast. The refusal of the craft unions to become involved in
anything except campaigns for immediate gains had resulted in the
parallel reluctance of the activists in Catalonia to do anything
except propoganda and educational work amongst the unions. This
led to the breakaway of part of the Andalusian section of the
Federation, who were obviously left out, and they formed a group
called 'Los Desherados' (The Dispossessed) dedicated to immediate
and direct action, usually violent. The split occured at the
Seville congress of 1882, and the following year the Federation
denounced the activities of the breakaways. By this time, the
supposed Black Hand conspiracy, to murder the entire landowning
population of Andalusia, was being used as an excuse to persecute
the movement throughout Spain, which no doubt accounts for the
rapid dissociation of the direct action proponents. But despite
the opinion of a sociologist called in by the Government to the
effect that the Black Hand never existed, the repression
continued. During the years of relative idleness this imposed,
there was a total reappraisal of the ideas and tactics of the
Federation.
It was at last realized that the groups comprising the
Federation were failing to give each other any support, were
failing to federate successfully, were not trying to cope with
differences of background and propensities to various tactics,
and that there was a serious gap between the conception of the
parties involved as to what the Federation as a whole ought to be
doing. The Catalonian anarchists and the craft unions had proved
to be so highly successful at industrial action that many non-
anarchists, republicans, carlists and catholic workers were
joining: the anarchists in Catalonia were tired of the reformism
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and material aspirations of the unions, and were failing in their
attempt to make unionism more of an anarchist activity.
PHASE THREE
At Valencia in 1888, Kropotkin's brand of anarchist
communism was effectively adopted. The Federation was, for all
practical purposes, abandoned, to be replaced by a two-tier
organization united in the 'Pact for Union and Solidarity'. This
comprised the unions of Catalonia on the one hand, and the
'Anarchist Organization of the Spanish Region' on the other. Many
people belonged to both and were active in both: the dual
structure of two parallel organizations, one industrial and the
other political, persisted in one way or another for the next
fifty years. The lasting contribution made to anarchist theory at
this time was developed by the Anarchist Organization of the
Spanish Region, a shadowy body remarkable for the looseness of
its organizational ties, consisting almost entirely of 'grupos de
afinidad': affinity groups. The affinity group not only proved
successful then, but recently has been popularized for a new
generation of activists in the Peace and Anti-nuclear movements,
who have rediscovered and redeveloped the same organizational
structures as the Spanish Anarchists did nearly a century ago.
It was implicit in the new anarcho-communism that the prime
areas of activity should be the education of people everywhere,
the spreading of the idea of society organized on the basis of
free federations of groups dedicated to libertarian communism.
Affinity groups were small groups of people united in their own
commitment to this ideal, who would propagandize it to their best
endeavours. There were two basic forms that this propaganda could
take: propaganda by word, and propaganda by deed. In either
case, the responsibility for deciding what should be done lay
with each individual group. Affinity groups were the nearest the
Spanish Anarchists ever came to solving the problems left by the
hole in mutualist theory. They had learnt that to try and weld
76
pre-existing and disparate groups into one unified movement would
not result in that movement being what either they, or any other
of the constituent parts, would wish. The lesson learned was that
if they wanted to achieve anything, it would have to be done from
within the organization they set up themselves. Their activity
henceforth was to be activity of groups, acting autonomously, but
united about common principles and about their inter¬
relationships. These affinity groups were, on average, only
around a dozen people each. They were the organic base of the
anarchist movement for the next half-century.
Nevertheless
^ j-^g solution developed to the problems inherent
in the old Federation created new problems in its turn. The
abolition of large scale structures led to the isolation of
anarchists from each other and from the non-anarchist industrial
workers also. Even if organizing workers industrially wasn't the
be all and end all of anarchism any longer, the fact remained
that without them, progress couldn't help being slow.
Additionally, there seemed no opportunity to do anything about
the enforced isolation because if all activity was to be at a
group level, there was no real basis for a federation. We must
remember that anarchists saw no point in federation for its own
sake, but only when there was a functional purpose to it. This
purpose appeared to be lacking. It is probably difficult now for
anyone to know what it was like to be in the forefront of a new
movement with neither the help of past history, the dead weight
of past theory, or the analyses of political theorists with
higher education to draw on: but the intellectual climate of
radical politics before the Russian Revolution was probably so
incomparably different to anything known today, and Spain was
probably as isolated from mainstream European thought then as it
has been throughout much of its history.
Individual groups began to do as they wished even when their
activities adversely affected all other groups too: some of them
took propaganda by deed as far as terrorism, resulting only in
mass repression. The supposed educational value of bombings never
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materialized - indeed, it seldom does - but there was no way of
dissuading groups from adopting this type of action out of
frustration and desperation. Whilst there is no doubt that the
mutualist element of the organization was theoretically sound
enough, the crisis that had been created in the federalist part
of the theory made the development of affinity groups fruitless.
A pyrrhic victory had been achieved. The nub of the problem was
how to build an organization involving large numbers of people on
the basis of affinity groups, without that large organization
threatening the autonomy and individual commitment engendered by
such a method of organizing. The only terms acceptable were those
which retained the individual responsibility of each group for
its own actions, and at the same time enabled those actions to
work co-operatively towards anarchist, and not terrorist or
reformist, ends.
As early as 1871, Anselmo Lorenzo had advocated the idea of
unions adopting the tactic of the General Strike. This was
developed by french anarchists into the theory of revolutionary
syndicalism. Inspired by the French example, the unions in Spain
(in which anarchists were still involved) launched strikes in
both rural and urban areas around the turn of the century. At
this time, there was still no federation to weld the affinity
groups together: strikes in Barcelona, Cadiz and Seville all
took place in isolation and were easily suppressed. The need for
a new federal structure had been apparent for some time, but as
explained above, the basis for such a federation had been
lacking. By this time though, those anarchists who had been
involved in educational work in affinity groups were influential
enough in the Catalonian unions to revive the tradition of
federal co-operation, and formed a new umbrella called ' Solidaridad
Obrera', which was to plan coordinated activity by all groups.
This was the body which organized the so-called 'tragic week' in
Barcelona in 1910. The events following, culminating in the
execution of the educationalist and schoolteacher Francisco
Ferrer, led to waves of protest throughout Europe. But in Spain
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they generated such enthusiasm that they led directly to the
founding in October 1910 of the C.N.T. (Confederation Nacional
de Trabajo). In so far as the problems involved in the
mutualist/federalist congruence of ideas in a single organization
were soluble, the structure of the movement which now emerged,
based on the C.N.T., solved them.
THE C.N.T.
Though the C.N.T. was a union, it wasn't purely syndicalist:
though it contained anarchists who influenced it and were
committed to working within it, it was neither the type of front
organization envisaged by Bakunin, nor the kind of infiltrated
body modern Trotskyist entryists try to work towards. The lessons
learnt in the days of the First International on the global
scale, and by the original Spanish Alliance and the first
Federation had not been forgotten. Malatesta had been warning of
the dangers of pure syndicalism, and of the fantasy of the
General Strike as the sole sufficient condition for the formation
of a new society in the years prior to the formation of the
C.N.T., and the Spanish anarchists had their own history to
reinforce the message. The C.N.T. was clear that its aim was to
be 'comunismo libertario': in essence, libertarian communism on
broadly Kropotkinian lines. They recognized (as the French
syndicalists had failed to do) that trade union activity was a
means, not an end in itself: the experiences of the federation in
the 1880's were not forgotten. The basic aim was anarchism, not
reformism, and it was on that basis that the new structure could
begin to work.
The smallest and most local level of the new federation was
the 'sindicato unico': the federation of all the workers in one
factory or area, regardless of occupation. Separate craft unions
no longer functioned: the potentially divisive split between
skilled and unskilled workers, which would not exist in the
communes of a future society, wasn't turned into the basis of the
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new union. In this respect the C.N.T. was unique. The effect of
not recognizing different classes among the members was to foster
solidarity between all the workers of an area on a local basis,
instead of promoting solidarity within sections of the workforce
on a national basis. Local federations of workers were of course
autonomous, and were federated into counties: counties federated
into regions which formed the National committee on the classic
anarchist pattern. The autonomy of each unit ensured that control
never passed to the top of the pyramid, but always remained at
the local level in which all members lived and worked. The
National Committee of the C.N.T. was simply a correspondence and
statistical bureau: all decisions were made at congresses - all
through this organizational history of Spanish anarchism
we've been quoting congresses as the place and time for decision
making. It is remarkable that even as late as 1936, when the
Civil War broke out, the C.N.T. had only one paid official, who
was the national secretary. Though regional committees were free
to pay their own secretaries, a wilderness of regional
secretaries could never constitute a centralized hierarchy.
Secretary in this context did really mean secretary.
Another interesting feature of the organization was that the
entire national committee resided in one region designated by the
annual congress. It always rotated, and there was no fixed place
which was always at the physical centre of things. Unlike the old
Catalan unions, but like the Andalusian groups, the C.N.T. never
maintained any strike funds at all: so it had no need of a
treasurer. Bureaucratic domination of the C.N.T. was impossible
not merely because of the numerous devices which prevented the
development of a bureaucracy, but also because the C.N.T. had
dispensed with most of the traditional functions bureaucracies
fulfil. Even the unpaid union officials had to be re-elected once
each year. The federal structure of the C.N.T. as eventually
developed by the Congress at Sans in 1918 is probably the high
point of the practise of anarchist federalism to date.
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It is notable also how the type of action the C.N.T. became
involved in, and the way that the local groups made up the union,
brought out most of the strong points of the structure. The
people who founded the C.N.T. had learnt the hard way that the
strength of a federation depends on the strength of the component
groups, and that the strength of those groups must be reinforced
by the activity binding them together. The C.N.T. therefore
concentrated on direct action: there was no co-operation in
industrial negotiation, which necessarily involves the
development of a bureaucracy in a union as well as undercutting
the need for and desirability of autonomous local groups.
Strikes, boycotts and industrial sabotage were the day-to-day
methods of operation. These necessitate, as a logical prerequisite
to success, the existence of local groups to carry them out: and
every action served to make local groups more cohesive.
"Constant activity in common originated a
maximum of interpersonal communication not
only among the leaders but also between them
and the rank-and-file, and among the members:
this contributed very powerfully to the
diffusion of the values of the C.N.T.
subculture and strengthened its cohesion.
Common efforts and sufferings - 'revolutionary
gymnastics' - welded the group together as a
whole."
(J. Romero Maura, in 'Anarchism Today', ed.
Apter and Joll, p.76-77)
In other words, it wasn't just the organizational structure which
was responsible for the success of the CNT but also the way that
its activities made use of the structure, and strengthened it,
which was a crucial factor in its success. There is no reasonable
doubt that the collectivization of industry and agriculture which
took place in parts of Spain in the early days of the revolution
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was a direct result of the success of CNT in not only diffusing
anarchist ideas, but in giving people the opportunity to test
those ideas out in what was admittedly a different context, but
still a valuable one. At the same time, the CNT fostered local
groups which were willing, able and experienced enough to act
autonomously when the central government collapsed. The result
was, if only for a little while, a society run by voluntary
organization.
THE FAI
The role of the anarchist militants in the CNT was, to begin
with, an entirely positive one. Working in affinity groups, they
provided the CNT with inspiration, education and leadership.
Their role as catalysts and educators was remarkable for its
success. The looseness of their links in the forty years after
the Valencia congress of 1888 had not prevented them from
developing their ideas and had seen the development of the
largest anarchist organization in the world. However, in 1926 a
group of them met in exile in Lyons and decided that there was a
need for a more structured federation of affinity groups in Spain
: and at a congress held in Valencia in 1927, the Federacion
Anarquista Iberica - known simply as the FAI - was created. The
FAI became a revolutionary elite within the CNT. Before its
formation, anarchists militants had worked within the CNT at
local levels. Now, worried by reformism, they constituted a
seperate faction dedicated to fighting 'deviationist heresies'.
The best example of this was the expulsion of Angelo Pestana and
the "trienti s tas1 in 1931.
Pestana wished to establish a syndicalist force in politics
simply to gain material benefits for workers rather than
political revolution, which was precisely what the FAI was set up
to counter. In the ensuing political struggle the FAI managed to
obtain his dismissal as secretary of the CNT. When thirty of
Pestana's colleagues (hence 'trientistas') signed a letter
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protesting at the influence of the FAI within the organization,
they too were expelled: the resulting breach wasn't formally
healed until 1936. In retrospect, the formation of the FAI can be
seen as a mistake, even if the premise is granted that during the
1920's the spirit of Kropotkin had departed from the CNT. Instead
of constituting a watchdog within the organization ensuring that
its history was not forgotten or ignored, they quickly became its
political arm, providing authority and leadership through their
own parallel structure which was not responsible to the CNT
membership. There seems to be no reason why affinity groups could
not have carried on working within the CNT rather than
controlling it, which is in effect what they did. By the time the
civil war began, the CNT-FAI was seen as one organization. The
successes of the anarchists in the Spanish revolution, the
initial defeat of the coup and the subsequent collectivization of
large parts of the Spanish economy were largely spontaneous.
Though FAI members certainly played a leading part, it was as
individuals rather than as representatives, and the groundwork
for the success had been laid long before the FAI was ever
formed. The mistakes of the FAI were made alone. As it developed,
it became less in tune with the old anarchist principles, and
more prone to issuing orders and exerting its not inconsiderable
authority. And in 1937 the FAI abolished affinity groups, saying
that although -
"the affinity group has been for more than
fifty years the most effective organism for
propoganda, for contacts and anarchist
activity, with the new organization that is
required of the FAI the organic role of the
affinity group has been eliminated. It is the
intention of the plenum that ..... they will
not be able to participate organically in the
FAI."
(see Peirats, op.cit. p.245)
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If it was true that the FAI was a mistake, it was because it
failed to be an anarchist organization, not because it was one.
CONCLUSIONS
The history here hasn't tried to be a political or social
account of the Anarchist movement in Spain, but a small and
skeletal beginning of an organizational history, tracing the
developments of the ideas and forms of anarchism from the last
chapter, and seeing how they were applied in practise in an
anarchist organization. We've seen some of the problems faced by
a mutualist-federalist movement, and seen how they were
eventually resolved. Throughout, I've ignored political issues in
favour of organizational issues, though their interrelation make
the task difficult, and results in a version of events with an
emphasis many may not recognize.
As a postscript, I ought to add a word about the collectives
established by the graduates of the organizations we have been
discussing after the outbreak of the civil war in 1936. They
weren't, as noted above, established by the FAI or the CNT, or
even exclusively by anarchists (though they were active and the
Kropotkinian ethos pervades their work) but by ordinary Spanish
workers and labourers who were confident enough to take the
opportunity to manage their own economies. Possibly the best
instance of this was in the agrarian collectivization of Aragon -
a remarkable enterprise: it is interesting that Aragon should be
best known in Britain not for this episode in its history, but
for being where Henry VIII's first Catherine came from. The
existing village structures were used as the basis for the
creation of communes in which all property was held in common
ownership. Smallholders were not forced to join in: the communes
federated to form the Aragon Federation of Collectives. They
attempted to abolish money (but found the attempt to be
premature) and managed to run a planned but decentralized
agricultural economy themselves with enormous and well-documented
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success in all areas.
We saw earlier that in the urban industrial areas the
workers in the CNT were organized on a factory basis. Perhaps as
a result of this, the libertarian communism of the rural areas
didn't find an exact parallel in citywide communes, and nothing
as radical as the rural collectivization ever appeared in the
towns. Instead, there sprang up worker self-management in most
industries, in Barcelona especially. Railways and public
transport, health, food and public services were all run as
efficiently as previously if not more so, and on the whole more
equitably. Not one of the collectives or co-operatives found
itself unable to operate properly. Leval summed up his
comprehensive first-hand account of the collectives by writing
that
"A new way has been indicated, an achievement
which emerges as a beacon light of which all
revolutionaries who seek mankind's
emancipation and not its subjection to a new
slavery will have to follow. If they do,
yesterday's defeat will be largely compensated
for by tomorrow's victories."
(Gaston Leval,'Collectives in the Spanish
Revolution', p.39)
Perhaps the same can be said of the history of anarchist
organizing in Spain also. We've seen in it the only large scale
and long lasting libertarian organization of modern times, and it
has given us an invaluable way of tracing the evolution, problems
and stages of the anarchist theory of organization which Proudhon
began.
But the major problem he left unsolved still remains:
namely, the ways that the small group, the mutual-aid group at
the basis of mutualism, really works. We postulated earlier that
the reason for the neglect of this area in classical anarchist
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theory is because it took the concept of community for granted.
Whether or not that postulation is a correct one is beside the
point: modern sociologists have tried to remedy the fault if it
exists. There seems no reasonable doubt that the impulse to work
on 'community' arose in the social sciences because even though
nobody knew what it was, people realized that it was becoming
extinct. In the second section of the thesis, we'll look at some
ideas of 'community', and some ideas of how to manufacture a
substitute.
Summarising the first part, we have outlined both the
concept of organizational form and the particular organizational
form we are concerned with. We have established connexions
between the form and a particular political and social tradition,
and we have expounded that anarchist tradition and the theory
behind it. And, in this chapter, we have gained some experience of
how the anarchist organizational model has been used and developed
historically. We have identified one major hole in the theory
behind the anarchist organizational model, and it is with this
that we shall be concerned in the second part of the thesis. Our
approach will be in sharp contrast with the discussion up to this
point: tilt now we have been laying a philosophical and historical
foundation. The second part is more conventionally sociological.
However different it may seem, the basic course we are pursuing
remains constant. It is simply that it makes more sense to use
sociological tools and concepts for the analysis of small-scale
mutualism rather than the more historical, and more overtly
political tools that we have employed up till now. Tackling a
subject from a different angle may well shed more light on it,
but the view will be unfamiliar to begin with. This is why we
divide our text up into parts: because if one part is ended and








There is no precise definition of what 'community' is, or
even what the word means. Over 25 years ago, a social scientist
called Hillery analysed 94 definitions then current, and found
that the only thing on which they were all in agreement was that
'community' must involve people.CCi ted in Bell & Newby,
'Community Studies',p.27). Since that classic tribute to the
power of sociologists to generate muddles, the number of
definitions has probably been increasing geometrically with time,
with no greater degree of agreement. Evidence of this is to be
found in the growth of a new academic industry which doesn't
attempt to offer new definitions, but instead seeks to explain
why the old firms failed to come up with a marketable product.
The most convincing of these attempts to analyse why the concept
is such an elusive one focus on the extent to which the word
incorporates a whole host of value judgements. Community,
remarked one commentator, tends to be a God word.
However, we aren't in the business of analyzing community
for its own sake, but only for the purpose of shedding light on
mutual-aid groups, on organizations based on voluntary action by
those involved. Or to put it differently, what precisely is a
mutual-aid group, and how does it differ from, say, a bureaucracy
or a hierarchy? And what specific aspects of the nexus of ideas
that go to make up 'community' can help us to answer that
question? With this more limited scope, there is less danger of
getting bogged down in semantic mire. Nevertheless, to attempt to
answer our questions immediately is impossible without resorting
to semi-mystical and quasi-religous ideas of neighbourliness,
89
brotherhood, and (that God word) community. Though their
intuitive appeal is matched by their intuitive meaning, neither
can in any way compensate for the lack of universal agreement on
their use, especially when compared with the classic notions of
goal, authority, self interest and so on. These offer a far
greater analytical capacity when applied to formal, classically
constructed organizations than we have at our disposal if we want
to talk about mutual-aid groups. Our first job is to try and
extract some equally useful concepts for this latter purpose from
the available literature on 'community', and similar fields.
We observed in an earlier chapter that just as there is no
agreed definition of community, there is no agreed definition of
organization either. Yet whilst people have not been slow to
point out the evaluative element in the former, the values
implicit in the sociological use of the word 'organization' have,
regrettably, not been taken up in the same way. The reasons for
this lie deep in the very roots of the whole social scientific
enterprise as it has evolved since the days of the Enlightenment
(in the eighteenth century) and even earlier. In particular we
can point to the very strong ideological links which have always
been present between social science and the 'problem of social
order'. In seeking to try and explain why human beings function
socially in the way that they do, in a scientific manner, it is
an almost inevitable consequence that an aspiring scientist will
come up with laws which show (as scientific laws are meant to
show) that they actually must function in the particular way that
they do. The enterprise is tinged with conservatism from the
start. When sociologists talk about organization, they don't talk
about any possible one, or any possible form: they talk about the
ones that they can see at the moment in time they are concerned
with. It is clearly improbable that such an approach would give
us any insight into what makes a totally different form of
organization tick, and indeed, the use of the word 'anarchy' as a
synonym for disorganization and chaos is a result of this
approach. Similarly, though we want to talk about community in
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the same sort of way as we now talk about organization (in at
least the conservative sense), there is little doubt that the
values implicit in the way the concept developed in the last
century have influenced us in such a way as to make the attempt
very difficult. Somehow, the holes in the two concepts are either
different sizes or different shapes: and consequently retain
different levels of meaning.
In addition to these difficulties we also have the problem
that in many ways the idea of community is taken as being an
irreducible one, with the corollary that there is no point in
trying to reduce it further. In other words, any attempt to
analyse it is doomed to failure, as Wittgenstein observed in a
different context about the concept 'red'. For example, Nisbet
has claimed that the basic units of our sociological thought
revolve around the dichotomies of authority/power, status/class,
sacred/secular, alienation/progress, and community/society.
Attractive though this approach may seem, we can find that other
thinkers with the same fundamentalist bent have used halves of
these dichotomies in completely different pairings. To name but a
few: Etzioni contrasts authority not with power but with
compliance, Durkheim contrasted sacred with profane rather than
secular, and Buber contrasts not community but politics with
society. We could perhaps derive some fundamental trichotomies
from these: authority/power/compliance, sacred/secular/profane,
and community/society/politics - and then complete the set of
five with, say, Maine's status/contract dichotomy and the common
progress/reaction dichotomy to give us status/class/contract and
alienation/progress/reaction. I don't intend to digress along
this line of discourse any further, fruitful though the results
may be. We can safely conclude from its beginnings that a two-
dimensional analysis of multi-dimensional concepts isn't the only
way to proceed.
The dimension of community which is most often stressed by
social scientists is the evaluative one; we usually find that its
virtues and subjective meaning are more prominent than anything
91
else. We don't want to say that the concept is a value-free one,
because it clearly isn't, but then neither are various concepts
of organization value-free either as we have just seen (consider
our use of 'well-organized' or 'badly organized' if you want to
reflect on the implicit values). However, stressing the
evaluative dimension in anything isn't simply pointing out a
fact, but is itself a perjorative utterance. A case can be made
for the truth of the accusation that social scientists have
relegated whole areas of social life to a theoretical scrapheap
by dubbing them evaluative, whilst at the same time ignoring the
values taken for granted in other contexts, and I think that our
discussion of 'organization' and of 'community' has shown this
quite clearly. Other values are simply taken for granted, the
chief of these being the usually unrecognized ones we use when we
distinguish some things as ends, other things as means, and judge
one as being more important than the other. These are the values
of rationality, and rationalists (including most scientists)
regard them as being possibly more fundamental to their work than
facts. Other values, by implication, are irrational and perhaps
insane. Rational in some contexts means reasonable, whilst
irrational in the same context is synonymous with unreasonable:
but this is not the context in which we ought to be thinking. The
essential step in the rationalist method is to identify means and
ends, and anything that doesn't fit into this neat scheme is
termed evaluative, or irrational, or even undesirable. Sociology
students are still taught today how the discovery of the
irrational parts of organizational functioning were discovered at
the Western Electric Company in 1929, yet as late as the 1960's
Blumberg could still write a book showing, among other things,
that the result of these studies was systematically
misinterpreted, due in large part to their relegation to the
'irrational' pigeonhole. In fact, what is irrational and
inexplicable to people who stick to a purely rational set of
ends-means assumptions makes perfect sense if those assumptions
can be abandoned. A more well known instance of this same
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approach can be found in the early writings of R.D. Laing on the
behaviour of mad people. He took personal behaviour described as
mad, and showed how it can make perfect sense if we don't try and
fit it into our own behavior patterns but start with a fresh
slate: part of Laing's thesis is that the medical rational model
has distorted our own perception of how schizophrenics behave.
TONNIES AND THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY
What we shall do is examine the genesis of the concepts of
both community and organization in order to see the way in which
one emerged as unscientific, evaluative, and theoretically
irreducible, whilst the other came to be seen as the epitome of
rational behaviour - organizational as the cure for all social
malaise. In the process of rescuing some of the usefulness of the
word "community", we will inevitably call into question the
utility of some of the other concept, of organization. We'll
concentrate our attention on the work and theories of Ferdinand
Tnnnies and Max Weber. Tonnies, in his book 'Gemeinschaft und
Gesel Ischaf t' (usually transalated as 'Community and Associ ati orf)
laid out the parameters within which most later theorists of
community operated. Weber performed the same service for
organization theory in his 'Wirtschaft und GeselIschaft' (usually
transalated as 'Economy and Society).
There is a similarity wor|<; 0f both these men in that
they both use rationality as one of their central concepts, and
both arrive at this position through a consideration of human
action and motivation. Virtually all typologies of human social
action must rely on some motivational considerations. However,
attributing motives to people is at the best of times a suspect
and risky business, and to use those motives as a basis for
theorizing could be considered quite unsound. Yet there is no
easy alternative. I've attributed simplistic motives to people in
this thesis, and no doubt will do so again. There is a temptation
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to think that while we cannot see inside one individual's head, a
group of people acting together is quite a different matter. Even
if this is true in some cases, it is an assumption with no
logical foundation, despite the fact that it has always been used
in an a priori manner. So, given that all we can say about human
motivation is really neither more nor less than speculation,
there is enough reason for us to begin from a different
assumption.
The statement we shall take as a typical example of what we
are questioning is one that Tonnies makes at the beginning of his
introduction -
"What, why and how do thinking human beings
will and want ? The simple and most general
answer is: that they want to attain an end and
seek the most appropriate means of attaining
it. They strive towards a goal, and seek the
correct way leading thereto."
('Gem ei nschaf t und Gesel Ischaf t',p.14)
The beauty of this as an opening statement is that on one level
it cannot be argued with because it is pure tautology.
Indubitably, if we look for the sort of goals Tonnies describes,
we shall always be able to find them, even if the goal is self-
gratification: and consequently, we will have a magical key for
explaining all human action. Yet we know that there are different
levels of human motivation, and most people can recognize them.
Consider a man chopping a tree down with an axe, and think of
the questions about his motivation that might reasonably be
asked. "Why are you doing that?" is the basic question, but it
can be asked over and over again of each and every statement with
which he responds .
"I'm chopping the tree down" says our hero when first
approached, and follows up with ..."Because it has Dutch Elm
disease" "Because that is the only way of stopping the
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spread of the disease" "Because I don't want other elms to
di e".„... "Because I like them, they look nice" at which point
the mad sociologist asking all these irritating questions is
attacked by a man wielding a large axe and has to run away.
Beauty is truth, truth beauty: that, one suppose, is all you need
to know. But is our man with the axe simultaneously performing
some half dozen different actions?
If we reject that as an idiotic way of looking at it, we
have to decide which explanation is the true one. Maybe none of
them are true. Ask a pre-school child why they're blowing bubbles
in the tea, and the chances are you'll get either "I want to", "I
don't know" or "because .." as an answer. Rationality has to be
learned like anything else if its starting point, the
identification of goals, is any indication. There is no evidence
to support the contention that human beings have a fixed innate
tendency to act towards one fixed goal. We are not all suffering
from monomania. Most people would accept that to look for only
one motive in a set of multi-layered levels of action is
misguided: our man with an axe had a lot of good reasons for
chopping away, not just one.
The straw men we are attacking here are not so very far away
from Tonnies and Weber. Though they both recognized that action
is explicable only in a multiplicity of motivations, they both
based their theories of community and of organization on
identifying just one type of motivation as being a central one.
Both justified this on the grounds of using ideal types, but an
ideal type is surely meant to be an exaggeration of reality, not
a distortion of it. There is a good case to be made out for the
use of ideal types when there is a definite tendency for the
phenomenon under investigation to tend towards one pole. If the
phenomenon does not show such a tendency, then the
usefulness is limited, and if (as with motivation) it is
inherently multipolar then the use of ideal types is misleading.
To look at a multifaceted phenomenon from only one point of view
cannot give a true perspective, and to claim that the other
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possible perspectives are unimportant is to compound the error by
producing a circular justification.
Attempts at ideal-typical analysis of motivation are in the
best traditions of sociological gobbledygook. Tonnies began his
attempt with an a priori discussion of human will. In his
distinctive and inimitable style, the incomprehensibility of
which shines through despite the best efforts of the translator,
he wrote:
"The concept of human will, the correct
interpretation of which is essential to the
subject of this treatise (Gemeinschaft und
GeselIschaft) implies a twofold meaning. Since
all mental action involves thinking, I
distinguish between the will which includes
the thinking and the thinking which
encompasses the will. Each represents an
inherent whole which unites in itself a
multiplicity of feelings, instincts and
desires. This unity should in the first case
be understood as a real or natural one; in the
second case a conceptual or artificial one.
The will of the human being in the first form
I call natural will (Wesenwi I le); in the
second form rational will (Kurwille)".
(from 'Gemeinschaf t und Gesel Ischaf t, p.119)
He goes on to add that "natural wiLL involves thinking
rational will is a product of thinking itself.^At another'
point, he adds a third category of intellectual will:
"Intellectual will gets on well with
subconscious motives which lie deep in mans'
nature and at the base of his natural will,
whilst rational will eliminates such




The second passage is quoted in case anyone thought they had
fully understood the first one. Which is not to say that
understanding is impossible - I suspect that Tonnies was trying
to identify what Freud later termed id, ego and superego.
Certainly such an identification helps make sense of what he says
in the passages quoted above, even though the analogy is less
useful later on.
To continue. Tonnies considered human relationships as cases
of common volition. With his typology of wills, he derived two
basic types of relationship. In a Gemeinschaft-like relationship,
natural will predominates: in a GeselIschaft-like relationship,
rational will predominates. These, he says, are ideal types. The
Gemeinschaft-GeselIschaft dichotomy thus made its dramatic
entrance on to the sociological stage. The manner is rather like
that of a conjuring trick: we are so much involved in watching
the intricacies of the hand motions and gesticulations that the
sleight-of-hand which pulls out the rabbit goes unnoticed. In
this case, the palm of the conjurer concealed both the lack of
precision and fuzziness of the 'Kurwille' and 'Wesenwille' and
also the lack of any attempt to reconcile the admitted
'multiplicity of thoughts and desires' with the assertion that
human will is basically a one-dimensional continuum. This isn't
to say that the concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft aren't
useful: they have proved their worth despite the inadequacies of
their philosophical and scientific origins. Those inadequacies,
though, are neither trivial nor accidental.
We've already seen that we are used to looking at things
with an eye to rationalist explanations, always on the lookout
for goals, and this may be a deceptively simple kind of
operation. When Tonnies writes that -
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"on the one hand there is simple emotional
(impulsive) and therefore irrational volition
and action, and on the other there is the
simple rational volition and action in which
the means are arranged"
(ibid, p.16)
we think we've understood him. Whereas what he has done is
precisely what we earlier accused rationalists of doing: he has
summarily dismissed everything which isn't goal directed from his
enquiry, and our comprehension, because it is impulsive and
irrational. So later on, when he comes out with all the
profundities which may well be contained somewhere in his theses
on the differences between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, we can
only shake our heads sadly that the glories of gemeinschaft are
becoming extinct in the pursuit of progress, and must remain
forever incomprehensible and inaccessible to us. We can all agree
on how one is organic and real, and how the other is artificial
and mechanical, and sigh when Tonnies observes that
"in Gemeinschaft people are united in spite of
all separating factors"
whereas
"in Gesellschaft people are separated in spite
of all uniting factors."
(ibid. p.74)
We appreciate only too well that a Gesellschaft -js full of
isolated, self-interested individuals, forever behaving like
rational zombies, but we don't even notice that though community
is for some reason unattainable, the reason is never explained.
In fact, of course, it has been defined as primitively irrational
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and therefore not susceptible to reason or causal explanation -
not a proper subject of study for a scientist.
What has happened is that Tonnies began from the position
that goals are what really matter. That this is a value-laden
assertion we have noted before. It is hardly surprising that an
approach which takes goals as being basic should make sense when
applied to behaviour which is clearly aimed at a goal, but
retreat into mysticism ("the flowers and fruits of the natural
will")when confronted by any behaviour which might be easier to
understand in other ways. The monotheism of the one goal is, like
all monotheisms, fundamentally intolerant, and can only cope with
apparently goal-less behaviour by labelling it irrational - the
modern equivalent of heresy. By definition, such irrational
behaviour is supposedly unpatterned and mad. Fit (supposedly) for
women and children only, says the rational paternalist nineteenth
century philosopher. But if 'community' is too evaluative by
comparison with other concepts, it is only because the values
attached to rationality - that goals are what count - have not
been recognized.
That is fundamentally what is wrong with the classical view
of community, as it developed from Tonnies' original formulation
of 'Gemeinschaft". There is an innate, rationalist, logic which
mitigates against any attempt to make sense of community as
having any bearing on organization, because organization as
defined is quintessential ly rational, whilst community is merely
evaluative and 'simply emotional'. This isn't to say that the
concepts are useless, but only that the way they were defined and
the context in which they were refined were both fundamentally
biased. The whole purpose of this criticism is to enable to us to
perceive and understand this one-sidedness, so that when we try
to understand how a mutual-aid group operates, we won't regard it
as being mystically incomprehensible. As Bakunin once said in a
different context, the urge to destroy is a creative urge.
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WEBER AND THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION
Max Weber began, Like Tonnies, from a typology of action,
but his subsequent exposition of the theory of organization and
the 'Fundamental Concepts of Sociology' is both more resilient
and more complex than that of Tonnies. Weber has shown that he
has had, historically, more staying power. He begins from a
slightly different question, for whereas Tonnies asked about
wilt, Weber asked about motive instead.
"What motives determine and lead the
individual members and participants to
behave in such a way that the community came
into being in the first place, and that it
continues to exist?"
(Weber, 'Gemeinschaft und GeselIschaft' in
'Theory of Social and Economic Organization*
ed. Parsons and Henderson)
Weber claims that any real enquiry begins with this question. It
is both clearer and more powerful (in terms of leading to useful
questions) than asking, as Tonnies did, what people want: but as
framed by Weber it is important to see that it is a variant of
the problem of social order, which we have already criticized.
Weber doesn't go on to classify motives, but instead talks of
'modes of orientation' of actions. There are four such modes.
Affectual actions are oriented towards emotions and feelings.
Traditional actions are oriented towards habits. The quadruple
classification is completed by two types of rational action:
'wertrational' actions are oriented towards ultimate ends, or
values, whilst 'zweckrational' actions are oriented towards
specific goals. Weber does not say, however, precisely what a
'mode of orientation' is, nor does he explain how it relates to a
motive. This is not a trivial objection. It seems slightly odd to
100
have to rely on purely subjective assessments when deciding what
type of action any instance belongs to. The closest we ever get
to having a definition of 'mode of orientation' is as a
"typically appropriate subjective meaning" (ibid,p.120). We know
that motives can have multiple levels in many instances: Weber
admits as much himself. "It would be unusual to find concrete
cases of action which were oriented in only one or other of
these ways"(ibid,p,11 7).
The nub of the problem lies in the way we decide which modes
to ignore, the way we determine which mode of action is
appropriate. Though all are subjective, some are more subjective
than others, and in the last analysis the choice of the most
significant level depends not on any intrinsic quality of the
action itself, but on the way we want to incorporate it into our
theories. Take any action - someone chopping down a tree, again,
will do nicely, as it is one used by Weber himself Cibid,p.95).
He points out that it may be performed to work off a fit of rage,
or to make firewood, or to earn money. It might be done to save
other trees: or perhaps it is a pine, and Christmas is
approaching. We are trying to establish the mode of orientation
of the action. The first thing we have been trained to do is to
look for a motive - a rational goal. The form of the question is
'Why ?", and it leads to an answer in the form "Because. An
overwhelming urge on the part of an aspiring scientist is to look
for outside corroboration, an objective need - in short, a goal.
Unless one happens to be a psychiatrist, in which case the
temptation is to see all action as being affectual. Which is not
a flippant point - we choose to decide which mode of action we
shall regard as being the most significant, and the significance
we look for is the significance for us. A psychiatrist's needs
are different to a sociologist's, as his profession depends on
analysing feelings, not goals: so a psychiatrist would tend to
see all action as affectual rather than rational. We are trying
to expose a deep seated bias in the enterprise itself.
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Weber was perceptive enough to recognize this bias. "It is
unavoidable tendency of sociological concepts to assume a
rationalistic character with a belief in the predominance of
rational motives or even a positive value of rationalism"
(ibid,p.107). He anticipates our criticism but his distinction
between the rationalist bias of the enterprise and the values of
rationality is unconvincing, and the confusion he warns us
against is therefore equally unclear to anyone seeking to avoid
it. Weber was led to conclude that all values are irrational -
"the more the value to which the action is oriented is elevated
to the status of an absolute value, the more 'irrational'
the corresponding action is." (ibid,p.117). Everybody knows you
can't argue with a fanatic, which is what the quotation seems to
be saying, but Weber has clearly thrown his baby out with his
bathwater. He makes clear that in the sense in which he uses the
term, anything 'irrational' cannot be a guide to action, which
equally clearly implies irresponsibility on the part of an
irrational actor. If that isn't placing a 'positive value on
rationality', I should like to know what is.
His anticipation of the problem didn't prevent Weber
incorporating precisely the rationalist values he was so wary of
into his exposition of fundamental concepts. Of particular
importance to us here is his own version of the Gemeinschaft-
Gesellschaft distinction, and his subsequent treatment of what
constitutes order in a group. These questions lie at the heart of
any analysis of what a mutual-aid group is. Weber said that we
would be in error if we gave a positive value to rationalism. We
don't know for certain what Weber believed: but if any one person
can be held responsible for incorporating rationalist values into
organization theory, it was he. (If we wanted to hold two people
responsible, the other would almost certainly be Taylor, of
scientific management fame.)
Weber's own terms for the distinction which in his thought
occupies the place of the Gemeinschaft-GeselIschaft distinction
were Vergemeinschafung and Vergesel Ischafung: usually translated
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as 'communal' and 'associative'. A communal relationship
"is based on a subjective feeling of the
parties whether affectual or traditional that
they belong together. A social relationship
will, on the other hand, be called associative
if and only in so far as the orientation of
the social action within it rests on a
rationally motivated adjustment of interests
or a similiarly motivated agreement, whether
the basis of the rational judgement be
absolute values or expediency."
(ibid,p.136 )
Rational judgements are thus firmly distinguished from any other
sort, based on tradition or feeling. Before evaluating this, let
us move on to the next stage in the argument.
Weber defined a 'corporate group' as a social relationship
with some sort of order: fixed members, for example, denotes some
order. An 'organization' is then defined as a separate type of
group, as a "system of purposive activity of a specified
kind"(ibid,p.151). It isn't necessary to have people: there is
organization in a robot assembly line. The key elements in this
are System and Purpose: many contemporary analysts use the same
concepts, for instance in defining organizations as purposeful
systems.
The next step is to combine both these ideas into that of a
corporate organization, an 'associative social relationship'
characterized by purposeful activity of a specified kind,
undertaken by administrators. Weber then goes on incorporate his
concepts of authority and control.
But once again, a conjurer has been up to some clever
tricks. What has happened is that the quite plausible notions of
communal and associative relationships have been combined with
the concept of organization to yield not two types of human
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social organization, as we might expect, but only one. Corporate
groups are defined as being associative ones only, and communal
organizations have been stipulated out of existence. Presumably
Weber thought that a communal relationship, based on subjective
feelings of belonging, could have no purpose without becoming an
associative group (but because Weber is dead, we'll never know).
His legacy was thus one with an inherently rationalist bias,
despite his warnings to us to avoid the temptation. Communal
groups are left as a footnote, whilst all the subsequent
discussion is centred on the associative ones. We have seen that
organization is partially derived from the concept of corporate
group, which is characterized by maintenance of order in a social
relationship: but again, we find that Weber's discussion of types
of order is confined to associative groups only. And needless to
say, the whole of his seminal discussion of power, control,
authority and legitimation is conducted solely in relation to
associative groups. He does allow for the possibility of
legitimate order in a group based on subjective feelings of
belonging, but at no point spends any time on it. This is a
curious omission for a supposedly objective investigator, for
clearly one might expect a different type of order would be
needed in a group which was communal. Anything resembling
coercive authority could be expected to undermine feelings of
belonging in such a group if it were the major method of co¬
ordinating activity.
So despite his assertion that a rationalist enterprise need
not endorse rationalist values, all Weber's analysis is
concentrated on the type of group he himself has defined as being
the more rational, to the exclusion of any other type. When he
makes his own distinction between voluntary and compulsory
organization (which he calls 'Anstalt' and 'Verein'), the one we
began with, he simply gives us his definitions without any
discussion, and states that both are associative: rationalistic
and goal-directed above all else. The implicit assumption that no
communally based group can be associative is one which Weber
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never seeks to defend or to justify - indeed, the case goes by
default. But it is an assumption for which there is no
theoretical basis at all. It can be considered a prime example of
the bias that Weber was so keen to avoid creeping into his work,
and turns out to be false even in his own work.
Consider the following quotation, which makes a point
fundamental to any theory of mutual-aid groups, but which Weber
entirely fails to follow through or connect up with his analysis.
"It is by no means true that the existence of
common qualities, a common situation, or
common modes of behaviour imply the existence
of a communal social relationship. Thus, for
instance, the possession of a common
biological inheritance by virtue of which
people can be classified as belonging to the
same 'race' naturally implies no sort of
communal social relationship between them. By
restrictions on social intercourse and on
marriage, people may find themselves in a
similiar situation, a situation of isolation
from the environment which imposes these
distinctions. But even if they all react to
this situation in the same way, this does not
constitute a communal relationship. The latter
does not even exist even if they all have a
common 'feeling* about this situation and its
consequences. It is only when this feeling
leads to a mutual orientation of their
behaviour to each other that a social
relationship arises between them, a social
relationship to each other and not only to the
persons in the environment. Furthermore, it is
only in so far as this relationship involves
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feelings of belonging together that it is a
'communal relationship'."
(ibid,138)
Weber then illustrates this point by saying that whilst Jews
didn't necessarily have any communal relationship with each
other, they did in Zionist circles. Yet Zionism, even at that
time, was a purposive political movement; before the 1930's it
was largely a mutual-aid network amongst Jews aimed at
establishing a national home. So, using Weber's own example, it
is clear that an organization can be both communal and purposive
- a fact his theory does not allow for.
The account of the genesis of a communal relationship we
quoted at some length is important. It can apply to virtually any
mutual-aid group existing today - community groups, groups in the
Women's Movement, disabled persons' groups, and even Kropotkin's
cyclists: the stage of realizing a common condition and problem,
mutually oriented action followed by the stage of trying to do
something together. Only this last was omitted in Weber's
account. The process of the development of what is essentially a
political consciousness which we've uncovered is an important
point which is central to many modern mutual-aid groups, who
exist in a pressure-group political environment.
The removal of the communal, or Gemeinschaft, elements from
the rationalist theories developed by the Tonnies-Weber tradition
was reinforced by the popularity in the early part of this
century of Taylor and his 'scientific management' theories, which
were probably central in institutionalizing organization theory
as a branch of social science in schools of management and
administration (as well as sociology) on both sides of the
Atlantic. Taylor built his ideas on the same rationalist basis,
in his case on the assumption that people, to answer Tonnies'
question about what people want, act out of individual self-
interest and gain. His 'science' consisted of attempts to find
the right carrot to dangle in front of the donkey. Even after the
recognition of the complexity of human action and behaviour in
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the thirties, when Elton Mayo and the 'human relations' school
were busy rediscovering the fact that individuals can never be
treated as if they act purely in isolation, and were exploring
the nature of the relationships which develop among groups of
people who work together or are put in common situations, the
assumptions really didn't change much. Human relationships a la
Mayo were too often seen as a barrier to efficient and truly
rational functioning, and really wouldn't exist in an ideal
world. The carrot wasn't offered up raw any longer: instead,
managers went off to learn about group dynamics from Kurt Lewin,
and read about 'informal organization' (as any communal elements
were known - as if they were somehow improper). The mental
shackles of rationalism were never really thrown off.
We've seen how community theory and organization theory have
so developed as to reject and mystify many of the key concepts we
are likely to need in looking at mutual-aid groups as purposive
organizations. Many people in such mutual-aid groups would be
very puzzled by the fact that according to the books, they ought
not to exist at all. Developing new attitudes and assumptions
isn't done overnight, but we ought to try now to start from the
beginning and find a new set if we can. One thing we do know is
that we won't assume that the most important things about a group
or a person are goals. The cumulative effect of the old theories
was to establish a completely unnecessary and misleading
dichotomy between groups which have goals, between types of
relationships which can be explained in rationalist terms, and
between those communal relationships which cannot be so
explained. Unless we bridge that gap, we'll never be able to
understand what the basis of a mutual-aid group is.
Our next step is to put together some parts of the
discussion of organizational form with which we began with the
critique of rationalism we've developed just now. It ought to be
possible to do this with a better awareness of the way in which
values necessarily affect any way of looking at social phenomena,






FINDING A PLACE TO START
We are going to Look at mutual-aid groups and attempt to do
so without the rationalistic (goal-directed) bias which creeps
into the ways of looking at organization and community we've
looked at up to now. Tonnies began with the question "What, why
and how do thinking human beings will and want?" When Tonnies
answered his own question by saying that people "want to attain
an end and seek the correct way Leading thereto", the questions
what, why and how became confused, levels of motivation became
mixed up, and the answer to the 'how' part tacitly ignores any
non goal-directed behaviour. So perhaps this might not be the
best question to ask as a beginning. It also leads, as we have
seen, directly to attempts to categorize action according to
goals or motives, There are a number of good reasons (which we
worked out in the last chapter) why this is not a good move.
Firstly, the imputation of motives and will to actions or
groups of actions is pure guesswork, since the motive cannot be
directly observed in individuals, let alone in large groups,
where the existence of a group motive is probably in doubt.
Secondly, it always results, for social scientists, in
rationalist explanation - that after all is what the question is
designed to bring out, and other kinds of answer are absent.
Thirdly, it always appears necessary for efforts on these lines
to include such catch-all categories as 'natural will' or
'affectual action', which serve two main functions. They give the
appearance of completeness to an inadequate typology, and they
also act as dustbins, whose acceptable names are synonymous with
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'irrational' and whose contents wouldn't fit neatly into a
rational scheme in any case. Nothing much is really explained -
rather like the phlogiston theory of combustion, which postulated
a substance called 'phlogiston' , the release of which gave the
appearance of flame. All phlogiston meant was inflammability.
As Popper keeps on pointing out in relation to Marx and
Freud, theories which explain everything in this way explain
nothing at all. Probably there is a certain value in them as a
way of seeing, as a perspective on the world, but that is about
all. Once this is granted, it follows that there may well be some
things which they cannot be used to look at with much success.
This argument applies to any perspective, but here and now we
apply it to rationalist ones in particular.
So it would seem we must begin with a different type of
approach. Not only are motives and goats too abstract an
approach, but a case can be made for the view that to say most
human beings want to attain an end is actually untrue of most of
our behaviour. People are usually caught up inside patterns of
events with an internal logic all of their own. Introspectively
at any rate, the idea of continuous behaviour directed towards a
single goal seems to be a myth. I am usually more concerned with
style than with substance - with doing something efficiently, or
quickly, or beautifully, or well, or even with just plain
finishing whatever it is rather than asking myself whether or not
it is worthwhile doing in the first place. Most employment is of
this nature. People fall into patterns of action rather than
aiming for specific goals all the time. Categorizing such
behaviour as 'affectual' or 'traditional' is beside the point
here: the point is that motives and goals are simply not the
right things to ask questions about. In as much as they are
important, they too form part of a total pattern of behaviour.
The central task becomes to understand how the pattern works and
how it is maintained. So we could try shifting our starting point
to actions rather than motives - possibly a better place to
start, as there is an objective reality to refer to.
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We could reformulate Tonnies' question and answer: What, why
and how do thinking human beings really act? They behave in
certain patterns. This rather unpromising way of putting things
is simply an assertion that ends and goals don't exist in
isolation. Patterns of social action and behaviour are a
truer representation of reality than models based on goals or
motives. As it stands, it is just as a priori as any assumption
made by the rationalist theories. Again, though, it is only meant
as an illustration that there are other possible ways of
analysing social action. Quite clearly, I've no great commitment
to the idea of pattern as a fundamental concept either. Our
impetus came from the need to start somewhere else, not with
will, motives or goals.
We have used a minimal definition of organization as
coordinated human behaviour, and referred to the way it was
coordinated as the form of the organization. To say that an
organization is also a pattern of actions is to restate the same
thing, but starting from the point we have just reached. Both
definitions are in many ways too broad for most uses, but though
not sufficient as conditions they are both necessary. Even if
patterns of organization exist outside organizations, you'll
never find an organization without patterns of action within
itself. The topography of the pattern, the way coordination
happens - what we have called the form - emerges as one of the
central features of the organization: so we see that starting
from questions about action, we find our attention directed
towards forms, whereas Weber started from motives and ended up
with goals. Not only can we connect up social theory and
organizational form, but we see once again evidence of one of our
earlier anarchist precepts - the means we use in our argument
affect the conclusion we come to, and that the ends can't be
separated from the means. Both are part of human behaviour
pat terns.
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Earlier we observed that voluntary and compulsory
organization were two distinct forms. We have to develop this
theme more fully. Our patterns of action are rather like a jigsaw
- we have no single coordinating concept central to our argument,
simply a place from which we begin. When doing a jigsaw, the
universal method of proceeding is to get the bits with the
straight edges done first. We have analagous pieces to our
patterns here - concepts we have been using unreflectively, all
of which we have been assuming have straight edges, so to speak.
If we are to complete a pattern of mutual-aid groups, we have to
fit these straight edges to each other. We have two groups of
concepts with straight edges. The first includes ideas of order,
control, coordination, authority, leadership, legitimacy and
power. The second group of concepts include voluntary,
compulsory, mutual, belonging, self-interest and co-operation.
All the pieces in the first group relate to the organization and
its effects on the individual, whilst the second group,
conversely, are more about the individuals and their relation
with the organization. At least that is the idea - the object of
the first collection is the group with the individual as the
subject, and in the second collection the individual is the
object and the group the subject. The way we fit these concepts
together is the next item on our agenda.
CONCEPTS OF AUTHORITY
Organizations of any type or form, like all other human
interactions, are composed of people acting according to certain
rules. The concept of rule-governed behaviour, and following a
rule, has passed from philosophy to social science, and the first
thing we'll do is to look at what a rule is, and how it relates
to authority - how the bits fit together. Peter Winch has argued
that
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"The acceptance of authority is not just
something that, as a matter of fact, you
cannot get along without if you want to
participate in rule-governed activities;
rather, to participate in rule-governed
activities is in a certain way to accept
authority. For to participate in such activity
is to accept that there is a right and a wrong
way of doing things, and that the decision of
what is right or wrong in a particular case
can never depend completely on one's own
caprice."
(Winch, 'Authority1 in 'Political Philosophy'
ed. Quinton)
Raymond Plant, who also cites the above passage, develops the
argument further and brings in the connection with community.
"Community, as a sphere of interaction, must
be rule-governed, and thus authority is a
necessary condition of community."
(Plant,'Communi ty and Ideology',p.54)
What exactly does authority mean here? In the context in which
Plant uses the term, he is talking about the exercise of
authority by social workers, but he never works out precisely
what the semantic content of the word is. Clearly, if all
authority is exercised by individuals, which appears to be the
interpretation to which Plant tacitly adheres in his defence of
the social worker's exercise of it, there are organizational
implications of particular relevance to anarchist theory. We've
tried to link up mutual aid and community before, and found that
an approach via rationalist assumptions is undesirable because
it is too evaluative. This argument appears somewhat different
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because on the surface it proceeds from Linguistic assumptions
rather than rationalist ones, and as it stands it applies to alt
groups, organizations and spheres of human life. It demands close
scrutiny.
Authority is one of those concepts whose use in sociology
derives, like that of bureaucracy, from Weber. Virtually
everybody follows or cites him in defining authority as being the
same as legitimate power, where power is the ability to impose
one's will on others. The legitimacy, according to Weber's
equally well-known schematic, is either rational-legal,
charismatic, or traditional - most people seem to regard
legitimacy as being the critical element in authority. The thrust
of Plant's argument, from which the above was taken, is to
reassure supposedly non-directive social workers that they don't
have to worry about the power they possess because community -
which they of course approve of - implies some sort of authority
(that is, legitimate power) in any case. The relationship between
community, power, legitimacy and authority is thus very much
influenced by Weber, despite the apparently innocuous linguistic
origins of Plant's argument.
The idea that rule-governed behaviour necessarily implies
acceptance of authority in the sense of legitimate power wielded
by someone else is, I contend, fundamentally mistaken. It is
confused on at least two different levels, because the concepts
used are ambiguous.
The first level of ambiguity lies in the concept of a rule.
John Rawls has pointed out in a different context that there are
two ways to use the word.
"Those engaged in a practice recognise the
rules as defining it. The rules cannot be
taken as simply describing how those in the
practice in fact behave: it is not as if they
were simply obeying the rules In a game
of baseball, if a batter were to ask 'Can I
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have four strikes?" it would be assumed that
he was asking what the rule was: and if, when
told what the rule was he were to say that he
meant that on this occasion he thought it
would be best on the whole for him to have
four strikes rather than three, this would
most kindly be taken as a joke."
("Two Concepts of Rules' in 'Theories of
Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot)
Rawls goes on to say that the whole point of the illustration is
that behaviour governed by such rules of practice doesn't need
legitimation: it is the practice itself which needs legitimation
if anything does.
It is clear that according to my reading of what he says,
Plant has confused the two concepts of rules. Obeying a rule in
the first sense is following a summary directive, acquiescing in
someone else's use of power, enforced upon you. Someone makes a
rule, you obey, so they have authority over you. In the second
sense, though, engaging in activity governed by rules of practice
isn't accepting authority in the sense of legitimate power -
except in special cases, such as learning how to play a game from
someone, or going to speech classes. Most of the time, we can
indulge in such rule governed behaviour without anyone in
particular exerting any authority over us thereby. Language is
rule-governed behaviour, as is well known - but to speak the
Queen's English doesn't mean that the Queen has authority over
our behaviour when we speak. Legitimate power is an inapplicable
concept here. By its very nature, such authority must be vested
in some purpose or institution for it to be enforceable. Even
when we are teaching children how to speak, or learning a foreign
tongue, the only real sanction is that if one doesn't learn then
one won't be understood. We may break the rules of grammar with
relative impunity - we may not be understood when we do, but we
are unlikely to be arrested for grievous syntactical damage. When
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we engage in action covered by non-enforceable rules of practice,
we aren't accepting authority in the Weberian sense at all. The
fact that there is a right and a wrong way of doing something
doesn't mean a thing in this regard if nobody enforces sanctions
aimed specifically at discouraging further breaches of the rule.
If we break these rules we are incompetent rather than wicked.
The second level of ambiguity relates to the idea of
legitimacy. There are two levels at least on which we can talk
about the legitimacy of a practise, which emerge clearly if we
bring the concept of order into our jigsaw. In one sense, order
is equivalent to the notion of an authoritarian system. Weber
analysed this level fully, dividing it into regulative and
administrative order, but the sense is the same. A group of
people decide what is to be, or how something is to be done, and
then get others to obey them in an ordered (corporate) group. In
this meaning of order, classically formal organizations from
armies and railways to coal mines and hospitals are ordered. What
appear to be rules of practise are simple rules of thumb, such as
clocking on in the morning. Each deviation is noted and punished
by the authorities who enforce the order. Rules are enforced.
Order is maintained. Weber analysed the legitimacy of this sort
of order at some length.
The second sense of order is analagous to the second sense
of rule. It is the same sort of order on finds in logic,
mathematics, or the periodic table of elements. This isn't
enforceable or enforced: it needs no legitimation because the
order is built into the pattern. Like rules of practise, to be a
part of that order is to accept it. When Tonnies talked of
Gemeinschaft as being real and Gesellschaft as being artificial,
the mystical and esoteric sense in which one takes the remarks
mask this possible and plausible difference in the type of order
in the two groups. Once defined as part of the second of our
kinds of order, an internal logic guides one's actions. Which
doesn't necessarily mean that free choice is abolished. When
playing chess, for instance, there is an infinite number of
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possible moves which you can choose from, all of which fit into
the ordered rules of the game of chess. All the decisions are
taken within the rules which order the game, and allow us to play
it at all. The case of this sense of order which interests us
most in human behaviour is in co-operative relationships. To
behave co-operatively is to maintain a co-operative order to the
relationship. Authority, once again, doesn't belong here, simply
because to enforce a co-operative action is a logical
impossibility - either it is free or it isn't co-operative.
Certainly, there may well be a rationale which underlies this
activity, but it isn't a legitimation of power and is
consequently not to be equated with authority in a Weberian
sense. It would be mistake to suppose that anything which has a
legitimate purpose, a justification or a rationale is necessarily
authoritarian. Once again, the rules of English grammar, which
consist of the order of the words in the language when combined
with their meanings, are legitimate and justified, but that does
not make English an authoritarian language.
The argument that all rule-governed behaviour involves the
acceptance of legitimate power is most certainly mistaken.
Equally mistaken is any argument seeking to hold that all ordered
activity means someone must do the ordering. There is a clear
need for a clearer terminology when talking about these areas. To
use the words power or authority in the accepted Weberian sense
may be mistaken, but there is certainly a need to find a way of
talking about the kind of order which doesn't include the
imposition of one person's will on another, and the type of
authoritative elements which are not authoritarian.
AUTHORITARIANISM AND AUTHORITATIVENESS
Possibly the most common semantic distinction which is made
to resolve the ambiguity which revolves around the word
'authority' is between the twin concepts of authoritarian and
authoritative. Though both derive from the same word, the
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implications of each are very different. The type of authority
which is authoritarian is the Weberian one, meaning the
legitimate use of power, where power is defined as the ability to
impose one's will on others. It derives from the status of the
person in authority, and is ultimately sanctioned by coercion -
the ability to punish, fire, arrest or to fine are among the
possible sanctions applied. The type of authority which is
authoritative, by contrast, involves the use of knowledge rather
than force - knowledge may be power, but it is neither coercive
nor imposed on others. Authoritativeness derives not from status,
but from skill, experience and expertise. It is sought rather
than imposed, and the only sanction is the possibility of failure
through not heeding advice.
The two notions are not ideal types, for they are not
logically distinct - they are not at either end of a continuum.
They often turn out to be inextricably linked in practice - not
only is some knowledge typically reserved for those wielding
authoritarian authority, such as financial information possessed
by management in large companies but not possessed by workers,
but many with specific skills in any situation use the sanction
of witholding their transmission or application to gain coercive
power. Some professions in particular - law and medicine are the
most clear cut example - involve both authoritative and
authoritarian elements. The confusion between the two types of
authority is genuine, and often deliberate. Commonly the intent
is to mystify whoever is subject to authority by using the
undoubted element of skill and expertise to legitimize the
elements of coercion. Thus arbitrary decisions can be cloaked in
the veil of superior knowledge, and knowing what is best. In
practise this avoids thorny problems of Tightness as well as
legitimacy, whilst even in theory it is still a device commonly
used to legitimize the institutionalization of professional
power. As Plant did in the passage quoted earlier, all that is
needed is a demonstration that superior skill is involved, and
the fallacious conclusion that authority of any sort is
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Legitimate is thereby drawn. And therefore someone has to
exercise that authority, so it might as well be me/us/the State.
April Carter has made a strong case for distinguishing
between authority and legitimacy. She says
"Legitimacy may be fostered and upheld
by propaganda, that is by psychological forms
of force and manipulation. Authority, by
contrast, is characterized by an absence of
coercion and requires voluntary and free
acceptance, and thus to point to true
authority does imply some kind of moral
approval."
('Authority and Democracy',p.52)
The same sort of distinction we made above has been made here,
except that Carter talks about authoritarian authority -
legitimate power in the Weberian sense - as being 'legitimation',
and uses 'authority' as we have authoritativeness. There is an
added ingredient perhaps of compliance in Carter's analysis, but
the impetus is clearly the same. This underlines the need for an
accepted terminology - we haven't used Carter's form of words
because it clashes too much with accepted usage.
The whole of our first group of concepts have concomitant
ambiguities to those we have seen in the ideas of rules, order
and authority. For instance, there is a clear distinction between
the concept of leadership in a group as a set of functions,
providing for decision-making, planning and so on, and the
concept of leadership as the charismatic order-giving and being
accepted type of personal figure which tends to be associated
with the same word. When we say a group needs leadership, do we
mean that it needs to obey a leader, or do we mean it Lacks
decision-making processes and proper planning procedures?. The
latter group of functions are quite easily carried out by a
cohesive and co-operating group, responsive and responsible to a
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larger membership. Were this type of group to function properly,
we wouldn't say the group still needed a general or a dictator of
some sort. At least, I hope we wouldn't.
The same point can be made about the idea of control in a
group. We confuse - or tend to - the control by the group (of its
environment) with the control of the group (by something or
someone either within it or outside it). We shan't go into detail
on this, or mention any further concepts. The nettle we have to
grasp is that our concepts, which we may have been using happily
all our lives, are highly susceptible to misapplication and
consequent misinterpretation. They all have common ambiguities in
that they can either assume individual roles where all that is
needed are organizational functions, or they can assume coercive
relationships where none are needed. When talking about
relatively unstructured groups or voluntary relationships it
would be wise to remember that the paradigm of organization we
tend to use is a hierarchical one, and that this can confuse and
distort our perception of common phenomena.
So the conclusion we have to draw from the first of our
group of concepts is that the understanding of mutual-aid groups
is as much an unlearning process as it is a learning one. All the
concepts relate to our understanding of the individual as the
object of an organization, as something which has been
organized. It is only to be expected that this area is one where
we are most liable to use concepts in the wrong way.
THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL ACTION
The second of our groups of concepts we will find much more
constructive, and possibly unfamiliar. It will be remembered that
they all take the individual as the subject - not as something to
be organized from without, but something doing its own organizing
with other individuals, none of whom object - it is the
organization itself which is the object of the actions of the
people involved. The unfamiIiarity comes from the fact that this
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is not an area we have much experience of academically, and
possibly not on the practical level either.
We will contrast voluntary, mutual, belonging and co¬
operation with compulsory and self-interest. This time we will
hope to derive some positive conclusions - theorems, if you like
- about our subject matter. What we want to do is to try and
isolate some of the key issues at the heart of their common
meaning. We shall begin with the two contrasting notions of
mutual and self-interested action, and try and find out exactly
what the contrast is. Many of us may not have considered there to
be a contrast at all - we would perhaps have contrasted self-
interest with disinterested, in the sense of altruistic or
unselfish. This contrast is not open to us, as the essence of
unselfishness or altruism is precisely the absence of a
connection between the individual and the action, and we won't
get anywhere with a concept which denies the relationship we want
to examine.
It seems reasonable to say that action is mutual when it is
undertaken by a group of people who pool their efforts and share
their expectations and outcomes. (This applies to mutual
destruction, assured or otherwise, as well as mutual aid). The
OED, not a terribly good source of sociological insight but one
that will serve well enough for clarification, defines mutual as
" (of feelings, actions etc.) felt, done, by each to(wards) the
other..". We've incorporated the notion of purpose in our
extended version, in that the expectations and outcomes are
included. The essence of any mutual action as contrasted with
self-interested action - the purest form of mutual action, if you
like - is that no individual regard themselves as any more
important than any other participant, or equally importantly, any
less important. (In such a case, the action would not be entirely
mutual though elements of mutuality would be there). In this
sense, employer and employee are engaged in mutual action in so
far as each recognizes that neither one is dispensable, and in so
far as both have the same expectations, of continuing employment.
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Obviously, other actions of the parties may not be mutual at all.
But in mutual-aid groups in particular, we want to draw a
contrast between mutual interest and self-interest: the calculus
of individual cost-benefits is suspended, and replaced with the
assumption that whatever the group does is more important than
whoever benefits from it individually. This is an assumption
which we want to make into a central one. It is not equivalent to
the assumption that all contribute and benefit equally: that is
simply an equivalence of individual cost-benefits. There is a
logical difference between this and the assumption of group
benefit. 'No man is an island, entire of itself...'. The
assumption, it will be noted, is liable to break down if
individual benefits are manifestly unequal, for nobody can in the
long run base their actions on a premise which is clearly false.
But it would also be threatened if there were any attempt to
separate out individual gains and Losses, for a small inequality
may be tolerable if unnoticed, but lethal if obvious to all.
Action which is self-interested, by contrast, is solely
concerned with economic rationalism individually applied: the
maximization of individual gains. The assumption here is that
each individual is simply acting in such a way as to benefit as
much as possible, and minimize any costs. Groups of people acting
out of self-interest can and do form groups while acting purely
selfishly as long as each one is secure in the knowledge that
they are better off inside the group than they would be outside:
an economic cartel is the classic example. The criticisms of
rationalistic theories we developed earlier apply most clearly in
this case, were the same type of analysis appropriate to a cartel
applied to a mutual-aid group. This makes it particularly
interesting to examine one theory of how such groups work: it
will indicate as clearly as anything can what mutual aid is not.
By what logicians call a 'reductio ad absurdum" we can then throw
out the rationalist assumption and arrive at what mutual-aid
groups are. We shall look at the exposition laid out by Mancur
Olson in his book 'The Logic of Collective Action'. Olson, it
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must be remembered, is concerned only with the actions of an
economically rational set of individuals: people who want to
maximize their benefits and minimize their costs, and regard the
end as justifying any means used to reach it - people who know
what they want, and "seek the correct way leading thereto'.
What Olson shows which is so important to our argument is
that such rational self-interested individuals will not be able
to act together and stay together unless the group is very small,
or coercion is used.
WHY SELF-INTERESTED ACTIONS CANNOT SUSTAIN A GROUP
He starts with the definition of a 'collective good' as
being one which is shared by everyone in the group, whether they
have contributed to the group or not. The observation that "the
achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common
interest means that a public or collective good has been provided
for that group" means that, as a logical consequence, any
rational member of the group will not contribute towards the cost
of provision of that good as long as they can get it for nothing.
So, since no rational individual will contribute to the costs,
they will not be met, and the good will not be provided: the
group will disintegrate. So the group is led to use coercion,
because unless people are forced to contribute, they will avoid
doing so. (The taxation system is a good example.)
The only case where this does not apply is if, for someone
in the group, the benefit they would get from their share of the
collective good is greater than the whole cost of providing the
good for themselves alone. And even in such a case, the amount of
collective benefit would cease to grow beyond the point at which
the marginal total cost of provision is equal to the marginal
individual benefit obtained by that person. It is obvious that
this situation would only arise in a small group, because it is
only in a small group that the proportions of individual benefit
to total cost will make such behaviour rational. The costs are
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directly proportional to size, and the benefits are inversely
proportional to size. In other words, the larger the group is,
the larger the cost of provision in relation to the benefit, and
the smaller the share of each individual - including the cost-
bearer - will be.
A consideration of this argument (which is actually rather
more technical in presentation in the original than I've
presented it here, though the logic is the same) shows why we
define a mutual-aid group in terms of people pooling their costs
and benefits, their expectations and resources, and suspending
the calculation of their own individual profit and loss accounts.
Olson's argument shows that if a group were composed of
economically rational individuals, it would not work or prosper.
Such groups would, were rationalistic assumptions about behaviour
to hold true, either remain very small or else resort to
coercion. But large mutual-aid groups have existed in the past,
and exist around us today. There has, in the last few years, been
a mushrooming of self-help and co-operative activity, of mutual
aid of all sorts in all fields from industry to play, from
pensioners to mothers (not forgetting the cyclists). Since they
do exist, they cannot therefore be composed of rationally acting
individuals - quod erat demonstrandum. That is why the calculus
of individual cost-benefit simply is inapplicable, and why the
corollary that the group is more important than the individual is
such a necessary one. But even if the members of the group aren't
economic rationalists, they aren't going to be ostriches either:
so they would probably not be able to carry on assuming that
nobody is more or less important than anyone else, or that nobody
is getting more out of the group than anyone else, if a state of
affairs in which some specific person were doing so became
manifestly obvious.
However, it is equally apparent that a mutual-aid group
would be able to carry some individuals who did belong purely out
of self-interest. As long as there weren't too many of them, the
125
Logic of the Olson argument wouldn't come into effect, provided
the disparity of effort and reward was not too great. This is in
fact an essential ingredient for continuity or growth, since new
members from outside the group must be able to join for these to
occur, and few new members can be expected to have internalized
the ethic of group benefit before individual benefit until they
have been involved for some time. Furthermore, we know that if
the assumption that the group benefit is the more important one
(we'll call this the 'group ethic') does waver in strength over
time, only compulsion or small size will stop a group being
adversely affected to the point of possible disintegration. Since
a mutual-aid group has been stipulated to be a voluntary
organization, we shall dismiss compulsion as outside the scope of
this preliminary discussion. But we can assume that the smaller a
group is the more stable it is likely to be. For if the group
ethic does waver and fluctuate in strength over time, the larger
groups will be the first to collapse in times of weakness since
the point at which it isn't worth bothering comes sooner.
THE GROUP ETHIC: RATIONAL OR EVALUATIVE?
We have to look at the group ethic in more detail. An
argument advocated throughout this thesis has been for the need
to regard rationalist and authoritarian assumptions in the social
sciences in the same way as we regard other, equally evaluative
assumptions about human action, and conversely, to give any
assumption an equivalent consideration as a road to whatever
truth or usefulness we can find. We've pointed out at some length
the ways in which this rationalist paradigm came to exist, and
how it affects most of our attitudes towards the analysis of
community and organization. The fact that we have referred to the
assumption of individuals in mutual-aid groups that what benefits
the group will also benefit them as an ethic, does not mean that
it is irrational. There is an inconsistency in rationalism in
that a series of actions by individuals, each one of which is
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strictly rational in itself, can result in a state of affairs in
which they are in fact worse off than if they had not acted so as
to minimize their losses - not acted rationally, that is. The way
Olson presents the disintegration of a large group is a case
typical of this phenomenon, which is often known as the tragedy
of the commons - overgrazing common land results in useless
pasture for everyone, but any one person is better off if they do
not restrict their grazing animals. Hunting whales to extinction
and the arms race are further example of this (with more severely
obvious moral overtones). The end result of all these cases is
that nobody is better off, and everyone is worse off.
This has led some analysts of rational action (such as
Michael Taylor in 'Anarchy and Cooperation) to develop ways of
calculating costs and benefits in such a way as to incorporate
attitudes very similiar to a group ethic: for the group ethic is
only irrational when it is analysed on the level of single
actions by individuals. It is wholly rational to believe that the
group ethic makes sense, and to use it to guide one's actions -
as a rule of practice, that is - even if any single action taken
by itself may appear to be not as profitable to a person as an
alternative course which runs counter to or ignores such an
ethic.
Consequently, the polarity between communal and associative
relationships, which Weber adapted from Tonnies, is far less
coherent than it first appeared to be (as is the whole
rationalist enterprise itself - once we decide to start
questioning it, we uncover more holes than a swiss cheese). We
have criticized the dichotomy for assuming that no communal
purpose can exist, and it is certainly untrue that all purposive
organizations derive their purpose from an associative nature. It
is now apparent that the very basis of taking 'subjective
feelings of belonging' as being distinct from 'rationally
motivated adjustment of interest' is unsound. It can be perfectly
rational to have, or to cultivate, subjective feelings of
belonging, and use them as a basis for what, by definition, would
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be a communal but also a rational relationship. And our group
ethic - the assumption that what benefits the individual is what
works for the group - constitutes such a feeling of belonging. I'
may be pointed out by diehard rationalists that one may act as if
one had a feeling of belonging, for rational reasons, whereas
nobody in fact has such a feeling at all. Or else it might be
said that people who have mutual feelings of belonging are in
fact being rational if they form an organization on that basis.
But neither of these objections is much to the point, let
alone fatal. To act as if one had a feeling of belonging is
indistinguishable from having such a feeling - Gilbert Ryle has
made this point forcibly in a parallel context (The Concept of
Mind) when he talks of the 'Ghost in the Machine'. Any sign of a
difference in the two states which makes a difference is also a
sign that one does not have such a feeling. Just as acting
exactly like a human being is the same as being a human being. A
difference that makes no difference is no difference at all. The
second objection cited is identical to the point we are making -
people who act on the basis of their feeling are not necessarily
acting irrationally at all. Once more, feelings and reasons -
rationales - are not polarities, merely two ways of looking at
actions.
Now a subjective feeling of belonging together isn't
necessarily the same as an assumption of group interests; a group
of people standing together in a bus queue day after day can moan
about the weather, swap news and opinions, notice that one of
their regular number is missing and feel that they all belong
together, without having an interest as a group. They could in no
way be said to constitute a mutual-aid group of any sort. But
when they all decide to sign petitions and march together to the
Town Hall to demonstrate about the atrocious bus service, they
could be said to have formed from those beginnings a mutual-aid
group, by perceiving a common interest and then deciding to co¬
operate in acting together to do something about it. A feeling of
belonging is thus not a sufficient condition for saying that a
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mutual-aid group exists, but when it is combined with a
perception of a common interest then it can lead to co-operative
action. It is co-operating in such action that is another
essential element in a mutual-aid group. Cooperative action is
people acting together, acting mutually. We earlier defined a
mutual-aid group as being an instance of purposive mutual action,
and mutual in this instance can be regarded as synonymous with
co-operative. Cooperative implies purpose, whilst mutual in
itself does not, without in any way implying that the purpose is
the most important thing around: an equal weight is given to the
manner of action. Since we are concerned with mutual-aid
organizations in any case this doesn't matter very much, for
purpose is also implied in the word "organizations", which are by
definition purposive. Together, co-operative action and a group
ethic are two of the necessary conditions for forming, or
denoting, a mutual-aid group.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF MUTUAL-AID GROUPS
We've now cleared up the main area of the second of our
groups of jigsaw. As hoped, fitting the edges of the jigsaw
together has effectively given us the outline of what goes in the
middle, what a mutual-aid group must be like, and what some of
the most important components in its workings need to be. They
comprise three elements: mutual (co-operative) action, an
assumption of group interest, together with a feeling of
belonging. These three areas of action, belief and feeling are
all interrelated and oughtn't really be looked at in isolation
from each other. They constitute the pattern which we can
identify and use in analysis of mutual-aid groups, and within a
group the three areas reinforce each other. No one element should
be considered more important than any other element, for within
the group they derive much of their meaning and force from each
other.
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To elaborate this point further - I think it is quite
possible for a group to include the elements of co-operative
action, group interest and a feeling of belonging, and yet fail
to be a mutual-aid group because the three elements are isolated
from each other and form no pattern. A good example of this is a
platoon of soldiers in action. There is usually some 'esprit de
corps' generated under conditions of common danger, which we must
equate with a feeling of belonging. There is also an assumption
of group interest in that each soldier knows that what benefits
the platoon is also likely to benefit him. The chances of
survival are greatly increased by being part of a cohesive unit.
Lastly, of course, the soldiers are also likely to co-operate in
a variety of ways - not merely as ordered by the sergeant, but of
their own free will. Yet these three areas are unlikely to relate
to each other. The feeling of belonging does not create the
perception of a group interest - the soldiers may hate each
others' guts and still recognize that they stand a better chance
as a group. And the interest of the group may well be better
served by strategically retreating as a group rather than
fighting as a group - the co-operative action they are involved
in is independent from any decision the platoon might reach as to
what would be best for them. And any mutual action that they do
undertake - sharing cigarettes or whatever - is individually
rather than organizationally oriented.
On the other hand we can imagine the same group of soldiers
after their demobilization. The sense of solidarity and belonging
built up by their wartime experiences remains, and they may
perceive a common individual interest that they could better
tackle as a group - they may all be unemployed, for instance. If
that perception leads them to mutual and co-operative action - if
on that basis they decide to work as a group - then they may well
be a mutual-aid group. Notice that their perception of a common
interest could lead them to adopt identical courses of individual
action, such as all applying for a job in the same place. It is
unlikely that this could be considered to be purposefully mutual,
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as it leads not to further action but merely further acquaintance
- they couldn't be said to have formed a mutual-aid group, as the
group action is not defined properly, and thus lacks purpose. A
series of identical actions by individuals doesn't add up to
group action or group purpose even when they have caught the idea
from each other. As Weber might have put it, they haven't
oriented their activity towards the group, as a social construct,
even though it may be oriented towards each other. Not alt social
activity has to occur in an organization.
The existence of a pattern in the actions, feelings and
beliefs of mutual aid organizations is the most significant thing
about them. They will tend to reinforce each other in most
circumstances. Successful co-operative action reinforces the
assumption of group interest by showing it is correct, as well as
reinforcing feelings of belonging through mutually beneficial
experiences. The assumption of group interest makes further
planning of co-operative action possible, and also highly
desirable, and the feeling of belonging acts as a kind of
emotional cement. It is the interrelationship, the pattern of
these elements which is powerful - the feelings generate the
belief, the beliefs lead to action, and action reinforces both
beliefs and feelings. It is to this pattern of social behaviour
that we direct our attention in the future.
People have often commented on the ability of voluntaristic
organizations generally to innovate and respond to changing
circumstances. This ability is a result of the fact that the
orientation of the organization isn't to a fixed goal, but to the
values and group identity and ethic which are at its base. The
group looks at itself reflexively, for unless it is transforming
those values into some realization of their implications, the
group will fold. This is what is remarkable, and desirable, about
mutual-aid groups, and this is why we have to look at the ways
that people communicate values and value-related matters to each





HABERMAS AND THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
The influence of Habermas on the critique of rationality and
other areas we've touched on earlier is probably deeper than I
realize. Certainly, Habermas hasn't been quoted as a source, but
this is because I'm not at all sure that I understand his
writings - which are admittedly rather dense - and am therefore
liable to render a disservice by quoting out of context.
Especially in the development of the theory of communicative
competence, Habermas comes close to the arguments developed here
from different directions. It was only when I had come to my own
appreciation of how important that the issues Habermas deals with
are, and developed my own route towards similiar conclusions,
that I began to think I understood him. In that process, an
unconscious understanding of what I had failed to comprehend was
probably one of the things making it possible.
As an illustration of this, compare the following quotation
with the discussion of Olson's logic of collective action in the
last chapter.
"We can start from the position that the
orientation of action towards
institutionalized values is unproblematic only
as long as the normatively prescribed
distribution of opportunities for the
legitimate satisfaction of needs rests on
actual consensus. But as soon as a difference
of opinion arises, the 'injustice' of the
repression of generalizable interests can be
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recognized in the categories of the
interpretive system operating at the time.
This consciousness of conflicts of interests
is, as a rule, sufficient motive for replacing
value-oriented action with interest-guided
action. The pattern of communicative action
gives way then, in politically relevant
domains of behaviour, to that type of
behaviour for which the competition for scarce
goods supplies the model, that is, strategic
action."
('Legitimation C r i si s',p.113)
If we regard our group ethic and feelings of belonging in mutual-
aid groups as an 'institutionalized value', and as an instance of
'repression of generalized interest' we can see that the parallel
is clear, though we have connected up the strength of the
institutionalized values as a means of repressing interest-guided
action in a mutual-aid group. It is perhaps notable that Habermas
has also found it necessary to question the nature of rationality
on his own route to the same area which we concern ourselves
with. In any event, the theories of communication developed by
Habermas are decidedly anarchist in their implications
and anti-authoritarian in their essence.
The parallels with the ideas of Habermas is rooted in the
basics of his work. One of his fundamental distinctions is
between work and interaction, or communicative action.
"By work, I understand either
instrumental action or rational choice or
their conjunction. Instrumental action is
governed by technical rules symbolic
interaction is governed by binding
consensual norms, which define reciprocal
expectations about behaviour, and which must
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be understood and recognized by two acting
subjects the validity of technical rules
and strategies depends on that of empirically
true or analytically correct propositions, the
validity of social norms is grounded only in
the intersubjectivity of the mutual
understanding of intentions and secured by the
general recognition of obligations."
('Technology and science as Ideology' in
'Towards a Rational Society', pp.91-92)
We can note in passing the similiarity of the points Habermas
makes about rules, which so clearly are another case of the
ambiguities discussed in the last chapter.
"Violation of a rule has a different
consequence according to type. Incompetent
behaviour, which violates valid technical
rules or strategies, is condemned per se to
failure through lack of success Deviant
behaviour, which violates consensual norms,
provoke sanctions that are connected with the
rules only externally, that is by convention."
(ibid)
SYSTEMATICALLY DISTORTED COMMUNICATION
Having established the difference between work and communicative
action, we can then bring in Habermas' idea of distorted
communication. He takes J.L.Austin's outline of the difference
between perlocutionary and iIlocutionary utterances as a first
step in this. Austin called the latter 'performatories', and
Searle calls them 'speech acts' - the iIlocutionary content of an
utterance is the extent to which one does something in saying
something, as Austin put it. Promising, betting, taking oaths,
135
announcing are examples of verbs with the intentional
performatory content we take as distinguishing iIlocutionary
utterances from the perlocutionary, or merely communicative. It
is the iIlocutionary force of utterances which distorts
communication (at least in my understanding of Habermas). When we
are talking to someone not with the intention of just
communicating, but with a specific purpose, in which the
utterances are instrumental, then the distinction between 'work'
and 'interaction' is blurred, and communication becomes
distorted. We are not able to communicate in such a situation
because the interaction is partly purposive, and is therefore
work. The content and meaning of the words becomes distorted by
the social work we do in uttering them.
I'll give examples to make this clearer. When two people,
one of whom has power over the other, talk together, the
communication is distorted because the person with the power will
say things that the other will take as recommendations, or
orders, or criticisms. Even if there is a conscious effort to
avoid such performatories, the person in the subordinate position
will always have to listen for them, and avoid uttering any of
their own. And thus communication between the two parties - pure
communicative interaction - will be systematically distorted by
the power relationships involved.
The same applies, more topically, to discussion of a
submitted thesis with examiners. Communication about content is
virtually impossible - the idea is to defend the thesis, not to
talk about it. And if during the course of such a defence a
communication becomes necessary (due to a misinterpretation
perhaps) the examiner has to disentangle defence and
justification from a genuine communication about actual content.
As Mandy Rice-Davies once put it 'He would say that, wouldn't
he?". Where we can think that to ourselves We have another
instance of distorted communication.
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Now there's nothing wrong with work-type interaction,
utterances with mostly purposive content. They are an integral
and essential part of human life. It is about the circumstances under
which true communication becomes both essential and impossible
that genuine worries arise. Where all communication is
systematically distorted, no consensual norms can be established,
and the possibility of value-oriented action is nil since values
cannot be agreed on. The arms race, and disarmament or arms
limitation negotiations, are an exemplary instance. Communication
is impossible between the USSR and USA because anything either
says to the other is suspect in that the listener will always be
looking for purposive content - asking not what the other side is
saying but what they are doing in what they are saying. This even
extends to critics of the nuclear arms race, who are always being
called, in Britain, communist tools or even accused of receiving
Soviet financial aid. So all communication is systematically
distorted, and no communicative interaction is possible. But
without it, there is no possibility of breaking out of the
context altogether. The fact is that the two sides cannot sit
down and talk their way out of the road to mutual annihilation
because they cannot see such talking as anything else than a part
of the arms race itself.
For mutual-aid groups, the ability to communicate properly
is essential because a mutual-aid group rests, as we have seen,
on feelings of belonging, co-operative action and an assumption
of group interest. In Habermas' terms, as we saw in the first
quotation above, it is value-oriented action, and the
establishment of such values is impossible if all communication
is distorted, and more importantly, impossible to maintain if the
truth underlying those values ever becomes suspect. The
'suppression of generalizable interest' depends on the assurance
of intersubjective value assumptions. Thus a group where all
communication is systematically distorted cannot be a mutual-aid
group, as values cannot be established and maintained.
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Even if they don't know the theory, most aspiring mutual-aid
groups realize intuitively that they must be able to communicate
without distortion. And the power relationships between
individuals are the usual things which they assume distort
communication, and these are seen as embodied in formal
structures involving authority, leaders and so on. The tendency
towards lack of these structures in mutual-aid groups is
attributable to the realization that the inevitability of
systematically distorted communication in such a structure makes
the maintenance of the value-base of the group virtually
impossible to assure. Before we look at Habermas' own thoughts on
how to establish communicative interaction without distortion,
let us look at some of the results of assuming an unstructured
group is the solution.
ON THE TYRANNY OF STRUCTURELESSNESS
Most of the work on this subject has been done within the
modern Women's Liberation movement. The fact that modern feminist
groups maintain their common interest as women in society, act
co-operatively on many levels, and believe that they are better
off acting together than they are in isolation makes them mutual-
aid groups. The network of feminist groups influenced by the
womens' movement today embraces social service groups, political
pressure groups, businesses, media and so on. An enormous amount
of work on organizational theory has emerged from the last decade
and a half during which all this has been building up, and I have
no intention of reviewing all the material available. But there
are a few crucial pieces of literature we ought to examine
because of the light they can shed on the strategy of
structureless and leaderless groups as a device for ensuring non-
distorted communication and equality.
Certainly one of the best-known of the feminist writings on
organization is 'The Tyranny of Structurelessness', by Jo
Freeman. I've used the pamphlet edition published by the Hull
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AWA, which says that the piece was written in 1970 in the USA and
later reprinted in the Berkeley Journal of Sociology. The
essential point of the article is that
"Women had thoroughly accepted the idea of
structurelessness without realising the
limitations of its uses. People would try to
use the 'structureless1 group and the informal
conference for purposes for which they were
unsuitable out of a blind belief that no other
means could be anything other than oppressive.
If the movement is to move beyond these
elementary stages of development, it will have
to disabuse itself of some of its prejudices
about organization and structure. There is
nothing inherently bad about either of these
we need to understand why
'structurelessness1 does not work."
(Jo Freeman,'The Tyranny of
Structurelessness', op.cit.)
She goes on to say that there is in fact no such thing as a
structureless group in any case, so the attempt to build one is
deceptive. Informal structures will always exists and in a
supposedly unstructured group, form the basis for elites. Freeman
defines an elite as a small group which has
"power over a larger group of which they are a
part, usually without direct responsibility to
that group and often without their knowledge
and consent intelligent elitists are
usually smart enough not to allow themselves
to be well-known. When they become known, they
are watched, and the mask over their power is
no longer firmly lodged."
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And as she goes on to point out, if a group believes it is a
structureless one, there can be no structures for either
recognizing an elite or limiting the power elites wield. So once
the naive idea of structurelessness as a means of ensuring
equality, democracy and undistorted communicative action is
adopted, it not only fosters a more insidious kind of power
structure, but also limits its ability to do anything about it.
The second detrimental effect of structurelessness as an
ideology is that it leads to what Freeman calls the 'star'
system, whereby the lack of a formal mechanism for contacts with
the outside world, especially the media, pushes some people into
'star' roles whereby they speak for the whole group, but once
again the group has no control over their activities. This leads
to resentment and 'purges', which leave the 'star' even freer to
act individualistically.
The last of the pernicious effects of structurelessness is
the fact that the group, even if it can communicate freely, can't
actually do anything properly within the group, and so people
committed to action have to leave if they are ever to put ideas
into practise. This opens up a veritable can of worms. Freeman
writes -
"The desire for meaningful political activity
generated is sufficient to make them
eager to join other organizations. The
movement itself provides no outlets for their
new ideas and energies Because these
women share common values, ideas and political
orientation they too become informal,
unplanned, unselected, unresponsible elites -
whether they intend to be so or not. These new
informal elites are often perceived as threats
by the old informal elites previously
developed within different movement networks,
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This is a correct perception the old
elites are rarely willing to bring such
differences of opinion out into the open
because it would involve exposing the nature
of the informal structure of the group. Many
of these informal elites have been hiding
under the banner of 'anti-elitism' and
'structurelessness'."
This leads to either purges or institutionalising some sort of
power structure, essentially a takeover by one particular group.
On the larger level, where anarchists would create federations,
Freeman points out that only nationally organized groups can
coordinate national actions, and unstructured groups are capable
of supporting such national actions but are incapable of mounting
their own. She concludes that local, regional and national
organizational structures are a necessity for the Women's
Liberation movement. The pamphlet concludes with seven
recommendations, or 'Principles of Democratic Structuring'.
These are intended to be 'kept in mind' rather that recited
as a catechism. They are first, delegation of specific tasks to
specific people, and secondly, requiring all those who have been
so delegated to be responsible to the group. Thirdly, all such
authority should be distributed as widely as possible. Fourthly,
Freeman recommends rotation of tasks to avoid responsibilities
becoming personal properties. Fifth, allocation of tasks should
be along rational criteria - "ability, interest and
responsibility have got to be the major concerns". Sixth,
diffusion of information to everybody as frequently as possible,
and lastly, the complementary recommendation of equality of
access to resources within a group.
REDSTOCKINGS AND THE FEMINIST REVOLUTION
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As a critique of the naive idea of structurelessness, Jo
Freeman's article is unsurpassed. However, she touched on one
area which makes the suggested recommendations as well as the
analysis itself slightly more problematical. The key sentence is
where she talks about elites 'hiding under the banner' of non-
structurelessness and leaderlessness. In other words, discussion
of structure in a group may be less fruitful if it is distorted
communication in the first place. In different words, the point
is forcefully made in the Redstockings collection, 'Feminist
Revolution'. The anthology is certainly the most stimulating book
on voluntaristic organizing I have ever read. To put the book in
some sort of context, I'll quote Robin Morgan on the early
history of the Women's Liberation Movement in the USA.
"After the first Miss America demonstration,
NYRW (New York Radical Women) meetings were
attended by more women than we could handle
so we decided to split up into small
groups, coming together in the umbrella group
once a month for information exchanges,
business meetings and continued communication.
The splits were actually political divisions
though. Out of this mitosis came Redstockings,
founded by those women who declared themselves
radical feminists they went about doing
steady consciousness-raising and writing
papers which were destined to become new
feminist classics."
(Robin Morgan, 'Going Too Far', p.71)
The Redstockings women back in 1968 included most of the pioneer
theoreticians of the movement, who were responsible for many of
the key concepts and phrases, from consciousness-raising theory
to slogans, even including the very word 'sexism'. That the
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original group was both innovative and influential there can be
no doubt, and that they were the inspiration for much of the
subsequent flowering of the women's movement is equally apparent.
But the larger part of the contemporary women's movement has,
according to the Redstockings anthology, become institutionalised
and absorbed by the very social structure that the early
activists were trying to change. Whether or not the process - of
incorporation perhaps - was inevitable is beside the point. A
large part of 'Feminist Revolution' concerns the efforts of the
remainder of the Redstockings group to analyse and pinpoint
exactly how and why the movement went the way it did, and how
their original ideas of feminist revolution were (as they see it)
lost along the way. As such, it is one perspective on a unique
record of dynamic organizational change by some of those deeply
affected by it.
One of the key elements identified as making the
transformation of the movement possible was the ideology of
leaderlessness. Firstly, it made possible the rewriting of
hi story.
"Flistory, after all, is about what was done
and who did it and what was important and how
it was accomplished. And who does things and
how it is accomplished is all about
leadership. There was a conflict between
promoting history and the movement's
ideology of leaderlessness The loss of
the movement's history, both recent and past,
is now a key problem which is stopping its
momentum."
(Kathy Sarachild (Amatniek), 'The power of
History', in 'Feminist Revolution' p.28)
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If one has an ideology of leaderlessness, then individual
contributions are either unrecorded or placed in a context where
their contributors are negated. As Kathy Sarachild wrote elsewhere,
"I remember seeing myself referred to as if I was dead."
(She was one of the original theoreticians of feminist
consciousness-raising and was still active and working at the
time: to be valued only as a historical figure would appear to
deny the value of present and future work).
Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, is the point that
the ideology of leaderlessness was used by some women to enable
them to oust the radical women who were in the vanguard of the
movement as a whole. Simply, structural issues were used to great
effect as weapons against the existing leaders in the movement.
"Two kinds of leadership emerged in the group:
1) Straightforward people who became leaders
by putting their politics out in the open and
fighting for them. 2) sneaky 'anti-leaders'
who shouted loudest against leadership, but
maneuvered quietly to push the group in their
direction by withholding information, not
telling their politics, and leading
personality assassinations on those who did
speak up honestly. Ironically, women have
become leaders fighting for the principle that
there should be no leaders."
('The Liberal Takeover of Women's Liberation',
Carol Hanisch, in 'Feminist Revolution'
op.c i t. p.1 29)
Essentially, the point is that structural discussion doesn't
occur in a vacuum, and discussions about organization are just as
liable to be distorted communications as any other type. And the
other side of this coin is that even when a communication
genuinely is undistorted on the part of the person doing the
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talking, it may be open to distorted interpretation by listeners
or those who interpret on their behalf. Additionally, the
possibility offered for writing individual contributions out of
history makes for even more distortion, because history is one of
the major tools of analysis. And if the possibilities for
analysis are restricted, even more distortion is inevitable.
It would be as well to remember that the original Catch-22
was about systematically distorted communication. You could be
sent home from the war if you were mad, but if you asked to be
sent home you couldn't possibly be anything but sane. And if you
didn't ask, you had to stay in any case.
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE
So we have seen that the presumption that leaderlessness and
structurelessness will be a guarantee of equality, freedom and
the opportunity to communicate properly about values is as far
from the truth as it could possibly be. We return now to see what
Habermas has to say on the subject. He recognizes the two-way
nature of the problem.
"In an interaction that links at least two
subjects in the framework of an
intersubjectivity of mutual understanding
produced in ordinary language through constant
meanings, the interpreter is as much a
participant as the one he interprets. The
relation of observing subject and object is
replaced here by that of participant subject
and partner. Experience is mediated by the
interaction of both participants;
understanding is communicative experience. Its
objectivity is thus threatened from both
sides: by the influence of the interpreter,
whose engaged subjectivity distorts the
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answers, no less than by the reactions of the
other, who disconcerts a participant
observer."
(Habermas, 'Knowledge and Human interests',
p.180)
This is admittedly heavy stuff to digest. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that undistorted communicative action is
impossible to guarantee. Indeed, Habermas himself states that
"communicative competence relates to an ideal
speech situation The dialogue-
constitutive universals at the same time
generate and describe the form of
intersubjectivity which makes the mutuality of
understanding possible. Communicative
competence is defined by the ideal speaker's
mastery of the dialogue-constitutive
universals irrespective of the actual
restrictions under empirical conditions. We
shall disregard to which extent the
motivations of actions involved in the
language games are linguistically organized on
the level of intentionality and consequently
open to public communication. We shall
disregard whether and to what extent
systematically distorted communication does
take place."
("Towards a Theory of Communicative
Competence' in 'Recent Sociology No.2' ed.
Dreitzel)
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The fact that we have to define communicative competence as
ideal-typical is not much help if this means it cannot exist in
practice. However, Habermas goes on to analyse the barriers to an
ideal form of communication, and comes up with three fundamental
differentiations in any iIlocutionary, and potentially distorting
utterance, and his subsequent comments resolve the situation.
"a) Being and appearance ... every speech
implies the claim of inducing consensus on
that which really is distinguished from that
which only appears to be This presupposes
a differentiation between a public world of
intersubjectively acknowledged interpretations
and a private world of sole feelings and
impressions.
b) Being and essence in every speech
the subjects unavoidably express their
own selves This presupposes a
differentiation between a communication on
objects and a metacommunication on the level
of subjecti vity.
c) Being and ought to be every speech
act exists in a context of actions and
intentions according to valid norms.
This presupposes the differentiation between
valid rules intentionally followed
and regularities of observable events.
If one analyses the structure we generate
one arrives at a number of symmetrical
v relations An unlimited
interchangeabiIity of dialogue roles demands
that no side be privileged in the performance
of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists
only when there is complete symmetry in the
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distribution As Long as these symmetries
exist, communication will not be hindered
These three symmetries represent ....
truth, freedom and justice communicative
competence does mean the mastery of the means
of construction necessary for the
establishment of an ideal speech situation."
(op.cit,pp.142-144)
To paraphrase the above, and summarize it, the exclusion of
systematically distorted communication is possible only when
people are able to incorporate the linguistic equivalents of
truth, freedom and justice into their discourse, and are able to
give other people an equal chance for self-expression as they
have themselves. In such a case, pure intersubjectivity of
concepts, which is at the basis of discussions of values, is
assured. Symmetry, or reciprocation, is the key to this. As long
as we are either feeling that our chances of expressing certain
views in a conversation are less than another participant's, or
are not prepared to allow someone else freedom to say what they
want, then our conversation is systematically distorted, and not
only will we fail to reach consensus on truth, but freedom and
justice will be absent too. To put a different way, the
illocutionary force the participants can wield cancel each other
out, and the most rational argument wins the discussion.
Although this is an ideal-typical theory, there is in fact a
clear guide to action here. We have seen that the attempt to
maintain values by ensuring communicative competence through
structurelessness is misconceived in theory and misapplied in
practice. The way suggested by Habermas to ensure undistorted
communication would seem to be by maintaining a structure which
was democratic in the sense that it attempted to ensure that all
have an equal say in discussions. That this can't be interpreted
in the sense of giving everyone an opportunity or the time to
speak is obvious - that is no assurance of symmetry in speech
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acts. The repercussions extend in every direction. Resentment
and ignorance are as much a barrier as status or power. To the
extent that each one of us can anticipate asynmetry in
discussions, we have the ability to perceive distorted
communication. Once perceived, we have the power to expose it and
remedy the inequalities. That this requires a structure rather
than no structure is obvious enough. The structure must be an
equalizing one and a democratic one.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
So how is all this relevant to an organization which wants
to survive as a mutual-aid group? The answer is that they have to
maintain a basis of feelings of belonging and group interest. To
do this successfully requires the ability to communicate about
values, and this can only be done properly if the communication
is not distorted. (For if it is, the basis of the group will not
be maintained). The touchstone of non-distorted communication, of
communicative competence, is the symmetry of chances to perform
iIlocutionary utterances in the conversation. These take three
possible forms - statements about truth (I think, I know, I
doubt), statements about freedom (I expose, I deny, I will) and
statements about justice (I accept, I allow, I obey). As long as
the members are not equally likely to perform any of the speech
acts, there is no guarantee of non-distorted communication, and
consequently the group will not be able to reflexively maintain
the values, beliefs and attitudes essential to its survival.
Habermas' linguistic equivalences of truth, freedom and
justice were admittedly difficult to understand. Perhaps it is a
good idea to recapitulate in our own words rather than in his
own. The three concepts all are mediated by speech acts. Inasmuch
as we assert or deny the truth in speech, exercise our freedom in
our statements, and signify what we think is fair verbally, the
linguistic equivalences are the expressions of our ideas about
truth, freedom and justice. Now the important thing about truth,
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justice and freedom is that if they exist at all, they apply
universally to all people.Habermas maintains that all
iIlocutionary actions are related to one or other concept, and
once we grant that the i Ilocutionary content of what we say is
the cause of our distorted communications, the conclusion that it
is institutionalized inequalities of truth, freedom and justice
which lead to systematically distorted communications is one
which follows logically. Since speech is an interaction, symmetry
of opportunities to make illocutionary utterances is a
demonstration of the universality in the concepts.
In a cosmic sense, I find this highly gratifying. The fact
that communicative competence, or the ability to talk rationally
about the values at the basis of a mutual-aid group, is a
necessary condition to its survival, would seem to indicate that
mutual-aid groups are somehow an embodiment of the virtues of
truth, freedom and justice. As an anarchist, I find this equally
gratifying. Freedom and justice have always been at the centre of
anarchist thought. And from the point of view of social
scientists, the incorporation of previously non-instrumental
values into social science in a way which means that they can be
seen to be useful rather than merely desirable is no bad thing.
Habermas has always been one of those who regarded the value-
freedom of science to be impossible. Now that we can relate truth
to both freedom and justice, we can see good reason for regarding
with suspicion the notion of value-freedom as either desirable or
possible.
In this chapter we have established, via the theory of
communicative competence, that our conception of a voluntarist
organization doesn't mean simply the absence of coercion, but the
institutionalization of equality as well. That this isn't a
contradiction in terms we established from looking at the
writings from the women's movement on the problems inherent in
structureless and leaderless groups - true symmetry and equality
has to be established and maintained. We have seen at least one
set of proposals (from Jo Freeman) as to how this can be done.
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But before we continue with our analysis of anarchist
organizational form, it is essential to return to a critique of
rationalist organization theory in order to establish that the
most common framework for analysing mutual aid groups and
voluntary organizations is unduly pessimistic in outlook and
largely misconceived in principle. The main purpose of this
part of the thesis is to show how mutual-aid as a coherent
organizational strategy is possible. As a part of this task, we
have to destroy the theoretical basis for the assumption that
anarchist organizational form is either impossible or unstable.





PARADIGMS OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION: OLIGARCHY
If there is a paradigm of voluntary organizations and mutual-aid
groups which is recognized at all, it is based on the twin
principles of oligarchy and routinization. To quote one author -
"As organizations which lack any formal
capacity to control their members, precisely
because they are 'volunteers', voluntary
organizations appear to be the least
bureaucratic of all organizational forms. Yet
over time the organization develops more
rigid structures and becomes, in the end,
detached from its ordinary membership
base From the initial informal stage, a
membership division of labour, executive and
staff functions emerges. Eventually a distinct
administrative body develops, membership
groups appoint delegates for purposes of
representation, standing committees are set up
and there are problems of com muni cation
the organization creates more and more rules
and procedures to conduct its business. The
executive becomes detached from the everyday
life of the organization. There are constant
attempts to solve the communication problem.
And, most important of all, the rank and file
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membership become increasingly passive and
removed from the main areas of decision¬
making."
(Gilbert Smith, 'Social Work and the Sociology
of Organi za tions",p.105-106)
Both principles, of the development of an oligarchy and of the
routinization of the group, are in evidence here. The two
principles both have a classical pedigree. The first principle,
as enshrined in Michel's Iron Law of Oligarchy, supposedly proves
that any organization inevitably ends up with power in the hands
of a small elite. The second principle has an equally respectable
theoretical origin (at least in so far as it derives from Weber's
writings on the routinization of charisma) and supposedly states
that with time, any organization will become a part of the
establishment it was set up as an alternative to. Both principles
reinforce each other, since oligarchy is one of the things which
leads to routinization, and the establishment (on a conspiracy
theory) uses fostering of elites as one of its tools. Both
principles are untrue. There is a large element of tautology in
both, and an equally amount of invalid generalization from
particular cases to types to global laws. The kernel of truth
both contain isn't a truth about people, or about organizations,
or about mutual aid at all, but a truth about a particular
political and social system. Whether it is possible for people
and the groups they form to step out, in a sense, from their
social and political background and follow a different line is a
different question entirely, and is one of fact and possibility
rather than theory. We shall get into facts later: for now, we
begin with the theory of oligarchy.
OLIGARCHY
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In its original meaning, oligarchy is simply rule by few
over many. Lipset defines Oligarchy as "control of a society or
an organization by those at the top", in his introduction to the
1962 Free Press edition of Michel's 'Political Parties'. This
definition appears to make sense but is in fact rather muddled.
To the extent that we would define the top of an organization as
where the control lies, it is tautological - part of the
definition of organization, no doubt, according to many, is that
some people must control. Since they are defined as being at the
top, organization equals oligarchy. The tautology is built into
the muddles, of which there are three. The first muddle is the
lack of a definition of an organization or of a society. The
second muddle is the circularity of the idea of a 'top' which is
a central part of it, as explained above. These two muddles make
room for the most serious, which disguises the first two and
exploits them with its own ambiguities.
The last muddle is that power and control are not
distinguished. It is axiomatic that a large number of people
cannot effectively and efficiently run a society if they hold a
plebiscite on every single issue from defence to the colour of
the toilet paper. Delegation is always used in practice in every
social organism. The issue is not one of control but of
accountability in a democracy. There may be two types of
accountability which those 'in control' owe to those they
supposedly control. They may be representatives or they may be
delegates. In the first case, their actions are not subject to
the approval of those they represent, except in a most general
way. The only sanction the people represented have is to find a
new representative. This is called representative democracy, and
is what has been prevalent in Britain for centuries. The actions
of delegates are subject to the approval of the people who
delegated them. If they don't like the actions then they can
overturn them. The delegate has no power to decide. In cases
where delegates have no idea of what the people want, they have
to come to informed guesses, and their decisions are subject to
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ratification of some sort. Both types of controllers are
presumably acting in good faith. But the good faith of a
representative lies in actions and decisions, and a
representative can in good faith decide to act differently from
the wishes of the people, whereas the good faith of delegates lie
in the extent to which they anticipate and carry out the wishes
of the people who chose them.
The two types of accountability in a participatory or
representative democracy (as the two systems described above are
usually called) have different implications for control.
The existence of delegates or representatives has different
implications. Using Weber's definition of power as the ability to
impose one's will on others despite their resistance, it is clear
that delegation doesn't imply this ability to anything like the
extent that representation does - in theory delegation makes
power of the delegates over their people impossible. Coordination
and leadership functions may lie with the delegates, but their
control isn't the same sort of control as representatives have,
and this isn't taken into account in the definition. Power is
what oligarchy is about, not control. (That this leaves out
bureaucracies is unimportant - unless one wants an iron law of
bureaucracy.)
Our own definition of an oligarchy shall be as a closed
group which has power over a larger group of which it is
nominally part, and which uses its power to maintain its
position. We wouldn't regard an open group as an oligarchy unless
it somehow maintained mechanisms to discourage others from
wanting to join. In this case its openness would be questionable.
We also ought to make clear again that this discussion is value-
based in that oligarchy is regarded as a problem, and we have the
intention of exploding the theory of its inevitability. In so far
as we have seen that communicative competence and the
establishment and maintenance of the value basis of mutual-aid
groups demands equality, this has a logical basis also. It is
necessary to our purpose here. Lipset also says that
156
"surveys of the internal life of voluntary
organizations have yielded evidence to
support the iron law of oligarchy."
(op.cit. p.22)
Defining oligarchy as a problem presupposes a solution can be
found.
THE IRON LAW
What then is the iron law of oligarchy ? It was put forward
by Roberto Michels in his book "Political Parties': references are
to the 1962 Free Press edition already cited. Michels states that
"who says organization, says oligarchy". "Political Parties'
remains the classic work on oligarchies, and its thesis is that
any organization will inevitably drift into a state whereby a
self perpetuating elite control the organization in their own
interests. Michels reached his conclusions largely on the basis
of the socialist parties of Europe up to the time he wrote the
book (1915), and subsequent events not only appear to have proved
him correct in his analysis in almost every case, but have also
resulted in the acceptance of the thesis he presents as being an
'Iron Law' indeed. The only qualifications noted by Lipset
(following Mills and Galbraith) involve the need to take account
of competing elites and also the needs Tor legitimacy of
democratic systems leading to less blatant self-interest being
pursued by the oligarchy than would be the case in a totally
unfettered dictatorship.
Michels rests his case on what is basically a two-stage
argument. He says firstly that "leadership is a necessary
consequence in every form of social life" (op.cit. p.364). The
second step in the argument is Michels' establishing the
necessity of strong leadership for successful organization, from
which he goes on to show that the leaders become a self-
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perpetuating elite, that "from a means, organization will become
an end" (ibid.p.338). The argument he makes is flawed for reasons
which anyone closely following the way we have treated similiar
arguments should by now be able to work out for themselves. Of
the various criticisms, the major one is that the first stage of
Michel's argument is incomplete, probably incorrect, and begs the
question. This isn't to deny the value of Michel's work in
relation to political parties from the theoretical and empirical
point of view, for 'Political Parties' is still essential reading
for students of political organization today, and has proved
itself a fruitful source of inspiration. The status of the book
as a modern classic doesn't make the iron law of oligarchy true
as it was formulated there and as it is often used today. It
remains an empirical generalization, based on a very limited set
of samples (though fairly comprehensive within that set) with a
primarily tautological base.
An invalid assumption is made at the very beginning of
Michel's argument as to the causes of Leadership, and it concerns
the nature of organization. He states that
"a class which unfurls in the face of society
the banner of certain definite claims
needs an organization. Organization appears
the only means for the creation of a
collective wi 11."
(p.61)
He then goes on to say that
"Organization based on the principle of least
effort is the weapon of the weak in
their struggle with the strong."
(ibid).
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It is not a pedantic quibble to point out that if a class has
already unfurled its banner of definite claims, it has created a
'collective will' of some sort prior to its 'organization'. The
idea that people need organizing in order to find out what they
want not only flies in the face of the common sense notion that
peple organize to achieve their will, not to create it, but is
also contradicted by the earlier implication that it is belonging
to a class which leads to the claims that people make. It also
leads to a logically infinite regression, for if people need to
organize to find out what they want, they need to organize to
find out that what they want is to organize, and therefore need
to organize to find out that they need to organize to find out
that what they want is to organize ( und so weiter, ja ? ) We
are actually dealing here with the myth of the revolutionary
vanguard which has to organize the masses, a belief which derives
from marxist orthodoxy. In fact most popular revolutions have
begun despite organizations organizing them rather than because
of them - Michel's own iron law applied in its proper sphere of
political parties shows this to be the case. And the major weapon
has been spontaneous action and numbers, not organization based
on the principle of least effort - that isn't revolution but a
coup d'etat. In short, Michels assumes that it is organization
which creates the will of its members, whereas the reverse is
true - it is the will that creates organization.
We saw this in our own analysis of mutual-aid groups. In the
beginning there was the need, and this led to common interests
and mutual feelings of belonging bringing forth co-operative
action, and mutualistic organization. The organization is formed
to fulfil the will of the members, not to create the will. The
will arises from need. As Shevek said (in Le Guin's 'The
Dispossessed') "It is suffering that brings us together". So
Michel's statement that organization is necessary to the creation
of a collective will is logically impossible, politically
suspect, and factually incorrect.
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It follows that a theory with such an assumption at its base
is unlikely to be a good one, though a correct theory can be
reached through false facts, incorrect assumptions and faulty
reasoning. A true statement is logically implied by any false
statement, surprising though it may seem. We do not establish
that the iron law of oligarchy is incorrect by showing it was
arrived at by faulty reasoning, but we do destroy a lot of its
force as a working hypothesis.
The second error which Michels makes concerned his repeated
references to phenomena such as the "apathy of the masses"
(op.ci t.,p.86) and the "incompetence of the masses" (p.111 and
p.165). Certainly it is true that most members were only passive
participants in the organizations he describes, but as he so
correctly points out, those organizations served the interests of
the leaders, and not of the members themselves. It would have
been more incompetent to have joined in. Therefore to abstain
from participation in an organization which isn't acting in your
interests is no proof of apathy or incompetence.
More serious in this connection is the charge that this
alleged incompetence and apathy indicates the need for
leadership. Michels entitled one of his chapters, chapter 2 of
section one,(b), 'The need for leadership felt by the masses'.
The main argument in support of this need is the indifference
shown by most people for most of their institutions. To presume
this indicates a need for leadership is guesswork, and the fact
that leaders arise to fill a vacuum is no indication either that
they have popular support. The techniques of opinion polling
would have resolved this question empirically, but they weren't
available to Michels. To my knowledge, nobody has actually tried
to find out empirically if apathy does indicate a felt need for
leadership, but I suspect that the results wouldn't support
Michels' thesis. In view of the fact that the political
institutions in the countries Michels cites were invariably
designed to facilitate the emergence of an elite, it is hardly
surprising in any case that most people saw no need for
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participation. Applying Occam's razor, we can see that there is
no need to suppose any predisposition for leadership, since they
couldn't really do much else. Michels actually does point this
out when he writes about parli amentarianism later on, but fails
to realize that the implications serve only to undermine his
generalizations about the need for leadership.
Michels also states that
"the most striking proof of the organic
weakness of the mass is furnished by the way
in which, when deprived of their leaders in
time of action, they abandon the field of
battle in disordered flight; they seem to have
no power of instinctive reorganization, and
are useless until new captains arise capable
of replacing those that have been lost. The
failure of innumerable strikes and political
agitations is explained very simply by the
opportune action of the authorities, who have
placed the leaders under lock and key."
(op.c i t. p.90)
Surely, in view of all we have argued up till now, the
susceptibility of an organization with leaders to disintegration
when it loses them is attributable to the weakness of that form
of organization, not to any inherent defect on the part of its
members. Far from being the most striking evidence of organic
weakness of the masses, this is surely the most striking argument
for adopting an organizational form in which there are no leaders
indispensable for action. The history of the C.N.T shows that
basing a mass organization on federations of autonomous groups
denies the authorities the type of action cited above. The same
considerations apply to all the other arguments from existing
cases used to support Michels' case: they serve as indictments of
the organizational form rather than of the members.
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ALTERNATIVES TO THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY
The elitist assumptions built into the theory, which pervade
Michels' book, would necessarily lead to oligarchy - as we have
pointed out, there is a direct logical relationship between
oligarchical theories and elitist ideologies. The whole book is
full of circularities of this sort. For instance, Michels
presents "The cult of veneration amongst the Masses" (Chapter 5
in part 1B) as one of the causes of leadership in an
organization: and then presents "Bonapartist Ideology" (Chapter 2
in part 3) and "Le Parti c'est Moi" (Chapter 3 in part 3) as
results of advanced states of oligarchy, when they are clearly a
part of the cult of leadership which he elsewhere cites as a
cause. In other words, if Michels wished to present the emergence
of oligarchy as a consequence of the veneration of leadership, he
cannot also get away with citing other aspects of this veneration
as a cause of oligarchy too.
Consequently, the argument for oligarchy presented by
Michels is simply not strong enough. There is no reason to
suppose that individual leaders are necessary for the
continuation or administration of an organization, or for its
formation in the first place. And consequently there is no reason
to suppose that a non-authoritarian organization without an
oligarchical leadership to wield power shouldn't present a viable
alternative to the pessimistic picture painted by him. The
anarchists, of course, denied the necessity of centralised and
coercive authority to an organization. Michels' dismissal of the
anarchist alternative is one of the weakest parts of the whole
book. In one place he commits the popular error of supposing that
anarchists
"are the declared enemies of all
organizations, and who, when they form their




If we have learnt anything about anarchism, it is that there is a
coherent if incomplete tradition of anarchist organizational
writing and practise, from Proudhon through Kropotkin to the
Spanish anarchists, and beyond them to anarchist-influenced
movements like the Committee of 100 and CND, the New Left of the
1960's, with a direct link to community action and political
groups of today. Michels, in common with many people, failed to
appreciate that the insistence on the possibilities of non-
authoritarian organization is in its way the central concept of
the anarchist alternative. I make no apology for repeating the
very same quotation from Malatesta that appeared in our first
discussion of anarchism.
"Were we to believe that organization was not
possible without authority we would be
authoritarians because we would still prefer
authority, which fetters and impoverishes
life, to disorganization, which makes life
impossible."
(op.cit)
Michels even cites Malatesta as saying that it was essential to
counter the powerful organization of the rich by a still more
powerful organization of the poor, and claims this manifested
symptoms of the mentality of leaders of authoritarian parties. If
he had ever read what Malatesta wrote, it would have been obvious
that it was an entirely different kind of organization which was
being talked about - not a political party. We can only conclude
that Michels' dismissal of the anarchist alternatives to
oligarchical organization was based on either ignorance,
misunderstandingor misrepresentation.
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Though we can refute Michels' thesis on the inevitability of
oligarchy, that part of his argument which concerns the effects
of leadership and the internal dynamics of organizations still
poses genuine problems which though they can be dealt with in a
non-authoritarian framework, are real rather than imaginary. Emma
Goldman said that "Anarchism is the great liberator of man from
the phantoms that have held him captive" ('Anarchism and other
Essays', p.53), but this doesn't mean that, in Michels' words,
humanity finds it easy "to emancipate itself psychically from the
social environment in which it Lives" (op.ci t.p.271). The
accumulation of specialist skills and knowledge in the hands of a
few: the inequality of access to means of communication: the
differences in ability to handle the complexities of the state
apparatus: the dangers involved in specializations: all these are
problems raised by Michels which we have seen to be valid ones in
our earlier discussions, even if it is untrue that oligarchy is
inevitable. Avoiding bureaucracy, problems of delegation and the
socialization of new members also have to be dealt with, if
oligarchical tendencies are to be nipped in the bud. The
difference lies in the fact that given the proper framework,
these phenomena which appeared to Michels as proof of his thesis,
are reduced to their proper size and are simply problems to be
overcome. There is no doubt that the awareness of the need for
solutions already exists, and the techniques are being developed.
We've already seen these under development in the 'Tyranny of
Structurelessness' by Jo Freeman, and a more encyclopeadic
treatment is given by Martin Jelfs in his 'Manual for Action',
which discusses many solutions to these problems for voluntary
groups.
Possibly the major reason why Michels* iron law doesn't
apply to all groups is because he developed it on the basis of
looking at European political parties only. The social-democratic
parties which were the subject of the book are by no means
typical of organizations of any kind, whether voluntary or other
kinds. We have seen that political activity of the kind that
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parties engage in is peculiarly unsuited to mutual-aid groups. It
doesn't reinforce the mutual basis of the group through the
cooperative action of its members, since the systems parties work
in encourage passive support rather than participation, and
centralized authority rather than federation. Large-scale
political lobbying isn't something which usually calls for more
than a handful of people whose job it is to be influential. The
same applies to unions which have national negotiation procedures
as the main event of the year - the members are necessarily shut
out of this by the negotiating team, whose task depends entirely
on their ability to sell the outcome to the membership rather
than ask them for their views. It is the differences in the
activities undertaken by the groups in Michel's study and mutual-
aid groups and voluntary organizations which is decisive in
rejecting the applicability of the iron law as presented.
THE ROUTINIZATION OF CHARISMA
The other main classical source of the popular view of
voluntary organization derives from Weber's writings on the
routinization of charisma. Rather like Michel's iron law of
oligarchy, Weber's account of the routinization of charisma
presents a picture of a gradual and inevitable slide into
mediocrity. Charisma was the term used by Weber for the sort of
superhuman or divine attribution of exceptional power to an
individual, and essentially is used by him as a type of
authority. Charismatic authority is legitimate not because it is
habitual, just or legal but because of the charisma of the
leaders, who have followers (rather than members of an
organization) and are obeyed not for what they say but who they
are. Charisma, by its very nature, is a temporary thing - it "may
be said to exist only in the process of originating"
(Weber,'Theory of Social and Economic Organization' ed. Parsons,
p.364). The main reasons for this routinization of charisma are
firstly, that the followers want to put their activity on a
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permanent basis: secondly, that the administrators want job
security: and thirdly, (this is not so much a reason as a causal
crisis) to resolve succession problems when the leader retires,
dies or otherwise becomes detached from the followers.
Clearly, from the brief account of the theory of the
routinization of charisma given above - which though condensed,
is accurate - it is so obviously leader-dependent that it may not
be too clear why it becomes an implicit paradigm for voluntary
groups. We have seen that leadership functions can be detached
from individuals, and that most groups would find a charismatic-
type leader a handicap to the mutualist basis of the group at an
earlier stage than the one at which charisma would be routinized.
To explain how the theory of charisma becomes applied to mutual-
aid groups, we have to go back to the place of rationality in
Weber's thought, for it is impossible to understand what he was
trying to do with the concept of charisma otherwise.
We have seen that Weber had a distinct rationalist bias in
his theory of organization, as in all his social theories. This
led to the problem of accounting for irrationalities which do
occur in the real world, for a social theory which is primarily
based on rational models cannot easily embrace the irrational.
One of these questions was, if rational economic models are
technically superior, why were they a product only of Western
European civilization? It was his attempt to answer this question
which led Weber to his theory of the link between the protestant
ethic and the rise of Rationality (see his 'Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism*). Since rationality didn't have the
same influence in other societies as it did in the European one,
Weber had to find an irrational difference between societies to
explain this, and that irrational difference was religion. Hence
the link between protestantism and the rise of economic
rationality, or capitalism.
Charisma occupies the same sort of role organizationally as
religion does socially. It is Weber's only way of incorporating
irrational elements into an organization theory. He states that
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"charisma is specifically foreign to economic considerations"
(op.ci t.,p.362). If one assumes that Weber's sociology was
complete (we have seen that it really wasn't, but just supposing
it was) then if charisma is the only thing which is the basis for
irrational elements in organizational theory, it follows
logically that any irrational elements must somehow be
charismatic. And if charisma inevitably becomes routinized, it
follows that any irrational basis for an organization will become
routinized also. And if feelings of belonging and belief in group
benefits are the basis of an organization, then they too will
become routinized - inevitably.
The process of routinization involves either
traditionalization or legalization of the functions that were
legitimized by charisma, and their appropriation by a
bureaucracy. It should be clear now why this has become part of a
paradigm of voluntary organization for social scientists brought
up in the Weberian school of organization theory, even though the
theory of charisma doesn't apply properly. It is because such
organizations are based on irrational feelings and beliefs that
establish the legitimacy of their order. Their basis is
therefore charismatic-like in its irrationality, and if it is be
understood at all, can only be equated with a form of charisma.
It is therefore subject, inevitably, to routinization,
development of bureaucracy and so forth. Since this will erode
the basis of the group, routinization will lead to disintegration
and therefore voluntary organization is inherently unstable. It
cannot be subsumed under a rational model, is clearly innovative
and not traditional, therefore it cannot last.
It isn't difficult to destroy either the force or the logic
of this approach to voluntary organization and mutual-aid. The
logic clearly depends on Weber's organization theory being
complete. We have seen that it is not. We have, at different
times, shown that Weberian ideas on organizational typology are
incomplete, and that Weberian ideas on authority (and therefore
legitimation) are also flawed. Once we recognize that Weber had
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by no means said the Last word on organizations, the Logic of the
position above vanishes. The force of the argument may remain -
Like the iron Law of oLigarchy, it may not be necessariLy true
that mutuaL aid is subject to routinization and then
disintegration of the group, but it may be a usefuL enough way of
Looking at things. The reason why this is so is because of over¬
emphasis on various parts of socioLogicaL theory. We have noted
the rationaL bias which creeps in to most sociaL theories. Within
Weber's own work, some areas were deveLoped more fuLLy than
others: and those areas have since been 'hyped' by educators and
textbooks. Charisma is a good exampLe of Weberian 'hype' - most
peopLe with a nodding acquaintance with socioLogy have come
across the theory of the routinization of charisma. Our best
course of action is to redress the baLance with a few other
insights of Weber, which are remarkabLy pertinent to our
discussions here, and received LittLe space from him, and even
Less from subsequent exponents of his work.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROUTINIZATION OF CHARISMA
There is a LittLe known passage in the discussion on the
routinization of charisma, entitLed "The transformation of
charisma in an anti-authoritarian direction". (Yes! perhaps Weber
wasn't such a bad egg after a L L ....).
"A charismatic principLe which originaLLy was
primariLy directed to the Legitimation of
authority may be subject to interpretation or
deveLopment in an anti-authoritarian
direction. This is true because the vaLidity
of charismatic authority rests entirety on
recognition by those subject to it,
conditioned as this is by 'proof' of its
genuineness it is readiLy possibLe that,
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instead of recognition being treated as a
consequence of Legitimacy, it is treated as
the basis of Legitimacy. Legitimacy
becomes democratic."
(Weber, op.cit. p.386)
In other words, the routinization of charisma doesn't inevitabLy
resuLt in bureaucracy, according to Weber. It can aLso resuLt in
democratic structures. The form that these structures might take
are aLso not usuaLLy associated with Weberian organization theory
- he doesn't give them anything Like the same exposure as
bureaucratic structures, and they vanish from the writings of his
commentators. The reLevant section is entitLed "Anti-
authoritarian forms of government". Whether Jo Freeman, Martin
JeLfs or anarchist theorists know of its existence I doubt, but
its contents are famiLiar, and I'LL quote the passage at Length.
It deserves more exposure than Weber, or anyone eLse, has given
it.
"Though a certain minimum of imperative powers
in the execution of measures is unavoidabLe,
certain corporate groups may attempt to reduce
it as far as possibLe. This means that persons
in authority are heLd obLigated to act soLeLy
in accordance with the wiLL of the members and
in their service by virtue of the authority
given by them The foLLowing are the
principaL technicaL means of attaining this
end:
a) Short terms of office, if possibLe onLy
running between two generaL meetings of the
members;
b) LiabiLity to recaLL at any time;
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c) The principle of rotation or of selection
by lot in filling offices so that every member
takes a turn at some time. This makes it
possible to avoid the position of power of
technically trained persons or of those with
long experience and command of official
sec rets;
d) A strictly defined mandate for the conduct
of office laid down by the assembly of
members. The sphere of competence is thus
concretely defined and not of a general
character;
e) A strict obligation to render an accounting
to the general assembly;
f) The obligation to submit every unusual
question which has not been forseen to the
assembly of members or to a committee
representing them;
g) The distribution of powers between a large
number of offices each with its own particular
function;
h) The treatment of office as an avocation
and not as a full time occupation.
(op.cit.,p.412)
That this passage is clearly relevant to mutual-aid groups
is shown by the parallels with the anarchist organizational
writings we quoted in an earlier chapter as well as the
duplication of many observations of our own and of contemporary
writers on organization from the womens' movement and elsewhere.
The reason why it has remained buried at the back of the standard
edition of Weber's 'Wirtschaft und GeselIschaft' is simply
because the solutions it contains are to problems which have
historically been peripheral to the study of organizations. The
solutions are equally peripheral to Weber's own concerns. And as
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we have pointed out, the inappropriateness of the usual paradigm
of voluntary organization is due to the fact that it treats
mutual-aid and voluntary groups not on their own terms, but as if
they were capable of being subsumed under the ordinary
organizational models and theories used widely by analysts and
academics today.
INCORPORATION AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FLAW
The last element in the current paradigm of voluntary
organization concerns the inevitability of incorporation: that
is, the transformation of the group from serving its own
interests and that of its members to serving the interests of the
state. Again, we can illustrate this with a quotation -
"The familiar scenario for a takeover
runs something along the following lines. Some
local group or lay organization, through its
own efforts or its 'adoption* by some branch
of the media, comes to public attention. The
work of the group seems, to most people who
know about it, to be a good thing; a
worthwhile enterprise. Then some agency, with
money for this 'problem' area, advances a
grant to enable the group to secure its
future, at least for the short term: to rent
buildings, expand its operations and generally
improve its day-to-day work. The money is
given with few, or even no, strings. With this
priming-money, the organization expands, more
money is needed, more facilities are set up,
which need organizing and coordinating and
more money is needed until, in the supporting
agency, the question of judging the whole
enterprise comes up. The agency feels that
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such a Large enterprise that receives so much
agency or public funding must be run by
professional workers. The organization has to
fulfil the accepted standards set for other
government agencies and so the original thrust
of the self-help group is lost and the whole
enterprise becomes yet another safe,
traditional but distant public service
venture."
('Self-help and Health', Robinson and Henry,
p.137-138)
This is only one model of incorporation amongst a number of
current ones: however, we shan't be dealing with the more
conspiratorial theories here. Our concern in this chapter isn't
with objections to mutual-aid and voluntary organizations based
on paranoia or conspiracy theory, but with objections based on
some kind of inevitability, of which the case above is a fair
sample. The questions raised by this type of incorporation are
various. They concern the effects of grants on voluntary
organizations generally, relations with sponsoring bodies as
regards coincidence of aims and mutuality of understanding, and
the nature of 'pump-priming' led expansion. We cannot deal with
all of these here, but shall return to some of them later when we
discuss the role of mutual-aid in the welfare state.
It is obvious that one solution to the incorporation problem
outlined above is simply to avoid any form of contact with
outside agencies. This is not only drastic, but for most mutual
aid groups it is also ridiculous. So it would clearly be
preferable if we could come to an understanding of what, in
organizational terms, seems to makes this fate inevitable - for
then we may be able to avoid it. We can, using the explanatory
framework we have been developing up to now, put the type of
circumstance above in a new light.
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We know that the threefold basis of a mutual-aid group lies
in the feelings of belonging together that the individuals have,
their belief that what benefits the whole group will benefit
them, and the co-operative action that these feelings and beliefs
lead to. Robinson and Henry's paradigm of incorporation is an
instance of the erosion of the mutual basis of a group.
Essentially, one action in which the members become involved is
the administration of a grant from a funding body. The problem is
that the co-operative action of administering a grant does not
arise out of the feelings of belonging of the members and their
perception of group interest - the use to which the money is put
may well do, but some of the work the members are doing is
administering the grant. While the group itself may have more
complex ideas about what it is doing, the definition of the
situation is under the control of the funding agency: and it is
they who define the group as basically a management entity - if
this were not so, there could be no question of professionals
taking the work over, and the paradigm would be inapplicable-
Even though this is only a small part of their own self-image, it
can become the most significant cooperative action undertaken.
But this co-operative action is at one remove from the
mutual basis of the group. This enables it to be detached,
both mentally and practically, from the group itself. The
difference sounds like hair-splitting, but it is not. If it were
the case that the work that was being done by the group could
only be done by that group - if, in other words, the link between
action, beliefs and values were obvious - there would be no
possibility of anybody thinking professionals could do it better.
The fact is that the link between the basis of a mutual-aid group
and the action it undertakes is weakened by the intervention of a
sponsoring body if the action of the group becomes oriented
towards that sponsorship. It is for well-meaning sponsoring
agencies as well as groups themselves to work out a method of
sponsorship which doesn't orient the action towards that
sponsorship but at the same time does contribute. Whether that is
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possible (especially on the part of the state) we shall return to
later.
towards empiricism
It is important to realize at this stage is that it is
possible to work out the impact of a particular form of aid for a
group if we have a good understanding of the basis of that group.
Of course matters are seldom simple. It is only to be expected
that the avoidance of elites, the socialization of new members
and all the other problems we have talked about will also have to
be solved at the same time as a group needs to work out the
impact of grants or something similar. It is equally likely that
external pressures (which we have avoided discussing up to now)
will simultaneously throw up other issues needing resolution. The
point of this whole chapter is that theory is a tool that can be
used against a sort of organizational fatalism - which states
that it is inevitable that oligarchy/routinization/incorporation
will occur because that is what happens to all voluntary groups.
Our contention is that this is a false prophecy, which only gains
acceptance because it is backed up by the application of
supposedly objective organizational models which are in fact
being used out of context. Our hope is that with a proper theory,
this kind of fatalism will simply not take root.
But theory alone is not enough. Facts have to back it up. We
have begun to develop our ideas, and shown the feasability and
possibility of mutualistic organization. The next part of this
thesis elaborates and refines what we have discussed in this part,
by considering cases which show how everything we have been
theorizing about actually has worked out in practice - sometimes
successfully, sometimes not, but always instructively. While we
have in this part been developing our ideas by looking at theory








DIFFERENT KINDS OF MUTUAL-AID GROUPS
We mentioned earlier in relation to mutual-aid groups the
importance of defining exactly what the membership is, and who
the members are. There are two sets of dichotomies here which are
crucially important for any mutual-aid group to resolve in
relation to its membership. As well as being theoretically
important, they will serve to structure our introduction of cases
from the literature. Indeed, the presentation of these two
dichotomies would be impossible unless we could make references
to actual cases - we could not possibly have developed this part
of our argument in the purely theoretical context of the last
part of the thesis. The first dichotomy is whether the membership
is open or closed - whether anybody can join, or whether the
number of members is limited. The second is whether membership of
the group is temporary or permanent - whether one joins for life,
or for a limited time only. A third factor related to this second
dichotomy is whether the group itself is seen as being a
temporary or a permanent fixture. For those who like their
classifications in tabular form, the figure following sets the
distinctions out clearly, with illustrative examples only. The
reason why we have not included temporary groups with permanent
members in the table is because they present a fairly obvious
logical inconsistency.
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TEMPORARY GROUPS AND PERMANENT GROUPS
Let us work through each of these categories in turn,
beginning with the differences between temporary groups and
permanent ones. It is true, of course, that groups which have a
temporary life-span - ones which can forsee the inevitability and
circumstances of their own dissolution - vary widely in the
length of time for which they might exist. Nevertheless, a clear
theoretical distinction can be drawn between those groups which
provide services for their members on a permanent basis, and
those who see their existence more in relation to a goal which
will be achieved in time, and thus have a temporary image of
themselves. Like all clear theoretical distinctions, this one
does get a bit fuzzy round the edges. A group can set itself up
with a clear, achievable goal, and find itself transformed into a
permanent group providing services for its members. For example,
Gingerbread, the group for single parent families, was originally
a group set up by and on behalf of single parents supposedly to
'ginger up the Government into providing more bread' by
implementing the Finer Report, but moved on to providing more
regular and permanent support services, such as regular social
meetings, group holidays, and welfare rights advice.
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Conversely, a group with an essentially permanent self-image
can find itself with a short-term goal to achieve. For example,
the campaign by charities to gain exemption from V.A.T. liability
is a short-term goal for permanent organizations. Still more
complicated cases exist: a goal may be nominally a temporary
one, but in practise become so long term that continued activity
and campaigning in pursuit of it becomes a service in its own
right indistinguishable from a permanent one. Cancer research
organizations, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, various
groups concerned with legalization of cannabis are only a few
examples of groups who would like nothing better than to wind up
their organizations. That such cases exist doesn't in itself
invalidate the distinction, since the subjective definition, the
self-image of the group, is the important criterion. The more
difficult this is in practise, the more likely it is that
problems will arise over the lack of an appropriate or realistic
self-definition.
Some temporary groups may well last a lot longer than
supposedly permanent organizations. Claimants' Unions, for
instance, are notoriously short lived, whilst temporary groups
with legal reforms as aims, such as the various abortion lobbies,
have a habit of soldiering on for years. Despite what we have
said about such groups regarding themselves as providing de facto
services (such as watchdog services, like the NCCL) one might
question the utility of the distinction when it is so obviously
full of difficult cases when it comes to applying it. The utility
lies, however, in the three ingredients of mutual-aid groups we
established earlier: co-operative action, a group ethic, and
mutual feeelings of belonging.
The key question to which permanent and temporary groups
would give different answers is whether or not they think it
would be a desirable thing if their group were to continue
indefinitely. A group with a permanent self-image would answer
with an unqualified affirmative, but a group with a temporary
self-image would answer, with qualifications, no. For as long as
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the group continued, the goal or state of affairs it is trying to
bring about would clearly not yet have been accomplished. (The
obvious qualification is that they would not wish the group to
wind up before this state of affairs was reached: but we could
make the question an ideal one - ideally, would you like to see
your group continue indefinitely?) As I have said, the subjective
degree of permanence is all important. Temporary groups can
withstand far greater internal stresses and strains within
themselves, because the state of affairs in the group, like the
group itself, is only temporary, and the eventual goal could well
be considered adequate recompense for any temporary discomfort or
inconvenience. To use commonly accepted jargon, a temporary group
offers far greater scope for deferred gratification behaviour
patterns. Deferred gratification is putting up with bad
conditions now in the hope of better conditions later. This also
occurs in permanent groups of course - many worker cooperatives
start by paying very low wages (like most new businesses), and
although the wages would be intolerable if the members thought
that they would never earn anything more, the expectation that
the cooperative wilt succeed enables them to defer their
ambitions until they can afford to gratify them. In this respect,
a permanent group is as resilient as a temporary group in its
initial start-up phase, since the members (though viewing the
group as permanent) see the difficulties as being only temporary,
The group ethic is the belief of the members that
they are all better off as members of the group than they would
be outside it, since what benefits the group also benefits them.
Given that this is a characteristic of mutual-aid groups the
relevance of the temporary/permanent distinction becomes much
clearer. If the members regard the group as a temporary one, the
group ethic is likely to be maintained even when the co-operative
activity is apparently without reward. The payoff for the group
is either all or nothing, and the members know this: so getting
the nothing part is necessary and expected. On the other hand, a
group which is regarded by the members as permanent and stable
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cannot maintain the group ethic by using a goal as a carrot,
since there isn't a goal to aim for. Once the workers in the
cooperative we just invented begin to realize that the corner
will never be turned, they begin to see that their low pay is
permanent. Their continued membership, and the coop itself,
becomes an open question once the group redefine their condition
as a permanent one.
One obvious qualification appears in the chart as pump-
priming: members regard the state of the organization as being a
temporary one on the route to some permanently viable stable
state, even though they recognize that such a stage has not yet
been reached. Some groups may start off with a pump-priming self-
image, but fail to graduate to the stage of having a permanent
and stable subjective view of the organization - the key element
throughout is the subjective view of the members. On the whole,
temporary groups do seem to run more successfully as mutual-aid
groups (even when the goal isn't achieved) because the group
ethic is much more resilient. Even the option for redefining a
situation is not as open in a temporary group, since it is by
definition temporary in the first place and therefore wouldn't
ever be seen as permanent in the first place. So there is less
need to reinforce the group ethic, and less need for the kind of
communicative competence on values we discussed earlier, since
deferred gratification does it all for you. A glance at any of
the regular media channels for voluntary groups, such as
'Community Action', 'In the Making', or the BBC Grapevine
programme confirms the generalization about temporary groups
being more resilient, though our suggested reason is purely
hypothetical.
PROBLEMS OF ENDS AND MEANS
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If the problems of maintaining group ethics are more severe
in permanent groups, there is one particular problem for
temporary groups which permanent ones seldom have to face. This
is assuming that the end justifies the means, and as a
consequence adopting various tactics and strategies which are
known to be dangerous in the long run, in the hope that the long
run will never come. The same mechanism of deferred gratification
in a temporary group which enables a group ethic to be maintained
even when an outsider would regard it as a myth, can also be used
to justify elitist, hierarchical, coercive and other non¬
voluntary unmutual practices in the hope that this will enable
the group to move towards its goal more quickly. I suspect that
this is one of the non-articulated criticisms which some parts of
the women's movement have against what they call 'single issue
organizing': it isn't simply that organizing around a single
issue is like treating symptoms rather than tackling causes, but
that it leads to an essentially instrumental view of group
activity. The goal becomes the god, and it is possible to become
so devoted to attaining an end that the means used to achieve it
can contradict the reasons for wanting the goal in the first
place. There will never, for instance, be a war to end all wars,
unless it be the big bang itself.
This identification of possible contradictions between the
values implicit in ends, and the means used to achieve them is
itself evaluative. It relates back to the belief in the values
implicit in mutualism, and to the anarchist belief that the ends
never justify the means. Many people would be quite happy to
reach a goal by hierarchical and elitist methods, and would
regard the position taken here as hopelessly romantic at best.
This is probably responsible for the observable paradox that
though temporary mutual-aid groups are both easier to organize
and to maintain than permanent groups, there aren't that many
more of them.
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In most pressure groups, co-operative working is seen as
Less efficient than centralized decision making and fixed
committee structures. This does have some truth in it, depending
on the tactics used by the pressure group. Most pressure-group
tactics tend to use institutionalized channels for pressure -
lobbying representatives, being represented at inquiries and so
forth. As actions go, they demand intense concentrated presssure
by a few people acting as representatives of the whole
membership, rather than involving the whole membership in the
action. Most members of pressure-groups don't act as much as
support those who are doing the acting. That such a system is a
product of a representative democratic political system is
obvious. Passive support replaces co-operative action. There is a
coalition of interests rather than a group interest, and the
basis for a mutual-aid group isn't usually present. The type of
action is all important. The fact that temporary mutual-aid
groups can be tempted exclusively into action which doesn't
involve the members of the group is a potential threat to the
basis of the organization, and can make subsequent groups more
difficult to establish.
SOME EXAMPLES
An example of this problem is found in the story of the West
Cumberland Action Committee as reported in 'Community Groups in
Action', by Butcher, Collis, Glen and Sills. Whilst the story
does involve more issues than this one problem, the following
central points emerge. First, a group of mothers organized a
group around the issue of bus fare increases. The group numbered
about thirty people, about one hundred attended a public meeting
and three thousand signed a petition.(p.55, op.cit) Secondly,
after the initial launch of the group, it became involved fairly
heavily in lobbying, meetings with officials and representatives
(p.65, op.cit.). Third, the authors of the study reported that
the group
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"seems to have fallen between two stools:
first, it became isolated from its local
constituency (its main source of public
support) and second, it proved unable to
establish links with other organizations
this may have been caused by its decision to
direct most of its energies into influence-
exertion the committee had moved too far
from the bases from which it originated."
(op.cit. p.69)
In other words, the fact that there was no co-operative action
meant that the mutualistic basis of the original group couldn't
be reinforced. The feelings of belonging which had led to the
original support of the group hadn't been channelled into a group
ethic or co-operative action because the single issue of the
local transport policy had been taken as being the only thing
that mattered. When the hoped-for quick results failed to
materialize, it had become too late to retrieve the situation.
However, this is by no means an inevitable result of
temporary pressure group organizing. Perhaps the best-documented
account of a group which didn't run into the type of problems
we've been discussing is found in Sidney Jacob's book on the
Gairbraid Housing Committee, 'The Right to a Decent House'. The
Gairbraid group didn't make the mistakes the West Cumberland
group made. In the first place, instead of sending delegates to
the authorities, they brought the authorities to the group at a
public meeting. In the second place, they used direct action
tactics such as mass protests and used the media well, and all
these activities involved the community and strengthened feelings
of belonging. In the third place, the advocacy role the group
adopted was not only as pure a form of mutual aid as one is
likely to find anywhere, but it also linked the committee, the
community and the problems they all faced into a direct series of
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confrontations with the Local housing department, resulting in a
further demonstration of the truths which Lay at the basis of the
group ethic - that what was good for the group was good for the
individual. As Jacobs sums up -
"The GHC had an effective life of about
sixteen months during this time, sixty-
eight committee meetings and seven public
meetings were held. Petitions were sent to the
housing manager and to the Secretary of State
for Scotland, and Gairbraid was responsible
for a trade union resolution condemning
Glasgow's rehousing policy. On two separate
occasions the GHC sent delegations to the City
Chambers the area was featured on a
'Current Account' television programme and
obtained considerable press publicity. The GHC
organized two demonstrations at the Housing
Department of which one involved people from
other areas. Ten documents for external
consumption were issued even' Gairbraid
household also received thirteen newsletters
Committee members accompanied residents
to the Housing Department, were involved in
legal representation, liason with the police,
and advocacy with the social work department.
The GHC organnized a pre-school playgroup,
bingo sessions, a mothers' group, a trip to
Edinburgh, visits to old age pensioners and
various other social activities."
Full marks to the Gairbraid Housing Committee. Cooperative action,
feelings of belonging and belief in the efficacy of group action
were all reinforced by the actions they organized. The community,
unlike the West Cumberland case, was not simply there to provide
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Legitimation of committee activities taking place out of sight
and not involving the local people.
TEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP AND PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP
Let us now take our second dichotomy: this is whether the
membership of the group, as opposed to the group itself, is
temporary or permanent. This isn't an either/or dichotomy, as
many groups have both types of members. There is almost bound to
be a preponderance of one of the types of members, though: and
mixtures can, and often do, create problems of their own.
Again, the degree of impermanence may vary widely. When I
first began looking at claimants' unions a virtually complete
turnover of membership in about three months was not uncommon
(though this is doubtless less frequent now than it was then). A
pre-school playgroup doesn't complete a cycle for two years, or
three if it admits children at two and they don't go to school
till they are five. Some similiar life-cycle groups may have an
even longer turnaround time. One main reason why the
permanent/temporary dichotomy is so important is because of the
fact that new members of the group have to be socialized into the
group ethic, the habits of the group, and may well need to
develop a feeling of belonging - feeling at home with the group,
if you like. In many cases, co-operative working will be new to
them also, and this requires both the learning and sharing of new
skills. As we have noted earlier, most people would join out of
self-interest, rational motives, and the suspension of self-
interest in favour of group interest - what Habermas called the
repression of generalizable interest - is as a consequence
essential if the group is not to disintegrate under the stresses
and strains of opposing self-interests. One key problem of groups
with temporary members is how to achieve all this as quickly as
possible.
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An obvious reason why claimants' unions have usually been so
short-lived is because the average time someone is a member has,
until recently, been too short to enable any socialization to
occur successfully, and too short to enable the skills built up
by one generation to be passed on to the next. The fact that new
claimants have more personal preoccupations in relation to their
new status doesn't aid this either. Even in times of mass
unemployment this is liable to be true, because typically a union
is approached only in the initial stages of the process of
claiming, and then only if difficulties are encountered: and most
people are understandably not keen to immerse themselves in a
claimant's role and would prefer to be working. The mainstay of
most claimants' unions I have come across have been not the
unemployed but those on long-term sickness benefit, for instance,
who are not able to work, rather than the unemployed as such. The
shorter the average time of membership and involvement in a
mutual-aid group of the temporary membership variety, the greater
the pressure and the more urgent the need to socialize new
members: and even under ideal circumstances (whatever those may
be) this is bound to be quite a skilled task.
Groups with permanent members face different problems in
this context. Though they are not faced with a crucially short
period of time in which to socialize new members, it may well be
likely that the existing permanent members of the group will
routinize their involvement, fall into predictable but personally
satisfying routines, and have a protective, not to say possessive
attitude towards their organization. We have already touched on
this in the discussion on structurelessness, and the issue of
oligarchy, which we have already dealt, with covers some of these
problems too. It is worth pointing out that socialization of new
members in a group of permanent members is likely to be just as
difficult as in the temporary instance, but for an opposite
reason. In a sense, the group ethic has gone haywire in the same
way as the human body's rejection mechanisms go against its own
best interests when a transplant problem occurs. The development
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of a group identity does involve the delineation of clear
boundaries between the group and the world outside the group, and
to accept an incomer as part of the group involves the suppresion
of otherwise healthy reflexes to reject outsiders. Older members
can jealously guard their prerogatives against the real or
imaginary challenges of new members.
MIXTURES
This brings us back to a problem we mentioned earlier, for a
mixture of old and new permanent people in a group presents many
of the same problems as does a mixture of permanent and temporary
members. The central feature of a mutual-aid group which causes
the problem is that mutual feelings of belonging and the group
ethic are both predicated on a common interest existing in fact:
but when some members are temporary and others permanent, or some
new and others of longer standing, there is obviously the
possibility of opposed interest groups to develop around the
visible heterogeneity within the organization. For example, in a
residents' group in a derelict inner-city area, permanent and
well-established households may wish for rehabilitation of the
houses, whilst temporary and newer residents, lacking deep roots
in the area, could well feel that they are better off being
rehoused. Or more basically, perhaps, permanent members of a
group may well decide that involving temporary members in
decision-making and the running of the organization is simply not
worth the investment of energy in training and in overcoming the
continuity problems generated when they leave - and in the back
of their minds there is always the posssibility that the mere
fact of temporary membership can only mean a lesser commitment.
In both cases, the egalitarianism essential to the group,
implicit in its mutual nature and communicative competence, is
threatened. A balance between permanent and temporary members, or
old and new members, is very difficult to strike. There's a
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Lovely illustration of the old/new problem in the study of Ilys
Booker's playgroup in West London in the 1960's, as reported by
Mitton and Morrison in their book, 'A Community Project in
Notting Dale', which is incidentally full of anecdotes relevant
to many areas of this thesis. This one, though, concerns a new
playleader, called Janet, who didn't like the children playing in
a courtyard full of broken glass and took them to a park instead.
"Sometimes she walked up with them and
sometimes they went in a van driven by one of
the new mothers. Mrs. Fellows and Mrs. Travers
were worried about all this, that the children
would get tost in the park, that there were
busy roads to cross, when they walked there
and back, and that the van they sometimes went
in was not insured. They regarded the children
as their responsibility and told Janet not to
take them to the park. Janet knew that some of
the new mothers preferred the park, so she
demanded a mothers' meeting. This took place
in the courtyard and was attended by about ten
mothers including the younger ones with
children in the playgroup, the older ones with
no children in the playgroup but still
involved in the group, and a few older ones
who had had little to do with the
playgroup for some time. The two views were
stated and the group divided at a vote
Janet and some of the mothers with children
currently in the playgroup had never seen some
of the older mothers who appeared at the
playgroup to Mrs. Travers and Mrs.
Fellows it was these mothers who had formed
the group in its heyday getting the
playgroup back to the courtyard was part of
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their wich that the playgroup might regain its
former character."
(Mitton and Morrison, op.cit. p.132-133)
This kind of problem is much easier to contain in a group
which has only one or two permanent members amidst a large number
of temporary ones, such as a playgroup with a permanent
playleaders. Though it is possible for such a group to fail to
realize the possibility of developing something akin to an
oligarchy or an elite, this isn't common, let alone inevitable.
There actually are advantages in such an arrangement, for not
only do the temporary members find the continuity and accumulated
skills of such a person a valuable resource, but typically
someone in the position of being a permanent member of an
otherwise temporary group is more than usually aware of the
possible problems, and has had time to develop the skills and
expertise necessary to avoid the problems and realise the
advantages. Also, with only one or two permanent members amidst a
large number of temporary ones, it is easier to isolate and solve
any difficulties. One or two people are less likely to constitute
an interest group of their own, especially when the organization
is so clearly based on the co-operation of the permanent and
temporary members.
Conversely, many groups with permanent members find an
occasional temporary member not in the least threatening, but
actually refreshing and useful as a source of new ideas. This
type of situation may even be encouraged as a means of recruiting
posssible new members , by seeing them and working with them over
a period of time with no commitment to continued membership - a
sort of pre-socialization period in fact. Probationary periods
of this type are common in organizations of all types and forms,
not just voluntary ones or mutual-aid groups. Alternatively, many
groups have found an exchange of members with similar groups
provide useful experiences for all concerned (as university
lecturers may know). In both the above situations, a mixture of
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permanent and temporary members is controlled to the extent that
conflicts and threats have little chance of developing.
OPEN GROUPS AND CLOSED GROUPS
The last of our distinctions (which we have been dealing
with in reverse order from the chart - we've been sort of working
outwards) is that between open and closed groups. This raises
perhaps the most difficult questions. There is a possible
misconception to be avoided at the very start. An open group in
the sense in which we use it here is one which has no limit to
the number of members. The fact that most mutual-aid groups
restrict membership to certain categories of people is a
necessary consequence of there being a group to belong to at all
and does not of itself make the group a closed one. In other
words, restricted membership is not the same as closed
membership. For instance, a women-only group may be open to all
women who choose to come. It would therefore be an open group,
even though no men were allowed to join. Closure is related to a
limit on size. If a housing co-operative had twenty houses at its
disposal, which were available to anyone irrespective of class,
race, sex, age, religion, colour, marital status or anything else
then any human being is a potential member, and there is nobody
who cannot join. But the group is a closed one because there are
only twenty households available. There are only three cases I
can think of which do not fit neatly into one or the other
pigeonhole. The first is a group which does have a maximum size,
but has such difficulty in attracting members that it is for all
intents and purposes open to everyone. The second is a group
which has a maximum size, but is open to everyone because it
splits into two groups when it reaches maximum size. Many
consciousness-raising and therapeutic groups are of this type,
and effectively can also be treated as open ones. The third is a
group which though closed to outsiders can grow through natural
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increase - the members have children who automatically qualify.
Some communes, kibbutzim, some religiouscommunities (not
monasteries) fit into this category. Interestingly, the Hutterite
communities of the nothern USA and Canada combine this type of
community with the second - such is their birth rate that they
split, like amoebae, every twenty years or so. On the whole, they
can be treated as closed groups of families rather than
individuals: and interesting though they may be, they are outside
the mainstream of mutual-aid groups.
Whether a mutual-aid group is open or closed is as
fundamental to its nature as whether it, or its members, are
temporary or permanent, and for many of the same reasons. Open
groups have many of the same problems as temporary groups do: the
difficulties raised by the need to socialize new members are
common to both. Unless an open group succeeds in this, it falls
into one of two pits. It may degenerate into a two-tier group,
with an oligarchical elite controlling decision-making. This
elite is composed of the older members and ignores a larger and
growing number of new members who haven't been integrated into
the group properly. Or alternatively, the open nature of the group
may allow full participation of people who haven't incorporated
the group ethic into their attitudes, and don't have the sense
of belonging which is essential if they are to participate in the
control and Leadership functions necessary for the group to
function effectively.
BOUNDARY PROBLEMS
Both these problems are essentially boundary problems. As we
have mentioned before, a group of any kind must maintain an
identity for it to develop into a cohesive relationship, and this
identity must be based on firm boundaries being drawn in the
minds of the members between those inside the group, and those
outside: and those boundaries must function effectively in
reality if the identity is to be maintained. The process is
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analagous to the development and maintenance of the belief that
what benefits the group benefits the individual in that it can
tolerate a certain degree of mythology in its makeup, but if that
mythological element becomes too great, people find it impossible
to base their practical actions on it. The boundaries of a group
must be real enough to allow group identity to be maintained.
We have seen in the case of permanent groups with temporary
members what happens if the boundaries cannot be relaxed in order
to allow new members to join, and exactly the same considerations
apply to open groups in recruiting new members. Inevitably there
will be rites of passage, or initiation ceremonies of some kind,
either formal or informal, which mark the crossing of the
boundary. Attending a first meeting, or being asked to take
responsibility for something, or putting one's name down on a
roster of some kind fulfil this function for both the new
individual and the group as a whole. There is a moment in an
association with an existing group when a participant feels that
they have 'arrived': acceptance is no longer in doubt and a
feeling of belonging has been reinforced and stabilized by the
crossing of a boundary. Once crossed, the boundary still serves
the purpose of identifying members from non-members in terms of
common experiences of members as well as the more obvious
exclusion of outsiders. (There is an obvious analogy with
deviance theory here: see Howard Becker's paper on marijuana
smoking for an example. J. Romero Maura also remarks on the
analogy with deviance theory in his paper on the C.N.T. in
Spain.)
Where the boundaries are undefined, identity isn't
maintained and the distinction between insiders and outsiders
disintegrates in the minds of all concerned. A feeling of
belonging is impossible to maintain, as nothing is perceived
which anyone could belong to. A belief in the group ethic becomes
similarly counterfactual, since where no group is perceptible,
no group benefit can be seen to exist either. Typically, cases of
this type fall into two categories. In the first category are
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groups which fail to become established because of the lack of
boundaries: they have made the fatal mistake of not defining who
they are. More often than not these instances are put down as
good ideas which failed to materialize, or which generated lots
of enthusiasm but failed to capitalize on it. Their status as
failed groups isn't always apparent. In the second category,
undefined boundaries turn suddenly into sharply defined ones in
an effort to reverse the disintegration, and people who thought
they were already members find that their status is doubtful.
There may be accusations of purges and coups by the newly-
excluded members, which often invoke a reaction which turns the
boundaries into such tight ones that new members cannot easily
join, and the first kind of boundary problem arisesinstead.
Forcible exclusion does serve to strengthen feelings of belonging
inside the group, but at the cost of alienating possible
potential members among those excluded, who may still be part of
a wider constituency of informal support whose goodwill may be
required even if involvement is not.
PROBLEMS OF SIZE
The other main problem of an open group is related to size.
Groups commonly have an open membership because they find
political or financial advantages in being as large as possible.
Two obvious examples are mass pressure group campaigns, which
seek to speak for as wide a constituency as possible, and groups
seeking to raise money by subscription to provide a needed
service of some kind. Many groups combine both reasons - trades
unions are one of the oldest examples of this. The greater the
number who join in, the greater the legitimacy of the group or
the sounder its finances are. Such groups tend to become ever
larger, and the larger the group, the more acute the problems
posed by size. Beyond a certain limit it is bound to be
impossible to involve all those who may wish to take part in
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decision making, and the greater the possibility of elites and
oligarchies developing. In some cases, this is happily resolved
by a more dedicated core group emerging of those who want to take
such responsibility, with the others being happy to adopt a more
passive role - this often occurs in constituency-type community
groups. The Gairbraid Housing Committee (see Jacobs, op.cit.) was
an example of this. In other cases, oligarchy may become almost
inevitable. This is a topic which was discussed earlier, but we
can note now that splitting the group and federating the parts is
a solution to this which works under the proper circumstances
(which are if people want it to).
Another danger in large groups is that special interest
groups may develop within the main group, and this may threaten
common group ethics. The different interests may become opposed,
and infighting results. There is a partial analogy here with the
old/new member split discussed earlier. The symptoms are the
same, but the cure is different. The problem is one that doesn't
go away - opposed interests tend to grow away from each other,
while age differences tend to vanish with accumulated
experiences. A previously integrated group can turn into a
coalition of interest groups. If this is a stable coalition, it
becomes similar to a federation and does no great harm - it is
an evolutionary development. But if two or more opposing
interests in a group imply opposing rather than complementary
courses of action, this is a different circumstance entirely.
Splits between owner-occupiers and tenants in residents' groups
are often of this nature.
ONE MORE EXAMPLE
The North Tyneside CDP gives an example of just this sort.
The background to this passage is the failed attempt by the CDP
to expand the size and widen the basis of a local resident's
group.
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"There was a division between the council
tenants on the new estate and the older
residents in the clearance area, mainly based
on resentment by residents because they felt
that they should have been given the new
houses: between the older residents, mainly
owner-occupiers, in the clearance area and the
newer tenants, whom the older residents
regarded as not maintaining the old values and
standards of the village and many of whom they
regarded as 'problem families'; between most
of these people and those who live in the east
side of the village in semi-detached houses who
were regarded as 'toffee-nosed'. The PMRAG
(Percy Main Residents Action Group) reflected
the concern of both the owner-occupiers in the
clearence area and in the private housing in
preserving a 'respectable community' in Percy
Main. By providing a formalised focus for
these values the PMRAG exacerbated the
conflicts between the owner occupiers and
tenants in the clearance area."
('North Shields: Organising for Change in a
Working Class Area', North Tyneside CDP, p.19)
We ought to note, in justice, that according to the CDP, the
original group had none of the tenants, who were over half the
residents, as members: and that they clearly saw the PMRAG later
on as a middle class pressure group run by the local doctor and
vicar. What the CDP eventually did was to set up a rival group,
called the Percy Main Pushers, and withdraw from the attempt to
expand the original group.
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Whatever the rights or wrongs of the situation, and
irrespective of whether the original PMRAG was a mutual-aid group
or a vicar-doctor front, the case is cited here as a clear
instance of an increase in size (prompted by the CDP's wish to
work with a large representative group) leading to conflicts
between different interests within the group where only one group
interest existed before. This isn't meant to reflect on the
legitimacy of either interest in a political or moral sense. Both
groups have a right to expression, whether they conflict or not.
Our mutual aid theory doesn't at the moment incorporate any
frameworks for the resolution of conflict. This would probably
need to incorporate rather more ideas from social psychology and
group therapy than we have space for here, and in any event, it
would be unrealistic to expect us to cover all the areas our
subject touches on completely and conclusively from scratch.
MORE ON SIZE
Other problems may also arise from increase in size. If the
group does develop a stable and acceptable leadership within
itself, there is always the possibility that the size of the
group and the consequent burdens and tasks of responsibilities
may be too great, and the group won't function properly if this
is so. Many of these problems are common to any large
organization, not merely mutual-aid groups. The technique of
splitting into smaller groups and federating is a solution to
problems of size implicit in anarchist theory, and we have
mentioned this earlier. The experience of such techniques has
developed, partly through the work of the ever-present women's
movement and partly through the work of anti-nuclear federation
which have both developed and flourished in the last few years.
Breaking up into small groups has become a standard format for
conferences of all sorts for much the same sort of reason. Within
federations, rotating chairmanships and strict limits on time
spent as officials of the group is an equally common technique
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for maintaining equality (the EEC Council of Ministers adopts
both these tactics: the EEC has always had the mythology of being
a mutual-aid group between nations). The technique works by
turning a potentially open and oversized decision-making body
into a successsion of smaller, closed ones - the theory is that
as long as the people in positions of influence know that their
position is temporary, they are unlikely to abuse it, and other
groups don't become discontented because they are aware that
T
their own turn will come. The CND in Spain, it will be
remembered, practised geographical rotation amongst members.
One other problem is akin to the open groups we mentioned
earlier, which nobody wants to join, as well as the cases where
the leadership functions are too great. Many open groups go
through long periods of hibernation because nobody wants to do
any work or take on any of the leadership functions. Perhaps the
group is waiting for the right time to do something, or requires
more energy than can be given except in short spurts. Raising
consciousness among members is the only solution if this is felt
to be a problem, and it is a tactical question rather than an
organizational one, so we shall not go into it here.
PROBLEMS OF CLOSED GROUPS
There are two main reasons for groups being closed ones
(apart from security). The first is a desire for small size - it
is recognized that open groups do have the size problems we have
just discussed. Elites, caucuses and divided interests may be
seen as inevitable if the group grows beyond a certain size,
perhaps that where formal elections become necessary. The second
reason for a group being closed takes us back to Olson and the
logic of collective action. If a group grows large and the total
benefit remains the same, the benefit each member gets is
lessened. This is often the case where there is a finite and
visible limit to the public good being provided - space is a good
example. Often the benefit, beyond a certain limit, may be
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inversely proportional to size. An example of this type of
benefit is found in educational mutual-aid groups (adult or
child) where large classrooms (or playgroups) lead eventually to
a vanishingly small benefit, and people are better off at home
reading books. And a playgroup of five thousand children would
defeat the whole point of having a playgroup in the first place.
Any child would be better off and safer at home. Optimum size is
a very real phenomenon. So is a finite good - a workers' co¬
operative who admitted all the unemployed as members would die
the death instantly - or else wages would be reduced to pence and
nobody would qualify for benefits either.
Despite the fact that there are some perfectly good reasons
for making groups closed ones - indeed, in the cases above the
reasons are not only sound but essential - it is the closed type
of mutual-aid group which has always been the most widely
criticized on grounds of exclusivity. Playgroups are often
criticized for being exclusively middle-class (by the Wolfenden
Committee on Voluntary Organizations amongst others). Beatrice
Webb castigated nineteenth-century producer co-operatives as
being mere joint-stock companies owned by their founders.
Kibbutzim have recently been employing outside labour (usually
Arab) as soon as the unit cost of such labour becomes less than
their own per-capita income. And many housing associations are
seen (e.g. by Community Action magazine) as being simply ways for
middle-class people to jump the council waiting lists.
POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITATION
There is no doubt that a possibility exists for a mutual-aid
group to become an agent of exploitation of others for the
benefit of its own members - this is inherent in any kind of
interest, whether a group one or otherwise. I cannot conceive of
any form of human organization which does not have the potential
for harm as well as good. Criticisms of particular groups do not
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add up to a criticism of mutual-aid as a concept, and I would
maintain that on balance, an organization which is a mutual-aid
group is less likely to be unaware of its wider social
environment and less likely to harm non-members than any other
kind of organization. The reflexive application of the principles
which structure the organization internally to the external world
is the cause of this.(We can note in passing the far greater
tendency of mutual-aid group members to exploit themselves, in
that they do things in conditions they wouldn't dream of
tolerating were they not in a mutual-aid group).
The implication is that there is an obligation on mutual-aid
groups to maintain their own internal egalitarianism in their
relations with the wider society in which they exist. This logic
only holds true if mutual-aid groups exist in a mutual-aid
society, however. The assumption made by those critics who write
off the aims of mutual aid organizations as being simple
manifestations of self-interest on the part of sectional groups
in society is that there is a group ethic amongst organizations
in that society which parallels the group ethic between
individuals in a group. Mutual aid groups ought therefore to act
as if their own welfare depended on the welfare of the society
around them. There is no problem about this if all groups in a
society reciprocate that action. But to extend the obvious truism
that the welfare of a group depends on the welfare of the whole
society into an argument for the unqualified acceptance of the
institutions of that society is as fallacious as objecting to a
mutual-aid group ejecting freeloaders. The key element, unstated,
in the equation is always the state as the guardian of social
order. The fact is that many people in mutual-aid groups have
become involved in this type of action because of the inaction of
the state and its unwillingness to support them, or may have
become involved to defend themselves against the state. The
members have no reason to trust governments or assume that their
interests are identical, and may have good reasons to assume the
contrary. The belief that society would be better off without the
201
state, or without many other institutions we are all meant to
support, is a perfectly reasonable one to hold. If one holds it,
the argument that a mutual-aid group ought to accept or even
support the institutions of the society of which it is a part
becomes untrue in general, though it may hold true in particular
cases. Reciprocity of this support is the first necessary item in
this, which amounts to a mutual-aid federation of a whole
society. I do not need to say that this is a consummation
devoutly to be wished.
OBJECTIONS TO MUTUAL-AID
One other reason why mutual-aid groups are criticized
applies particularly keenly to closed groups, and arises from a
similar line of thought, which sees all solutions as ultimately
emanating from the state. If the state does not provide enough,
this argument runs, we ought to pressure it, through our
democratic institutions, into providing more, for three reasons.
Firstly, because to provide it ourselves is divisive: it may
lessen the strength of our commitment to universalism in social
institutions.Secondly, because it takes away state resources
which ought rightly to be assigned according to a broader social
plan. Lastly, because it is no proper solution in the long-term
since it bypasses the state. To which the answers are as follows.
One, creating deprivation is divisive, not meetingneeds: two,
mutual-aid groups create resources and in any case, the problem
is one of control rather than mere distribution: and the
third argument is clearly a circular one (and anarchists would
say that no solution which doesn't bypass the State can be
permanent).
This whole issue is of greatest political importance, and
there are some claims made which appear on the surface to be
plausible, but are in fact either nonsensical or taken from a
context where they make a lot more sense. The most notable of
these is that,somehow, people who form a mutual-aid group to
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solve a particular problem are responsible for the continuation
of that problem, or even its aggravation, for non-members. The
tactic of blamimg victims is a time-honoured one in state
political systems. But people cannot justly be held responsible
for a problem they did not create. Nor can they be held
responsible for a problem when they have not only not created it,
but have instead found a solution of their own. Equally, to blame
them for the actions of a system they have actively opposed when
the response of that system to their success is to victimize or
ignore others is looking to blame the wrong party. It is
impossible to respond at all to circumstances which demand it
when we fear that any response will only make matters worse.
No group can solve any problems by leaving them in the hands
of those who have created the problem and found no answers to
give them. Sidney Jacobs writes, of Gairbraid and its Housing
Action Committee -
"it is said, Gairbraid's aspirations were
achieved only at the expense of other areas
who were unorganized To expect people to
forego the chance of a decent house because
somewhere in the city an unknown person may be
deprived, is to attribute to them either
irresponsibility to their own family,
gullibility, stupidity or saintliness. The
system creates extreme competition and it is
therefore a distortion to place the onus for
both unfair distribution and the existing
shortages on the residents rather than on the
authorities whose priorities, policies and
practises are entirely responsible If
the GHC had not existed, people elsewhere
would not have been treated better, Gairbraid
would simply have been treated as badly
To accuse the GHC of selfishness is to ignore
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its record of helping other areas and
consistently trying to achieve city-wide
reform to behave otherwise is to comply
with an unjust system while opposition, even
on a small scale, opens it to public debate
and perhaps begins a process which may
inspire others and may even change it."
One might add, more positively, that as long as the system works,
however badly, it will not be changed if nobody acts. If we want
to act, and the system still works after our action, it will not
be changed either. It is only when a system has ceased to work
that a replacement will be found for it. And if a mutual-aid
group is told it is making things worse, it will only hasten the
day when an unjust and unfair system will be replaced.
And a warning admission to end with: if a system, despite all
its faults, has no viable alternative, none of the above follows
logically. Optimists will say that something better must exist,
pessimists will ask what it is. We said in the beginning that the
main argument against anarchism was that it was impossible. The
purpose of this treatise is to demonstrate the possibilities
inherent in mutual-aid as a coherent organizational strategy. Its
possibility and functioning is what we are establishing.
Inevitably, the way groups function is affected profoundly by the
political system from which they arise. Whilst we have just been
drawn into discussing, in the last few paragraphs of this
chapter, some of the ethical questions which this might raise,
the practicalities of links between the state and voluntary
organizations is a topic which is clearly important and we shall
return to it later. We move on in the next chapter, as a bridge
from theory and from taking mutual aid groups in isolation, to
consider the very real political questions which can arise within
mutual aid groups. As well as being important in itself, this too
is an aid to the further development of the framework for
analysi s whi chlwe are developing: and we shall also take the
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opportunity of considering a case which will enable us to apply





THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL
The experience of people involved in mutual-aid groups is
inevitably political, and raises pragmatic questions quite
distinct from those of theory and principle. These may be
questions of an external nature, concerning relationships between
one group and another, or between a group and an umbrella
organization, or a funding one such as the State. However
interesting these may be - and indeed, they are often the first
which come to the minds of many interested in voluntary
organizations - they are for our present purpose contingent on
the internal questions with which we shall deal first. These
internal questions concern decision making, allocation of
responsibilities and tasks, leadership, and accountability to
members. It is often the case that these are not regarded as
political questions at all, but nothing could be further from the
truth. Possibly the most useful slogan of the contemporary
Women's Movement (if slogans are ever useful) is that 'the
personal is political'. Problems apparently affecting only
individuals are often facets of political issues with a public
dimension having a much larger impact on many more people.
"One of the first things we discover in these
(consciousness-raising) groups is that
personal problems are political problems.
There are no personal solutions at this time.
There is only collective action for a
collective solution."
(Carol Hanisch,'The Personal is Political')
207
The recognition of this is what brings internal organizational
issues into the political sphere, and the way such internal
problems are resolved is often a deciding factor when external,
overtly political questions have to be resolved later on.
Originally, the idea that the personal is political was developed
as a way of generating political actions and ideas out of
individual experiences, but it applies equally forcefully when
used in connection with interpersonal experiences in groups.
Some groups are just as likely as individuals to regard
themselves as unfortunate exceptions, and therefore look for an
individual solution to what they imagine to be merely an
isolated, individual, problem.
The recognition that there is this political dimension to
personal or interpersonal problems is not, however, the same as
saying that all political problems can be reduced to
interpersonal ones, as Robin Morgan has eloquently pointed out.
"We know that the personal is political. But
if the political is solely personal, then
those of us at the barricades will be in big
trouble."
(Robin Morgan, 'Going Too Far', p.1 86)
Consideration of the political aspects of one's own life and
that of our peers is an activity which any of us reflecting on
involvement in a solidary relationship of any kind (that is, one
in which we are responsible for the actions of others taken on
behalf of the group) must necessarily undertake. This would be
true even if (as is usually the case) we fail to reconcile any
insights gained through finding solutions to personal or group
problems with our overtly political inclinations and attitudes.
There may well be an incompatibility between the political
implications of such individual solutions on the one hand, and
the politics of organizations on the other. There is a clear
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distinction between those organizations which do not bother to
attempt a reconciliation and those that do: between organizations
for which personal attitudes are an irrelevancy, and those for
which they are the blocks from which the group's political stance
is constructed. The latter group must allow for individual
expression if the organizational attitudes are to develop, whilst
for the former, individual views are a distraction at best.
The point of this argument is that for a mutual-aid group to
function, the building blocks are going to be the beliefs of the
members and their ability to work together. Unless the individual
is allowed and encouraged to express feelings, worries and
thoughts about how they relate to the group and how it seems to
be functioning, there will be no mechanism for monitoring the
foundations of the structure. It is clearly going to be pot luck
to try and form a mutual-aid group and take no notice of what the
members feel about each other and the organization. It is the
ability to see the organizational implications, the political
worries, which lie behind individually expressed views and then
take the necessary action, which is clearly essential if a group
ethic, feelings of belonging, and co-operative action are to be
the basis of a group. This ability isn't, by definition, really
capable of planning for. Autonomy and democracy are in this
instance attitudes rather than anything else.
But like many distinctions clear enough in the abstract, the
one outlined here also tends to become blurred at the edges when
we try to apply it to cases and to people. Nevertheless, the way
in which personal needs and feelings relate to organizational
politics is at the root of some historical and legal distinctions
which are semantically clear, though they tend to overlap in
practise. Our label of mutual aid is one, and two othersare self-
help and charities. All three, as well as related concepts like
community group and grass-roots body are related not as much by
any theoretical or conceptual parameters, but simply by common
usage and media exposure. There is a tendency to use permutations
of these phrases as if they were synonymous, possibly through
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Lack of thought, possibly out of ignorance, probably out of
desire in many cases for a better literary style.
SELF-HELP
In the late nineteenth century, the apostle of self-help was
Samuel Smiles, whilst the prophet of mutual aid was Kropotkin. It
is difficult to imagine any two people who could better represent
the polarities of their time and yet remain comparable in their
work. Smiles was an establishment preacher, every atom of him a
Victorian Anglo-Scot, born in Haddington with a successful career
in London. Kropotkin was an exiled aristocrat, a revolutionary
with no home for most of his life, who attained eminence as a
geographer and fame as a political philosopher. It was the
socially conformist Smiles who enunciated the individualistic
ethic of self-help, and the individualistic rebel Kropotkin who
performed the same service for the collectivist ideas of mutual
aid. Such are the contradictions of the nineteenth century. We
have already mentioned Kropotkin's ideas about mutual aid:
Smiles' book on self help is equally anecdotal as 'Mutual Aid'
is. It is composed almost entirely of stories concerning eminent
individuals who began their life in (comparative) poverty and
obscurity and then rose by their own efforts out of the deprived
masses to become rich and/or successful. He advocated the same
course for anyone who wanted to better themselves. Poverty,
deprivation and lack of education are now agreed to be mostly
political and social phenomena - Smiles was thus advocating
personal solutions for political problems. Self help in this
sense is different to mutual aid in precisely the area with which
we began this chapter - personal problems for Smiles had no real
political dimension.
For many of the areas in which self help supposedly applies,
the logic is faulty. To give an illustration - once there were
chain letters sent round (maybe they still are) which told the
recipient to send one pound to the person at the top of a list of
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seven or so, add their name to the bottom, strike the top name
off, and send the letter out again to twenty of their friends.
The letters promised to result in thousands dropping on the
doormat in a fortnight or so, and usually threatened cosmic
retaliation by the little people if you either ignored the
instructions or broke the chain. The mathematics are easy to
work out - assume that there are seven on the list and each
person is so intimidated that they do send it out to twenty more.
Your name will be at the top of a letter received by twenty to
the power of six people - or to put it another way, 64,000,000 .
This is more than the population of this country, so it cannot
work for everybody. Indeed, either the little people would have
their work cut out doing whatever they do to punish non-co-
operators, or the postal services would get very jammed very
quickly, or else we would in the end receive as many requests for
pounds as pounds we received. Sixty-four million to be precise,
and we would have to pay the postage on each one. The economic
effect of all the money sitting around in understaffed sorting
offices would be deflationary to put it mildly, and some bright
spark in the treasury would no doubt realize the vast potential
of a tax on circular letters. The redistributive effects of all
this would favour only those who cheated, but no doubt the little
people would see to them. Lawyers would argue for years over
their estates (in between dealing with their own mail, of
course). The analogy with Samuel Smiles' ideas, carried to their
logical conclusion, is pretty close. We can't all be first
violins in the orchestra because if we were there wouldn't be any
orchestra. Where wealth comes from the exploitation of the poor,
we can't all be wealthy, and where power is measured in terms of
the number of people you can order about we can't all be
powerful. Where access to education is limited, we can't all be
educated, and where housing is not built we can't all have
houses, let alone live in mansions. Samuel Smiles' world is what
games theorists call a zero-sum game, in which aggregate wins
always balance aggregate losses.
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Mutual aid, by contrast, is essentially a group phenomenon
and not an individual one, and arises out of common need. It is a
whole new ball game for those involved, with no zero-sum
assumptions. The issues may be the same as the personal ones of
the self-helpers, but the solution is sought through the group,
by the group and for the group. It is thus political by nature,
even though its roots lie in personally perceived problems. Oddly
enough, Smiles gives an excellent example in the introduction to
'Self-Help', of a group of young men who were seeking to remedy
deficiencies in their education by organizing adult education
classes which they ran collectively. They invited Smiles to talk
to them, which he did. Their fate is nowhere recorded, which is
sad, but it would no doubt make excellent material for either a
Ph.D thesis or an historical novel. This early forerunner to the
W.E.A. is an example of group activity. In principle, everyone
could adopt the same solution to a problem. Whereas it is
impossible to remedy educational deprivation by sending everyone
to Ruskin College on a TUC scholarship.
We have already seen that the consideration of one person's
welfare is different to considering the welfare of the entire
group to whom that same problem is common. The difference between
the two is a political difference of the first magnitude for the
reason that the activity of a group might benefit the group as a
whole, or else may (by acting differently) benefit only one
person, or one section, of the group. In the latter case, Olson's
logic of collective action would ensure the speedy demise of the
project. Which kind of activity is undertaken, what the payoffs
are, and how the enterprise is run are all political decisions in
thei r effect.
Many groups calling themselves self-help groups are in fact
mutual-aid groups: a self-help group is a rather tenuous concept
in the light of our philosophical researches to date - whether it
is a solidary relationship or simply a coalition of individuals
is open to question. Many groups would consider the distinction
irrelevant to them, but that does not make it irrelevant to us.
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CHARITIES AND COMMUNITY GROUPS
Two other concepts, of charity and of community group, can
be dealt with at this point. Supposedly, a charity is composed of
people acting altruistically, for the benefit of people outside
the membership of their group. In Britain, charity is a legal
term, but the status of charity law is such that a great many
groups with charitable status are set up to benefit their own
members, which is perfectly legal as long as the benefit is not
in the form of direct monetary payments. The law states that
nobody who manages a charity can derive any financial benefit
from it - but the law makes no mention of any benefit other than
financial ones. So industrial democracy is illegal in a charity,
as workers cannot manage or vote on policy decisions. Yet we know
that charitable status is acquired by many groups whose purpose
is to benefit their members, albeit non-financially. The reason
for this is simply that there is no special status given to any
non-profit making group unless they are a charity (though
recently common-ownership co-operatives have been given the
opportunity to qualify for a lower rate of corporation tax). So
unless a group is prepared to pay tax on all donations,
subscriptions and other resources as if they were income, there
is no choice but to become a charity. And one of the restrictions
on charitable status is that no charity can become involved in
political action or campaign for changes in the law, be their
reasons disinterested or otherwise. According to our analysis, a
mutual-aid group is inherently political in some senses. So
doublethink is the standard in many mutual-aid groups in that
their legal status and their actual actions may be incompatible.
That this doesn't aid coherence in either development of theories
or analyses is obvious, but all we can do is report the reasons
for this.
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We have seen already that the term 'community' is very
difficult to define, and the concept of a community group is an
equally nebulous one. In its common usage, a community group is
simply a group whose activities reflect the needs or express the
aspirations and nature of the community in which it is situated.
The vagueness arises from the use of the word 'community' in the
expression. But much of the emphasis, the emotional content of
the use of the term 'community group' comes from the implicit
opposition with other, more rationalist organizations which are
either profit-making or statutory. This is interesting because
the original idea of a charity, and the rationale behind the
privileged legal status charities enjoy, was to provide a
similar legal division between types of organization on the
basis of their commitment to either altruism or self-interest on
the part of their members. As we have seen, this crude division
leaves mutual-aid groups and community group sitting uneasily in
either the charitable camp, with all its implications, or the
commercial one, with its equally unsuitable official status. Yet
not all community groups are mutual-aid groups, though a vast
majority might well be. The classic case which springs to mind of
a non-mutual aid community group is that of a group providing
community benefits for others, who have no participation in the
group themselves and are thus purely passive, such as voluntary
meals-on-wheels services provided for old people.
So clearly the ideas of mutual-aid groups, self help,
charities and community groups are not equivalent: yet some
groups, despite the incompatibilities between the concepts can
claim quite legitimately to be all four. Most Battered Women's
Refuges, for instance, could say this. They usually have
charitable status, and are also rooted in the local community.
They derive their impetus largely from the idea of mutual aid
between women, and also make a point of adopting self-help
principles. (For instance, housing and rehabilitation after women
leave a refuge to carry on on their own is usually left to
individuals rather than being the concern of the group.)
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THE STORY OF TOO
The confusions engendered by all these hidden differences in
commonly used concepts is reflected by hidden differences in a
group's idea of itself, and are well-known to many who have been
involved in projects of many different kinds. A particularly
clear case has been written up in an account of the demise of The
Other Cinema (TOC) in the magazine 'Wedge1, issue 2 of 1977, from
which this reinterpretation and all quotes are taken. TOC was a
group of people who had set up their own organization to show and
distribute left-wing films denied normal cinematic channels for
their audiences. Now workers' co-operatives are a clear cut case
of a mutual-aid group designed to solve employment problems
common to all the members, whether from the lack of other jobs or
to further the opportunity to do work which the members see as
being more fulfilling for them, but which they are not able to do
through normal employment channnels. All the assets and any
profits accrue to the group, not to the workers excepts as wages.
A partnership is more self-help, since the assets are shared by
the partners themselves, and the partnership is more often simply
seen as a vehicle for individual careers. Partners do not
typically regard themselves as being part of a group in the sense
that they wouldn't be inclined to assume that they would
automatically benefit from any activities of any other partner if
they had not contributed themselves. TOC was neither of these two
things though. Legally it was a charity, with fifteen workers and
a council of management, who were, according to the constitution,
responsible for decision making. The state of the Law perhaps
forced this structure on them, but in view of what happened
later, it would probably not have been chosen if a little more
thought had gone into the setting up procedures. For despite the
nominal structure, the workers clearly saw themselves as working
in a co-operative or collective of sorts, able to take decisions
themselves. This assumption coexisted with the explicit structure
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described above, in which a non-executive council took all
decisions. This was made possible because
"there was an unwillingness to appear
authoritarian on their (the council of
management's) part. It seemed that they felt
guilty that they should make the decisions
over people actually doing the work."
The council was apparently seen by all the people involved as a
figurehead only. But at the same time
"the existence of this higher authority -
however nominal - prevented the TOC workers
from taking the initiative over policy"
This was despite the fact that the workers were trying to run TOC
collectively. It would seem that the infection of doublethink was
not just on the surface but ran deeper - many of the workers were
approaching decision-making on a purely individual basis.
"Responsibility to TOC should have been more
important ..... too often people used the
collective to make their working lives more
pleasurable, the main concern was with
individual self-vision."
This tendency appears to have been aggravated
"when the new exhibition staff joined the old
distribution collective, that is, as employees
hired to execute a preconceived project."
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The group who originally worked on the project (TOC, that
is) were clearly not envisaging a purely commercial operation.
They regarded themselves as working partly at least for a much
wider 'constituency' of film-makers and audiences whose needs
were not being met by the established channels of film
distribution and exhibition. In as much as they regarded
themselves as answerable to this constituency, and attempted to
solve the problem of channels of distribution by group activity
not merely within their own worker grouping, but also by means of
gaining the participation of the audiences and film-makers to
whom they looked for support, there was a clear bias towards an
artistic mutual-aid network from the very beginning. This was in
addition to the mutualistic elements of co-operative working they
tried to build into their own daily working structures.
The right legal framework for any particular mutual-aid
group isn't easy to choose under even the most favourable
circumstances, and the implications of becoming a charity were
never fully considered by either the staff or council of TOC. The
advantages were obvious: not simply tax concessions, but also the
possibility of grants from the British Film Institute. The latter
possibility clearly influenced the decision to have the council
of management partly
"made up of film makers who supposedly had
enough experience and weight to their names to
facilitate relationships with the BFI."
Nevertheless, being a charity created ambiguities in the
decision-making process and a vacuum of responsibility which
turned out to be a greater disadvantage than not gaining
charitable status could ever have been.
A third role of TOC we have touched on conflicted with the
mutualistic and charitable elements - that of an employing
organization. New staff were hired to exhibit films who were
legally and technically possessed of the same status as the 'old
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guard' who had been involved since the conception of TOC, but in
practice were 'mere' employees.
"The division between exhibition and
distribution was one between doers and
thinkers, a sort of intellectual hierarchy
rather than an official one."
There are at least three separate problems which may have occurred
here. It is always difficult for new people to join an existing
project, especially a closely-knit and selfconsciously crusading
one, and fit in with the way it works. It is equally difficult
for the originators and founders of such a project to share
decision making with newcomers and involve them fully in the
ideas and working of the group. The first problem is due partly
to inexperience, which is inevitable, and partly through lack of
confidence any person feels when placed in a situation in which
they know less and can do less than their peers. The second
problem is due to feeling of possessiveness, guardianship and
jealousy on the part of established members, as well as often
well-founded worries about how to maintain vision, standards and
priorities, not to mention power. Both these problems were
exacerbated in this case by the fact that decision making lay in
theory with the council of management, whose nominal powers to
supervise these areas easily became a smokescreen concealing the
true state of affairs. The third problem is that the role of an
employing organization is very different from a group of people
trying to put their own ideas into practice, since employees are
there to put other peoples' ideas into practice rather than their
own. As a generalization from both this and other isimilar cases,
it is almost inevitable that employing new people in
circumstances where there are powerful hidden structures and
hidden agendas, and when informal (in the covert sense)
relationships are the major ones in the way decisions are taken
and plans laid, will be unsatisfactory and possibly disastrous
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unless there is an attempt to establish clear and overt statement
of what the jobs entail, who is doing the employing, and who
holds what responsibilities - in short, the secret sections must
be brought into the open for all to see. Non-distorted
communication must be attempted. In the case of TOC, all this
went by default.
TOC eventually closed down with much controversy when the
British Film Institute turned down a grant application for
£25,000. Clarke and Elliot, the two participants in TOC who wrote
the 'Wedge' article which is the source of this story, say that
the BFI "is in fact responsible for TOC's closure". The political
issues they discuss are certainly interesting, and revolve around
the role of the state in relation to the arts. But in the context
of the discussion of organization here, the closure was clearly
traceable to the internal contradictions within TOC which went
unresolved, and are equally political. The crux of the crisis was
of course economic, but the economics of mutual-aid groups are
different to the economics of charities and to the economics of
businesses. The difference doesn't lie in the fact that the
balance sheets add up differently, but in the economic strategy
adopted.
To elaborate this point, the strategy for a business is to
charge for goods or services and thereby cover the necessary
costs in providing them, including return on capital and the
wherewithal for life and ideally for luxury. For a charity, the
strategy is to cover costs by obtaining donations: there is no
question of charging what the market will bear in all cases
because, unlike businesses, charities aren't simply providing a
service but meeting a need. The difference is one of approach.
For a mutual-aid group, the economic strategy rests entirely on
the development of group solidarity in response to group need as
a way of cutting financial costs, and either charging
subscriptions to meet a deficit, charging for services, or
soliciting donations. To put the differences more simply:
businesses tap markets, charities tap goodwill, and mutual-aid
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groups tap the efforts of their members.
The strategy of TOC was sufficiently hybrid to fall into
none of these categories, and it went down every possible road to
ruin. It failed as a business because nobody recognized the need
for
"adequately investigating the economics of
exhibition"
and TOC couldn't tap a market it hadn't researched properly. It
failed as a charity because nobody recognized the need for public
relations necessary for any charity to obtain donations from as
wide an area as possible, and fell into over-dependence on the
patronage of the BFI.
"A very thorough PR job would have been needed
to overcome their reputation for inefficiency
and bad credit, but this wasn't done because
of their woolly collective."
and thus TOC couldn't tap goodwill it had alienated rather than
cultivated. Lastly, they failed as a mutual-aid group because
they never really tried to make explicit, both to themselves and
to the outside world, what kind of group they were and who they
were benefiting. There were actually two equally feasible bases
for a mutual-aid group whi ch might have worked: either as a film
workers' co-operative, or as a film goers' consumer group. The
former would still have needed adequate business management but
the boundaries and resources would have been clearer, whilst for
the second strategy to have succeeded they ought really to have
built up enough solidarity amongst audiences to either raise
charges, use voluntary effort to cut those costs which had to be
bought from outside, or else get a pressure group of some sort
going to force grants out of some body or other. The fact that
BFI was left holding the baby, in the sense that they were made
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responsible for the survival of TOC, was simply because grant-
giving authorities do tend to be the line of least resistance for
groups who are unclear about what else they could do, and it is
such a tine that is taken in default of positive decisions to do
something else. The circumstance of the closure is thus
attributable at least in part to the inability of TOC to decide
what type of group they really were, and this was clearly an
internal matter (albeit an intensely political one). The eventual
external political fracas was a direct result of this failure.
This isn't to say that the BFI were either justified or
correct in refusing to pay an ongoing grant, or that they had no
hidden motives of their own for wanting to see the activities of
TOC cease for ever. The point we are making here is that the
eventual closure at some point was a logical consequence of the
political vacuum which existed where there should have been a
clear idea of what sort of organization TOC was to have been.
And it is necessary if we are to see this clearly just how
businesses, mutual-aid groups and charities differ economically
from each other. Taxonomies are useful not just to librarians and
academics.
Purely as an aside, any person or group who does depend
economically on grants from someone, even if the grant is a just
entitlement, is putting the power they ought to wield by
themselves for themselves into the hands of a body which doesn't
have the same priorities. In the words of the song:
"There was a young lady from Riga,
Who went for a ride on a tiger.
They returned from the ride
with the lady inside,
And a smile on the face of the tiger."
The lady from Riga might well have bought and paid for a ticket
for that fateful ride she took, but her fate was nothing to do
with justice either - the odds were against success if not the
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first time then subsequently. Tiger-riding is an inherently
unsafe method of transport.
THE MORAL OF THE STORY
But I digress. We've used the story of The Other Cinema as
an illustration of the utility of the way we've been developing
an idea of what a mutual-aid group is and is not, and what we
look for in mutual-aid groups and related organizations. Assume -
which is not a justified assumption, but one we make for its
illustrative value - that TOC really wanted to be a mutual-aid
group but failed (whatever that may mean, it has an intuitively
obvious interpretation). We've pinpointed as possibly the crucial
area of that failure the lack of clarity in terms of defining
action. This is true of the failure to try and get a sensible and
non-contradictory framework, true of the failure to absorb new
workers, true of the failure to negate the damage done by the
pseudo-management council and true of the failure to avoid
dependence on the very establishment TOC was meant to be an
alternative to. But what, practically, could have been done about
any of this? Unless we can somehow point towards the form of an
answer, our speculations are academic in the worst sense rather
than the best.
The area that TOC, as a mutual-aid group, failed in was in
the maintenance of the basis of the group. There was certainly a
feeling of belonging amongst the original members, and an
awareness that they could not act separately but only as a group,
and co-operative action was certainly present. So the basis was
there, there can be no doubt. What we can say, looking back on
the history as we have presented it, was that there was no
feedback, no commitment to operate in the reflexive manner that
anarchist organizations do. The structures for communication on
this level were absent. The reasons for this deficiency are
perhaps clear in the story, but it is the effect we are talking
about. The group never appeared to take time out to look at its
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activities, membership or structures in relation to its original
values and aims, and that is why those values and aims were in
the end forgotten and unachieved. Even in a BFI-funded cinema
they might not have been recovered.
What we shall look at next are issues related to this
chapter: we saw that the BFI played a large part in the case of
TOC. We look in the next chapter at the way the state relates to
mutual aid groups, and the effects that contacts with state





MUTUAL AID IN THE WELFARE STATE: CONTEXT
We've now reached the stage of having a decent analytical
framework for the understanding of mutual-aid groups. However,
any discussion of the relationships between such groups and the
state is inevitably piecemeal for a number of reasons. Firstly,
mutual-aid groups as an organizational form could be in any area
doing almost anything, but the activities the state is concerned
with are specific. As a result, the areas which we talk about are
liable to make no great sense if we try to extract a pattern from
them based on our arguments up till now: it is the state that
determines the parameters of the discourse and the arena in which
confrontations will occur. Hence we can't easily relate this to
what has been discussed earlier, and the discussion will appear
piecemeal. Secondly, the state itself is not homogenous. There is
no single fixed policy towards voluntary groups in general, and
mutual-aid groups in particular aren't considered at all
differently. Different parts of the state do different things in
different ways and with different motives. Though the state in
its many guises is ubiqitous, it is incapable of governing
everything, and mutual-aid groups tend to spring up in the holes
in the woodwork, as it were, like mice. They exist in the parts
the state has not been able to reach. The state is also full of
contradictions itself, and government policies which may have a
single guiding principle behind them turn out to be applied in
many different ways by different people. And conversely, some
state organs may apply policies with different principles behind
them in identical ways. Theories of the state, whether anarchist,
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marxist, liberal or whatever, may seem acceptable in a political
or historical grand scale, but on the small scale which affects
individual cases these unifying principles are full of exceptions
and have an explanatory value which is inversely proportional to
the remoteness of the alleged cause. 'Why' type explanations are
really not as interesting as 'how' ones. Even if I believe the
state is on the whole not a benevolent body, the fact remains
that the people who act on its behalf are not malicious, and
their actions too have to fit into this framework. Lastly, many
mutual-aid groups exist in the social service area. This can be
explained quite simply, for this area of activity is perhaps the
furthest removed from rationalist criteria of success: and
therefore more groups will start and survive in this field. The
environment is less hostile, and questions of why things are done
are relevant, while goal achievement - in particular profit - is
correspondingly less important, and more subjective anyway.
(Though it is becoming more common for social services to see
themselves as delivering services to clients as units, and to
measure efficiency in this sense.) Explicable though this is, it
does give a misleading idea of the scope and potential of such a
form of organization if we dwell on it as a unifying pattern. So
once again, our approach has to be a piecemeal one.
Although in terms of the way we approach mutual-aid groups,
relationships with the state are neither an essential nor a
central part of our analysis, this in no way implies that the
state is not important. The fact that our analysis here is
piecemeal does not imply that we believe that a piecemeal
approach to the state is capable of solving the problems that the
state presents. Nobody could accuse anarchist theories of not
dealing comprehensively with the state: but we have not sought to
develop a complete political theory here. The fact that we
haven't made the state a central part of our arguments, and the
fact that we don't believe any theory which does so can do
anything to aid our insight into what organized human behaviour
would be like without the state, is purely a result of the fact
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that our sociology of mutual aid is independent of statist
ideology. That the state and its effect on groups is important
here and now is unarguable, but this doesn't mean that we have to
shackle ourselves by making it the key to all we write, think and
do.
A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE STATE
This piecemeal approach to relationships between voluntary
organizations and the state is best contrasted with unified
conspiracy/incorporation approaches. A good example of this is
found in John Dearlove's 'The control of change and the
regulation of community action', in Part I of 'Community Work
One' ed. Jones and Mayo. Dearlove's basic thesis is that the
relationship between groups and the state is analogous to that
between individual claimants and welfare agencies. Dearlove
points out how the rules and regulations governing welfare
payments
"do not float free of the economic and social
structure, and the system of welfare benefits
enforces and polices the work system A
pool of low paid labour is encouraged and low
paid work is enforced. A work ethic is
propagated by these rules, and still more by
the culture of humility which greets
claimants. The stress is on self-support,
family support and individual solutions in a
free market. The effect is to keep individuals
off the state and in the private sector, and




The relationship of the state with groups is seen by Dearlove as
similar.
"Ideally they are keen for groups to assume a
role which helps them in the provision of
services for which there is an established
demand, but failing this they are happy if
groups assume a self-help role so that they
provide for themselves without any recourse to
public assistance. The state desires subjects,
clients, supporters and helpers, not masters,
customers, demanders and disrupters"
(ibid)
Now I wouldn't seek to quarrel with any of this, within
limits. What I would quarrel with is the way this vision
constricts us. It may be true that the state desires subjects and
helpers rather than masters or disruptors, but that doesn't mean
that we have to be one or the other. To form a group which can
function independently of the state is being neither one nor the
other. Of course, many left-wing state socialists would claim
that if you are doing something which the state could do but is
not doing, you are supporting the state: but this isn't true for
those of us who don't share the assumptions. It is obviously
nonsensical from an anarchist point of view to force the state
into control over yet more areas of our lives when we could
organize ourselves to do the same. For Dearlove, this possibility
is not considered. The main type of situation he considers are
those where
"community action groups concerned to force
change and innovation on the authorities
experience considerable difficulty in
surviving and in maintaining their radical
direction community action groups may
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come to provide for themselves what they
originally considered to be a need which
should be seen as a right to be met fully and
adequately by the state ideally the
authorities like groups which do more than
just help themselves; they like groups which
actually come to help government by assisting
in the provision of a service for which there
is an established and recognized demand."
(ibid. p.32-33)
Dearlove's example of the housing situation in the London Borough
of Kensington and Chelsea illustrates his point perfectly by
charting the progression from pressure group to service
provision.
The key to seeing what is wrong with seeing all voluntary
groups as either opposing the state by making demands on it (in
which case they usually fail) or assisting the state by working
with it (in which case they usually become incorporated) is to
remind ourselves that the state is part of the problem, and not
part of the solution. Our ideal is to do without the state
entirely. If we put ourselves in a position where, by our own
analysis, we end up being co-opted, we have only ourselves to
blame. Our aim is to do without the state. As a social construct,
it will go away if it is ignored - its existence and power lies
in the minds of people, at least in so far as it needs them to
both obey and enforce its laws and regulation. That ignoring the
state is unlikely to be enough by itself is probable: but this
doesn't imply thatwe have to look to it for solutions. So though
according to left-wing statist ideologies Dearlove's analysis is
quite correct, it is inadequate if our aim is to build
alternatives to the state rather than capture it. It is clearly
unjust for the state not to provide those services which we have
a right to, but the aim of the state is not to be just, and we
should not judge it as if it were. The essence of the state is
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its unfairness. It is about protecting inequalities, not
eliminating them. Just as power stations are driven by
differences in energy - entropy, it is called - so the state is
driven by differences in people, that is,power.
THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH THE STATE
The question we have to ask ourselves is whether the fact
that the government has the ability to co-opt groups which try
and work with it means that it is fundamentally impossible for
groups to work with the state structure under any circumstances.
Or, under what circumstances (if any) can contact with the state
not lead to cooption or incorporation? Most of the discussion
of the role of the state in relation to voluntary groups comes
from community workers: the 'Community Work' series of books in
which the Dearlove article appears is edited and published by the
Association of Community Workers, and a large amount of equally
insightful material was published by the various CDP groups
during the 1970's. But ultimately, the profession of community
work depends on the state for its existence, and community
workers depend very largely on the state for their livelihood,
either directly or indirectly. Their existence is based on the
premise that there is a role for community workers and community
work in relation to voluntary organizations. The well-known
agonized self-doubt of community workers concerns whether they
prop up the existing structure of the state, or whether they seek
to change it: and if they seek to change it, how effective they
could possibly be in promoting that change. Were community
workers to adopt our point of view - that the aim is to live
without the state - then their discussions would be rather
different. It seems likely that the adoption of left-wing state
socialist philosophies of various types by community workers
isn't a result of any serious consideration and rejection of the
anarchist alternative because to consider that alternative isn't
simply to ask where community work is going, but also calls into
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question whether it can go anywhere at all. At Least the
ideologies of state-based social change offer a rationale for
employees of the state. In this context, it is worth noting that
Dearlove maintains, rather like Michels, that the poor are
politically inert and so (one assumes) need community workers to
mobilize them. He blames this on an ideology of 'self-help'. We
have already seen that self-help and mutual-aid are very
different, and that the essence of mutual-aid is mobilization.
Clearly the need to find a role for themselves as professionals
plays as large a part in the writings of community workers as
does any objective aim of seeking improvements in society and
social change. This isn't a bad thing: it would be nice if
doctors and lawyers spent as much time working out their own role
in society as community workers do. But this does account for the
bias towards working through the state to change itself that one
finds in writings from community work sources. And as a result,
the question we are asking here - whether it is possible at all
for groups to work with the state - is one which cannot be
discussed as freely because one answer to it is a form of
professional suicide, and as such would be difficult to
contemplate for community workers. Any way of contemplating the
subject which does involve community workers in a constructive
role must necessarily involve social change via the state,
because that is the employer of most of them.
As a matter of fact the role of the state is not a uniform
one. All the tactics described by community workers for the state
to use in relation to community groups - challenges to provide
services followed by cooption, forcing them into conflict
strategies to provide an excuse for repression and so on - are no
doubt used at different times by different government agencies.
But these agencies, within both central and local government,
differ so widely in the reasons they have for being in contact
with voluntary bodies, and in their consequent concerns, that it
is possible to identify what the effects of such contacts will
be, and what effect it will have on any group. By no means all
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the effects will be harmful, or permanent: and it is possible to
limit degrees of involvement. At the same time, a mutual-aid
group with some amount of self-knowledge will be able to see what
those effects will be, and what the extent of any involvement is
likely to be.
REGULATORY CONTACT WITH THE STATE
To illustrate this with an example: we have seen that all
mutual-aid groups have some kind of legal framework, and this
necessarily involves contact with government departments. We
discussed an account of The Other Cinema earlier, in which the
legal framework adopted did little to help the organization, and
it is not unknown for the Income Tax Inspectorate in Scotland and
the Charity Commissioners in England to ask for changes in a
group's constitution. Registration of one type or another is an
obvious contact which most voluntary groups go through, and many
face some kind of inspection as well. For those groups with
charitable status, annual accounts have to be submitted to the
relevant authorities, who also have the right to terminate the
status of the group should the inspection of the accounts reveal
anything which breaks the charitable guidelines. However, this
power is strictly limited, and its impact can be foreseen. Though
it is true that an inappropriate status can be chosen which may
lead to difficulties within the organization itself, the
requirements of registration and inspection are as purely formal
as one can get. It is possible to see what one is liable to
become involved in, and the fact that clear limits are built into
this type of contact means that it doesn't have to lead to any
enforced changes in the way the group is run, which cannot be
predicted. That in the case of a charity these may be wide-
ranging (I'm thinking of the prohibition of political activities
by charities) doesn't make the limited nature of the contact less
clear. The predictable nature of such a contact makes it possible
to plan to overcome the limits. Thus organizations like NCCL and
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Release, which do want both charitable status and the ability to
campaign for changes in the law, are able to plan for two
parallel organizations working for the same end, one of which is
charitable and the other political. This may be inconvenient, but
it can be foreseen, and because the contact with government is
strictly defined, unintended incorporation can be avoided.
Other contacts of the registrati on/inspection type are more
positive, even though they are with government departments.
Conforming with fire regulations, or the Health and Safety at
Work Act cannot be said to have a harmful effect on the way an
organization operates, and may well do it some good. Playgroups
have to be registered with a local authority, who make an
inspection to ensure that children are looked after properly:
again, this does no harm. All these requirements are formal in
the sense that their effect and the requirements for registration
are both limited in advance and public knowledge. Given their
limited nature, the effect of such contacts between voluntary
groups and the state is surely uncontentious. Other contacts of
such a limited nature may be of direct financial advantage to a
voluntary group. They may range from rate reductions for
charities from the local council, through entitlement to use
school premises free of charge for local community groups, to
governments grants available for new businesses (as of right) in
development areas, and tax allowances of various kinds from the
inland revenue. These contacts aren't simply a matter of
registration or of inspection like the others, but may confer
financial benefits and even direct government grants. But the
point is that they are limited by law and mandatory. Everybody
knows exactly where they are at all times. Whatever the indirect
effects on a mutual-aid group (such as greed influencing choice
of legal framework or location) the effects of government
contacts, like those relating to registrations, are formally
limited and automatic: and if they turn out to be bad effects,
those particular instances aren't really explicable as examples
of a conspiracy by the state to do nasty things to voluntary
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groups. Which isn't to say that persecution cannot happen, merely
that the law governs it.
So given the fact that limited, formal and legally-governed
contacts between voluntary groups and agents of the state are
both inevitable and (even when they result in grants) often
predictable, we can draw the conclusion that it is the informal
and discretionary elements in contacts with government which may
lead to problems of unintended consequences, displacement of
goals and incorporation or cooption. There are basically two
types of discretionary contact between the state and voluntary
group. The first (and more common) type is where the state, as
embodied in a central or local government agency, sees itself as
being in partnership with a voluntary group, and the second type
is where the role isn't that of partner as much as initiator, or
parent - so-called pump-priming schemes being an example.
THE STATE AS PARTNER: BACKGROUND
Before going into detail on the role of the state as a
partner, it will be necessary to go into a small amount of
autobiography. It may have been noticed that up till now, the
amount of empirical work reported here has been relatively small.
I've tried to use cases reported in the publicly available
literature wherever possible to illustrate points rather than my
own research experiences. At the same time, all the theoretical
work was being constantly illuminated by contacts, usually on an
informal basis, with people from various groups in the voluntary
sector (that is non-statutory). At this stage there was no
conception of mutual-aid groups as a voluntary form of
organization. The need for such a concept arose partly through
the observation that there were many different types of
organizations in the voluntary sector which couldn't all be
subsumed under the same model. One of the main concerns early on
in my research career - this was during 1976 to 1978 - was the
effect of government funding on groups in the voluntary sector. I
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drew up a chart outlining the nature of a voluntary group as I
saw it then, the effects of government funding and the way this
resulted in incorporation and the destruction of the basis of the
group. Most of the points in that chart have been dealt with here
in considerably greater detail and with a much greater
theoretical base, so I shan't embarrassmyself by reproducing it.
I distributed a few thousand of these up and down Scotland with
a message stating what I was trying to find out, and asking for
feedback from recipients, with any information which might be
considered useful in shedding light on the processes described.
Although this did not work terribly well, I paralleled this
activity with visits to some government bodies which funded
voluntary groups as well as some voluntary groups which were in
receipt of funds or, like Councils of Social Service, knew a lot
about them. It was during this investigation that I came to the
conclusion that research into the effects of grant aid on
voluntary bodies could be little more than a narrative account of
particular instances with no systematic theory behind it, and was
a red herring in the sense that it would be useless for any
explanatory or predictive value. This was for two reasons. The
first was that the term 'voluntary body' was in the first place
undefined and in the second place covered organizations of such
radically different nature that no definition was possible. This
work has been concerned with refining a part of that concept
and bringing out some of the problematic areas for what later
emerged as mutual-aid groups (or voluntary organizational form).
The second reason why the subject as defined turned out to be a
red herring was one we have referred to above: that there are
differences and contradictions in the way different parts of
government approach various groups, and these tend to make
generalizations impossible, especially when combined with the
varieties of voluntary groups.
What I will do now is to present the data that was gathered
mostly during that stage of the research, together with the
interpretation that hindsight gives. Everything I did then makes
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much more sense to me now, and I have no doubts about the accuracy of the
interpretation; but it has not been possible to do that phase of
the research again. Consequently, though its value is undoubted
and the principles are now clear, the data on which it is based
is less recent than the theory we have developed here since then.
There were three sources of government funds compared: two local
authority and one central government. The two local authority
bodies were both in Lothian Region, and were the Social Work
Department and the Community Education Department, whilst the
central government body was the Social Work Services Group of the
Scottish Education Department.
LOTHIAN REGION SOCIAL WORK DEPARTMENT
The Lothian Region Social Work Department: had a composite
budget for all types of funding which was administered by the
Combined Services section of the department, responsible for
outside bodies.. About a third of this went on groups doing
'agency' work in the sense that the local authority had a
statutory duty to provide certain services and fulfilled this by
making grants to outside bodies to do it for them. Another large
amount went to the established voluntary groups found in any
local authority area, such as Councils of Social Service and
bodies with an established pedigree of worthiness but no
endowment. I was unable to obtain information on precisely how
the rest of the money was spent, but there was at that time no
clear machinery or priorities for awarding grants. The Combined
Services Officer did tell me that the criterion was not what the
voluntary organization in question needed, but who it helped. It
was services that were funded, not groups. The way that grants
were obtained was simply via a letter of application processed
through the Director of Combined Services in the Department and
the relevant council subcommittee. The Director of the Edinburgh
Council of Social Service said that there was a lot of cynicism
in the voluntary sector about the whole process, that many groups
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found it necessary to inflate the budgets for the services they
provided to get a grant to cover their needs, and that there was
a degree of pot-luck about the whole business. Annual reviews
made rational planning impossible, and the review procedure
itself was haphazard, in some cases consisting of a simple phone
call asking 'how are you getting on?1. It must be emphasized that
this account is not current, and is simply what was occurring
then. Regionalization in Scotland was new, and the original plan
for five voluntary organization liason officers was reduced to
one. At the same time, the fact was that most voluntary groups
funded by the social work department appeared to believe that the
main criteria for getting a grant were firstly, that you had had
one before, and secondly, that the people responsible for giving
the grant liked you. With hindsight, the reason for this was
simple. It was that the Social Work Department, though
responsible for funding voluntary organizations, simply saw
itself as funding the services they provided rather than the
organizations themselves. Voluntary organizations were a means to
an end, and were thus transparent (in a sense) to the Social Work
department. It was this institutionalized lack of interest in the
voluntary bodies as organizations which was responsible for their
dissatisfaction with the whole process.
LOTHIAN COMMUNITY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
Compared to the Social Work Department, the Lothian Region
Community Education Department was a model of clarity. They
issued guidelines on their grants, application forms to fill in
and tried to make everything as easy as possible. The stated
criteria for grants were firstly, on whether an area's
educational needs were being met: secondly, on the size of the
membership: and lastly, on their range of activities. The
procedure was not administered through a separate part of the
council bureaucracy, but used the existing structure of the
Community Education Department, with additional co-ordinators
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where necessary for things Like playschemes. The Community
Education Department had been formed by a post-regionalization
amalgamation of the old Adult Education and Youth and Community
Departments, and was responsible for all adult and youth
education and leisure needs. The whole structure worked
smoothly, as near as could be seen. Unlike the Social Work
Department/ the Community Education Department recognized the
value of organizations in the community as well as the services
they carried out, and were interested in both. One of the more
interesting examples of the attitudes of the Community Education
Department was in their funding of the Lothian Playschemes Forum.
Playschemes are for school-age rather than pre-school children,
and are run not by parents but by playleaders. They are also non-
contributory, with the main aim of giving children something to
do during the holidays: playschemes funded by local authorities
are a feature of life in most cities these days. The Lothian
Playschemes Forum was a grouping of all the schemes in the
Region, and had arisen as a response by playschemes to the
changes brought about by regionalization. All individual
applications were processed by the forum, which had
representatives from all the schemes. At one meeting I attended,
over one hundred people were present, many of whom were
playleaders of schemes. The grants for all playschemes were given
as a lump sum to the Forum, which then divided it up and sent oyt
cheques to individual schemes. The meeting I had been to was for
the planning of the summer 1977 schemes, which numbered around
fifty in the Lothians. However, the Forum had no officials or
constitution. It was, in all respects, an informal forum. While
the Community Education Department clearly preferred to deal with
one meeting of all playschemes than have to deal with each one
individually, they were worried that the lump grant wasn't being
used to best effect when the details of how it was allocated were
outside their control. The Community Education officials didn't
like outside leaders or paid volunteers, believing that all
labour in playschemes ought to come from the local community, in
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Line with the grant aid policy we outlined above. But given that
tens of thousands of children were using the playschemes it was
difficult to deny that there was some value in what was going on,
and the only sanction would have been to refuse to deal via the
Forum and have stricter requirements for each playscheme with the
sanction of removing grants. Since withdrawing grants would
result in a mass lobbying of individual councillors on the Region
(the Forum did have very convincing mobilization of public
opinion , which was efficient enough to restore cuts in the
playschemes budget in 1977 at least) as well as turning out
thousands of teenagers with nothing to do, the Community
Education Department was effectively squeezed into inaction. This
was despite their expressed opinion that the value and the
spontaneity of schemes was being destroyed by the use of money to
employ outsiders. So, remarkably, in this instance at least, the
playschemes forum had more say in the grant than the grant-aiding
authority did. Undoubtedly the effective mobilization of public
support and pressure on elected representatives had a lot to do
with this, but the conditions which allowed this to happen were
created by the Community Education Department themselves. Their
objection wasn't to the service provided, but to the way it was
provided - to the organization of the playschemes. But at the
same time they weren't funding the way the playschemes were
organized, but were funding the schemes themselves. Therefore
they couldn't affect one without having to invoke sanctions on
the other. It is obvious that the political process can be used
as a lever against bodies accountable to elected representatives,
but there has to be a point into which this lever is inserted.
The point of insertion in this instance was provided by the split
between the service and the way the service was run. The fact was
that the Forum acted as a channel for funds for the service, but
as a barrier for influencing the organization of it. And unlike
Social work Departments, the Community Education Department did
see organization as separate from service.
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THE SOCIAL WORK SERVICES GROUP
Moving on to the central government body,the Social Work
Services Group was a branch of the Scottish Education department,
and was much more difficult to approach than either of the local
authority bodies mentioned. The grant policy was laid out in a
circular, and stated that the SWSG had the aim of encouraging
services by voluntary organizations of benefit to Scotland as a
whole. No bodies eligible for local authority aid were also
eligible for SWSG assistance (whether or not they actually got
any). Incidentally, the two local authority departments also
tried to avoid overlap and dual funding. Six categories were
listed for grants. They included headquarters activities of
national bodies, specialist services for low-incidence need,
pathfinding experiments, pump-priming demonstrations, training,
and research. Most grants ran (usefully) for a three-year term.
Central government money had a reputation of having fewer strings
and constraints than any other sort, and this applied to the
SWSG. However, it wasn't easy to get a grant in the first place.
I came into contact twice with the SWSG. The SPPA Executive
committee, with whom I did some work, was in receipt of a
headquarters grant: and during 1978, a group which the late
Professor John Spencer and myself were involved with had a grant
application for research turned down owing to 'the methodology
envisaged in the proposal not being adequate to explore
satisfactorily the hypotheses put forward' (quote from the
rejection letter). Neither of these two contacts was very
productive, and the only account I have of the workings of the
SWSG in practice came from one of the organizations they funded.
This shall remain anonymous, but was a national Scottish
organization supposedly acting on behalf a large disadvantaged
minority grouping. It had been going for some thirty years, but
during the last half-a-dozen of them was slowly dying. Originally
it serviced a large number of local groups on a headquarters
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basis, but this dwindled to simply organizing an annual
conference, and then this failed too. The SWSG, which had been
providing the money, suddenly woke up to the fact that the grant
was being wasted and killed off the moribund remnants of the
organization by withdrawing the grant. However, this somewhat
precipitous decision was reversed. Lobbying by supporters of the
group convinced the SWSG that if the group didn't exist it would
be necessary to invent a replacement. The SWSG accepted this
argument to the extent that they did agree to a one-year grant
under new management to try and revitalize the organization. It
had a low threshold of success - in other words,owing to the
fact that it had actually been doing absolutely nothing for ages,
almost anything was an improvement, and there was little
difficulty in getting the grant continued. This constitutes an
interesting example of the way funding was related neither to the
services provided, nor the need. The voluntary body got away with
doing nothing for some time, and yet the money kept rolling in.
The reasons are not difficult to pick out. The main one is that
for an HQ type of grant, the criterion is simple existence.
Unlike the service orientation of a Social Work Department, or
the educational and organizational orientation of a Community
Education Department, the SWSG wasn't really capable of
monitoring the use to which the money was being put. It
apparently regarded the grant as an investment, rather than as
consumption. By this I mean that while local authority groups
budget from year to year and are in many ways concerned solely
with the direct impact of the money they allocate, the SWSG were
more concerned with the infrastructure and not with immediate
dividends.
GENERALIZATIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS
We can draw some fairly interesting conclusions from the
three funding bodies and the cases outlined above. In the first
place, it is clear that there is some amount of influence over a
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grant-giving body because it is publicly accountable, as we saw
from the Playschemes Forum. Such pressure does need to be highly
organized to work properly. The tactics of pressure-group
organization which this requires do, as we have seen, present
certain problems for mutual-aid groups from an organizational
point of view. However, we saw that these were largely a result
of centralized lobbying tactics being incompatible with grass¬
roots activity. It is clear that the Playgroup Forum turned this,
to some extent, on its head by turning the potentially
centralizing influence of a central grant, which could have been
dangerous because of the possibility of needing to administer it
centrally, into a device for decentralized application of pressure
by the individual groups which made up its membership.
Contrasting this with the SWSG, where the pressure was largely
within the establishment to maintain an established organization,
and we see that the two cases are different. Additionally, whilst
the Forum could influence the Community Education Department, it
was still vulnerable to that whole department being cut, which
was a possibility in Lothians at one stage. The Social Work
Department was not apparently susceptible to either of these
types of influence. This is due to the fact that social workers
see themselves as making professional, expert decisions, and this
is seen as incompatible with becoming influenced by pressure from
outside.
This brings us to the major factor affecting grants to
voluntary groups by the state in its various guises. We can put
this in the form of a relationship: specificity in the grant is
inversely proportional to flexibility in its use. This, I think,
is a relationship that makes intuitive sense as well as covering
all the facts. The specificity of the grant arises from two
factors. The first is the purpose for which it is awarded, and
the second is the practice of the grant-giving body. The first
factor limits the use which a group can make of the grant, and
the second limits the way any application of any money is carried
out. If we apply this relationship to our cases presented here,
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we see how this works out precisely. The Social Work Department
was highly specific in the grants it gave to individual groups,
and the uses to which they could be put. The fact was that the
Social Work Department Like aLl social work departments, tended
to be highly specific in its definition of what grants were to be
used for, limited groups by restricting the social work remit to
pure service provision. On the other hand, the Playschemes Forum
was subject to less influence, direct or indirect, from the
Community Education Department. In the first place, the grant was
non-specifically directed in that it was a lump sum for the Forum
to distribute itself.And in the second place, the remit of the
Community Education Department was Less specific than of Social
Workers in that educational services are by their very nature
less susceptible to objective assessment than social work
services. Specific objections were therefore less easy for
educationalists to make, and influence on groups correspondingly
less severe. Specificity of the grant from the Social Work
Services group was even less than from the Lothian Community
Education Department. The grant was simply a headquarters grant,
and not only did this mean that its use and application were
virtually unlimited (since a headquarters is at liberty to define
what its own services should be) but the added factor was that
the funding body, unlike the Lothian Social Work Department
regarding services and the Community Education Department as
regards educational provision, could lay no real claim to
superior technical or professional expertise in the use of the
grant in any case.
PREDICTING CHANGES IN VOLUNTARY GROUPS
So the principle of inverse relationship between specificity
of a funding body and freedom of action of a voluntary group does
appear to hold good in the above cases and with the funding
bodies described. Whilst this sample is admittedly a small one,
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the hypothesis does have a Lot of Logic behind it. CLearLy
though, to deveLop the point further, there is bound to be a
whoLe spectrum of specificity of grants. It makes sense to ask
the further question: how can a group teLL if a specific grant
wiLL affect it adverseLy? There is another paradigm of the
dissoLution of a voLuntary group impLied here, which was in the
originaL chart on the effects of grant-aid which I used for the
abortive attempt at remote-controL research, but is here quoted
in an aLternative formuLation from another anthoLogy from the
Association of Community Workers.
"A grass roots anti-poverty organization might
proceed through five phases:
1) the group comes into existence with a
generaLized commitment to improve the Lot of
the poor;
2) in order to obtain government funding, this
commitment must be programmatic, for exampLe
the group wiLL seek funds to open an office
and run a WeLfare rights Information Service;
3) the receipt of funding produces a division
in the organization between those who now
become fuLL-time workers and other members who
retire to a peripheraL position reinforced by
the idea that "they're getting paid to do it;
why shouLd we work for free?";
4) the core group ceases to be dependent on
grass roots invoLvement, since the future
programme, as it is not defined, depends on
satisfying the funding agency;
5) the group becomes an adjunct of the
existing sociaL services. Grass roots
invoLvement is minimaL."
(from 'Criticism and Containment', Martin
Loney, in 'PoLiticaL Issues and Community
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Work' ed. Curno, p.89)
Let us analyse the above group as a mutual-aid group. The basis
of such a group isn't programmatic, but is based on feelings of
belonging, a group ethic and co-operative action. The grant was a
programmatic one with specific uses to which it was to be put: in
particular, the funding of full-time workers. This undermined the
group ethic since some of the group were earning a living from
the group and others were not. This made it difficult to believe
that all benefited equally from the grant, since the evidence of
some drawing a wage and others receiving nothing clearly
contradicted this belief. Feelings of belonging, which depend on
a group ethic, are also eroded by the split into paid and unpaid
group members, and co-operative action of the entire group is
replaced by action only by the paid section. This paid section
constitutes a sub-group whose basis is the grant which pays their
wages, and once the unpaid members drop out, this becomes the
basis of the group that is left behind. An unstated factor in
Loney's five-phase plan is that this development of a full-time
staff is often encouraged by the funding body who see it as
evidence of growing professionalism. Could anything have been
done to avoid the fate of the group described in the model Loney
outlines?
The answer to this must be yes. Had the group opted for
part-time work for all the members instead of full-time work for
some, step three in the process would not have taken place.
Additionally, step four is likely to have a diminished impact
since part-time involvement would inevitably mean the
programmatic element in the group would also be part-time. This
would enable the basis of the group to remain intact. In short,
anything which is liable to affect the group ethic by dividing
benefits unequally should be approached with extreme caution as
it might erode the belief that what benefits the group benefits
all the members. Secondly, anything which affects feelings of
belonging by dividing the group into distinct sections should
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also be avoided: and thirdly, any activity which by its very
nature cannot be undertaken co-operatively by all the group
should also be avoided. If these three prescriptions are taken
into account, the group will not be affected severely by a grant
(or any other contact with the state). What we have done is
simply to draw logical conclusions from the analysis we developed
earlier in the thesis.
We can extend this set of arguments even further once we
incorporate the distinctions between open and closed groups, and
temporary and permanent members. We saw that there are particular
problems associated with such groups. The need to solve these
problems can appear suddenly under circumstances prompted by a
contact with the state. For instance, since the early days of the
first Job Creation Programme, voluntary bodies which have taken
advantage of it have found that it has introduced divisions in
the group where none existed before; that a group with permanent
members finds itself with temporary ones, or a closed group finds
itself with members who have violated its boundaries to gain
admittance when they never even realized these boundaries
existed. This can also lead to role changes - becoming employers
can clearly become a case of a voluntary group being coopted
by the state if the group internalizes the view of itself as
existing simply to to administer JCP's. Contacts with the state
can open up career opportunities for people within groups, who
use the organization as a ladder of upward mobility - many
community workers are erstwhile community activists. This too can
create divisions in the group, if some of the members are
seemingly using it to feather their own nests. And above all, a
programmatic type of grant can tempt a group by its availability,
and they may dive head-first into activities which they would not
have considered worthwhile if there were not money attached.
Self-knowledge is the only way of planning changes and deciding
whether the risk is too great. The more specific the contact, the
greater the need for finding out whether the specific ideas of
the state agency coincide with your own.
246
Ultimately the issue is one of control and power versus
trust. Any contact at all with a government body has built into
it the possibility of the payer of the piper calling the tune.
This can sometimes be indiscriminate, vicious and self-righteous.
The tenure of Horace Cutler as Chairman of the Greater London
Council offered the most notorious cases of this - any group that
contravened Cutler's idiosyncratic and right-wing views and
beliefs was liable to be chopped. The National Theatre was only
the most famous case (see Loney op.cit p.96). There is no way to
avoid victimization of this kind whether one receives government
money or not, and all a grant does is offer the additional
sanction of its withdrawal. Consequently, there is always going
to be a balance of trust with control. At one extreme there will
be no acceptance of any grant and a trust that the registration
type of contact (fire, insurance, etc) will not be used to close
the group down. At the other extreme, a group may get a large
grant and trust the government agency not to withdraw it or abuse
the power it gives them. In this latter case the need to avoid
giving an excuse may affect the behaviour of the group in any
case. Generalization is impossible. My own opinion is that the
state is not to be trusted far, but this is due to the
capriciousness of the economic and political system rather than
malice - in most cases. And since the ideal of a mutual-aid group
is to be in control of its own destiny, this unreliability is to
be avoided. It is true that control over the use of government
money is better that rejecting the opportunity of that control
because control over use does not imply control over allocation.
The ever-present danger is that of indispensability- Once the
state becomes indispensable to the functioning of a group, that
group ceases to have any potential as an alternative.
PUMP PRIMING: THE STATE AS INITIATOR
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The other role of the state in relation to voluntary group
isn't that of a partner but of an initiator. The idea of pump-
priming is quite a widespread one, and underlies much current
community work practice as well as much recent history of
government grants (such as Urban Aid and CDP). There is no doubt
that the belief that this role is in any way different to the
partnership model is illusory. Central government pump-priming is
only pump-priming in the sense that local government is expected
to take over once the grant has expired. This was true of Urban
Aid (which was largely central government money) as well as of
the Community Development projects, and is more dangerous for
voluntary bodies than simple partnerships. This is because not
only is there a current accountability to the funding body, but
also a future accountability for current activities when
alternative sources have to be looked at. The only useful type of
pump-priming is when the money is used for capital expenditure,
because this does not then apply. Incidentally, pump-priming by
charitable trusts is subject to the same constraints. Uncertainty
is equivalent to discretion, and discretion is often capricious,
and therefore not to be trusted. And without trust, one should
not surrender control.
This chapter has been a little pessimistic in parts about
the possibilities of mutual aid groups flourishing in the welfare
state. We redress this balance in our final part, when we discuss
the work and experiences of the Scottish Pre-school Playgroups
Association. We have left SPPA till the end because they
represent the closest thing to an empirical justification for
this thesis as it has been possible to find. The story of SPPA is
basically an optimistic one because it is about people who have
not only put into effect a lot of the things we have been saying
about mutual aid groups up to now, but have done so
independently, building their own practice and theory as they went
along. (Kropotkin would have been proud for them, not least
because most of them probably have never read a word that he
wrote). At the same time, the illustration is not a perfect one:
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but it is decisive in establishing the viability of mutual aid as






THE SCOTTISH PRE-SCHOOL PLAYGROUPS ASSOCIATION
The Scottish Pre-school Playgroups Association (SPPA) is a
most remarkable organization from any theoretical point of view.
Possibly according to some organization theorists it ought not to
exist at all: and if it does, it ought not to be stable and
therefore should be unsuccessful. Yet SPPA has not only been in
existence for some 15 years in its present incarnation (and for
some time before that as a part of the now-English PPA which, it
must be stressed, is an entirely different organization to which
none of what follows may apply in either part or in full) but has
been growing all through this time. Through all this, the average
time any one person has been a member is around two years - and
on the Scottish Executive Committee the two year rule is built
into the constitution - and at every level there is no permanent
or professional management.
The levels of SPPA are many and autonomous. The basis of the
organization is a playgroup. These join together to form
branches, and the branches form districts. The districts come
together in regions, and the regions combine in the Scottish
Executive Committee (SEC) and its associated sub-committees.
There are both formal and informal links with the English and
Northern Ireland PPAs, and both European and intercontinental
contacts on an international level. (We will return to the
structure in more detail later on). In Scotland alone during
1980, some 1500 playgroup members of SPPA between them catered
for the pre-school education of around 30,000 children under five
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years old, and trained either formally or informally about 15,000
other people, mostly parents. All this has been occurring
spontaneously. The role of the different arms of the state has
been inconsistent both in time and area, and has not always been
positive. In those cases where it has been positive, that role
has been supportive and reactive rather than initiating any
action. Throughout, the management, execution and initiative has
come mostly through the parents of the children involved. Our
contention that this phenomenon is worth looking at as an example
of mutual aid in action and as a testing ground for exploring the
value of the theoretical discussions we went into earlier is
surely not a surprising one. And, whether or not it is desirable
for the same organizational principles to be used to structure
other areas of social life apart from pre-school education, the
possibility of this occurring is surely a reasonable area for
speculation.
The purpose of this chapter is primarily descriptive, in
that we shall be looking at the form of SPPA, the way the
organization works and what it does. Inevitably, some of the
facets of SPPA that we look at would not be at all significant
were we using a different perspective, and other facets of SPPA
which might be of interest from other points of view will be
ignored - in particular, we will not be concerned with the
quality of pre-school education provided by playgroups as
compared with other types of provision. This is not to imply that
the area is not of interest and still less should it be taken as
any indication that this is an area which would bear unfavourably
on the Playgroup movement. The only reason for this and other
omissions is that they is not essential to the thesis under
development, not that they are unimportant. Postgraduate research
is of necessity limited in the resources available to carry it
out, in the time available to it and in its subject matter: there
should be no need to apologize for any limitations this imposes
on its scope, once such limitations are acknowledged.
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At this point I wish to go into the history of my own
involvement in SPPA, and to outline the way that the information
and data presented here and in the following chapter were
obtained. During the winter of 1976-77, I had narrowed the field
of my work to that of voluntary organizations in general, and was
involved in visiting as many of them in the Edinburgh area as
would see me. These visits were purely of an exploratory nature,
and though the experience and information I gained through them
was to be instrumental in shaping the ideas developed here, those
insights were personal rather than objective, and writing them up
in full here would serve no useful purpose. It was apparent that
close contact with one or more of these groups would be the only
method of obtaining the empirical data and developing the insight
into members' motivations which seemed necessary to incorporate
into an adequate research project.Of the contacts and
relationships subsequently developed, those with SPPA were to
prove the most fruitful and long-lasting, and the most suitable
for incorporation into a written work.
There are a number of pertinent reaons for this, which are
of direct interest both for methodological reasons and because of
the light they shed on the subject matter. A brief digression
into a couple of my less successful attempts at fieldwork will be
essential here.
UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT RESEARCH
One of the groups with which I was involved for some while
was the local Womens' Aid. For nearly a year I maintained close
contact with the people involved, and gained a lot through the
relationship. However, over time the relationship deteriorated
for a number of reasons. Firstly, I was purely an observer - a
research student pure and simple. I didn't actually have anything
to contribute or do, and this made me feel parasitic and useless.
In the type of work which Women's refuges undertake, emotional
currents run high at the best of times, and I was unable to
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handle my own reactions. Secondly, I was a man in a group
otherwise consisting entirely of women, whose own work revolved
entirely around the relationships between the sexes. I was
excluded from the refuges themselves, and also from some group
meetings on this basis. Not only did this limit the scope of any
investigation, but also made clear to me that it was probably not
a good idea to try and do any work with a group whose members and
beneficiaries were ones who were inherently and necessarily
different: I could not easily put myself in their position and
neither could they forget my presence, or even accept it.Thirdly,
I owed my original access to the group to a university contact,
and there was clearly a difference of opinion in the group over
whether my presence was a good thing. This was exacerbated by a
fourth factor. The group itself appeared to be divided between
two groups of differing motivations: at the time I mentally
tagged them 'feminists' and 'do-gooders', but though the tags are
immediately understandable, they are unfair. The difference was
between women whose motivation was primarily humanitarian, and
those whose motivation was primarily political. My impression
since through reading about refuges, and talking with active
members of other groups as well as women in the Womens'
Liberation Movement is that this phenomenon is not a unique one:
I know it is not confined to the Womens' Aid groups, since I have
seen it in other places also (such as Welfare Rights groups).
This is a factor which clearly makes it difficult to operate
a mutual-aid group. It is possible for members of either faction
in any group where such a division exists to feel no sense of
belonging to such a group, but merely to be using it to gratify
humanitarian instincts, or alternatively to further political
ambition. Though the Edinburgh Women's Aid group did not suffer
from this, the policy of various left-wing political groups to
enter organizations and try to incorporate them into a wider
movement is ultimately destructive to any specific feeling of
belonging the group may have developed. It frequently leads also
to disagreement over policy questions, which undermines
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commitmemt to group action.
In any such situation, people polarise and sitting on fences
isn't safe. Not only was I a member of neither group, but I also
owed my access to one group, who accepted me more than the other
did. In the short term at least, my position was quite
impossible, and adding up all the problems, of doubtful value
either to myself or, more importantly, to the women themselves.
Clearly, the combination rendered Edinburgh Womens' Aid
unsuitable for prolonged empirical investigation, however useful
the experience may have been to the conception of ideas, or
stimulating from the purely subjective point of view.
At the same time that I was going to meetings of EWA, I also
became involved in a co-operative bookshop in Edinburgh, and
through that in the co-operative movement in Scotland generally.
The contrasts with Womens' Aid could not have been greater. I was
committed personally to co-operatives, and far from being
primarily a research student, the probability is that I would
have become involved in the Edinburgh Books Collective in any
case. I was a full member of the group in my own right, and was
certainly neither useless nor parasitical. None of the problems
encountered at EWA arose here, but a different set of problems
manifested themselves instead. I had no intention of going into
action-research as a methodology. But the combination of
deep involvement with participation and observation would have
made it inevitable had I continued with the plan of incorporating
an account in this thesis. I found that it was impossible for me
to write about groups of which I was a member, in a report which
I was writing in my role as a research student.
Whether or not action-research is a suitable methodology for
postgraduate research is a separate question: but I felt it to be
unsuitable for me. I was not working with a team and did not have
a large body of established theory to call on. I did however have
definite views and opinions, and these certainly had direct
relevance to the course that I felt a new and growing mutual-aid
group could take. At the same time I was working with people whom
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I Liked and with projects I was involved in, and did not feel
able to use the group as a testing ground for my own ideas. I
could only function properly if I could suspend my researcher
status. The two roles did not mesh well together.
Secondly, my own involvements made me reluctant to write up
my friends and our work as if it was simply a case study. The
marriage guidance counsellor does not put video cameras in the
marital bedroom as an aid to clients at work, and the social
worker doesn't make their own family the subject of case
conferences. I became, and still am, reluctant to use experiences
I feel strongly about as material in a thesis, however valuable
they may be: and I suspect that even though everyone knew I was
involved in research into mutual-aid groups, colleagues in such
ventures would regard such an attempt as skating on thin ice.
Oddly enough, I have not felt such a reluctance to discuss and
learn from my work with organizations such as Edinburgh Books
Collective when the audience has been people working in other
mutual-aid groups - perhaps because I regard it as a form of
mutual aid between mutual-aid groups themselves, and therefore
unexceptionable. This does not apply in the present case, or to the
present audience. Perhaps it was naive of me to think it would
have been possible in the first place.
SPPA IN CONTEXT
The Scottish Pre-school Playgroups Association gave rise to
few problems. During my visits to various voluntary
organizations, Willie Roe of the Scottish Council for Social
Service suggested that SPPA would be a good place to visit as
they had a highly-developed sense of organization (my
recollection, not his exact words) and I found that to be true. I
have forgotten who first suggested it, but someone mentioned that
the Lothian Region Training Committee didn't have a treasurer,
and was I interested in taking it on ? I agreed, and things
developed from there. My status as a research student was no
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problem - later it became a positive asset - and I had a definite
job to do as well. The organization was old enough and well
established enough to have a definite momentum of its own, and
close enough to what I wanted to look at to justify involvement,
but without having to feel personally responsible for what went
on in the same way as had paralysed me earlier. I was involved on
an as-needed basis as perceived by the other members. The fact
that I wasn't the parent of a child at playgroup wasn't any problem
or barrier at the level of the organization I was involved in. I
never did become deeply involved in individual playgroups in the
region, where this may have caused a problem. In short, none of
the problems which arose in the two cases mentioned earlier arose
with SPPA. The only drawback to the situation was that the
dataset was limited: but later on, I became involved with the
Scottish Executive Committee, and the biennial survey of
playgroups throughout Scotland, which proved both highly
illuminating and overcame any possible limitations of working
with simply one group; the sample is in fact based on over 1000
groups, controlled for function.
Let us have a brief recapitulation of part of the ground we
covered earlier. One of the reasons for developing a different
way of looking at mutual-aid groups was because rationalist
organization theories did not appear to deal properly with the
ideas and values which play such a large part in their structure.
Both Tonnies and Weber, and many since influenced by their
thinking on this subject, drew a fundamental distinction between
'Gemeinschaft' and 'GeselIschaft' or, as Weber put it, 'Anstalt'
and 'Verein'. Associative relationships have been seen as
logically distinct from communal relationships, in that an
organization can be either rational, purposive and goal-directed,
or else based on common feeling, custom and friendship, but not
both.
Amongst the things we have been saying is not only that a
voluntary (in the third sense outlined earlier and contrasted
with compulsory) organization is capable of bridging that gap,
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but also that theories which presuppose the existence of a gap
must be somehow faulty. A mutual-aid group may be both firmly
based in the communal feeling of its members and at the same time
be capable of rational and purposive behaviour. In so far as it
exhibits this latter characteristic, it seems to be an
organization like any other, and so it is only too easy to see
the distribution of power and authority as being the most
fundamental thing about it. This would be an error, because it
takes no account of the essentially voluntary nature of such a
group. What should be looked at is the relationship in such a
group between ideas (which are apparently communal) and results
(which are apparently purposive and associative). Feelings of
belonging and belief in group interest lead directly to common
action in a voluntary organization. So we shall look at the
ideology of SPPA in this chapter, which should perhaps be
regarded as a demonstration of the usefulness of looking at the
links between theory and practice in voluntary groups above all
other things. Apart from looking at that ideology, we shall also
look at its practical manifestations, both in relation to SPPA
structure and activities. We shall also begin to look at the ways
in which the inadequacy of the orthodox theories of organization
when applied to mutual-aid groups leads to tensions in the way
they run. In all this, the coherence of the ideology in setting
out the basis of communal feelings of belonging, belief in group
interest and commitment to co-operative action is the fundamental
tool of analysis.
PLAYGROUP IDEOLOGY AND BELIEFS
This ideology is set out in various places in playgroup
literature - of which there is, incidentally, an enormous amount.
We quote here from the SPPA leaflet entitled "Playgroups: Why?
What? Where?". Whilst the leaflet is primarily intended to set
out the provision for under-5's which SPPA provides - it says "a
playgroups is one of several kinds of provision for children
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under five" - the ideology of the organization is seen as central
even in such an introduction. The leaflet goes on to say:
"What makes a playgroup different from these
(other kinds of provision) is not what the
children do but how the playgroup is run
Ideally, playgroups are run by the
parents of the children attending it. They form a
committee, rent premises, raise funds, buy
equipment, appoint the playleaders - often
from among themselves - and take it in turn to
help during play sessions."
And in an italicized paragraph at the end of the leaflet, this is
put in context.
"The years between birth and five are now
well-known to be the critical ones in the
development of a human child. By offering
parents the chance to take responsibility for
these vital years with increasing knowledge
and confidence, playgroups contribute to the
well-being of the whole community, present and
future."
It can be seen that the belief system of SPPA is not merely a
statement of a desirable end, but also a atatement of a method, a
way of achieving these ends. And it is this which is fundamental
to the ability of SPPA to bridge the gap between a communal
association and a purposive organization: since the ideology is
not just a statement of aims but also of method, this ensures the
possibility of maintaining the communal nature of the group. As
Dorothy Gaskin put it as long ago as May 1976, in the SPPA
newsletter:
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"SPPA exists to advance the education
of pre-school children by ensuring that the
parents are involved in and responsible for
their children. This is done by having
committees of parents to run the group, by the
mothers helping at the playgroup session, etc.
It's quite easy really. For example, you join
a tennis club to play tennis, not to let other
people do it for you, or to play yourself but
stop other people enjoying a game. It's just
the same, joining SPPA."
And on a local level, the message is carried on the back cover of
each issue of Lothian Playgroup News:
"The Scottish Pre-School Playgroups
Association exists to help parents understand
and provide for the needs of their young
children. It aims to promote community
situations in which parents can, with growing
enjoyment and confidence, make the best use of
their own knowledge and resources in the
development of their children and themselves."
(And then it goes on to list nine different ways of doing this.)
Over and over again we find that the ideology of SPPA is
concerned not merely with an exposition of the theory behind its
aims and goals, but also with the theory behind its practice and
its methods of organization also. And it is this characteristic,
which it shares with other mutual-aid groups, that is the basis
of its transcendence of the communal/associative gap: to be able
to organize in a purposive and rational way and, at the same
time, maintain communal feeling and group identity, it is
necessary to have an ideology which says something about the
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method of organization, the commitment to co-operative action.
SPPA are quite aware that it is this which sets them apart from
other groups working with under-fives.
To summarize the essential elements of the ideology of SPPA,
it is not and does not see itself as simply an organization
providing play facilities for pre-school children, but one which
believes that the parents of those children should help to
control, run and provide those services: and SPPA sees itself as
an association comprised of parents who are doing just that. This
brings us to a second phase of our analysis: the way that this
ideology manifests itself in the structure of SPPA. The
development of the structure from the ideology is set out quite
clearly in numerous places, but I quote from a newsletter
published by SPPA in August of 1976: the article is recommended
by the editors as being "as good a statement about the
association and its purposes as any we have read". I want to
quote this at some length:
- 'What is SPPA?' An association of
playgroups. This means that the playgroups
make their own decisions. They are not told
what is good for them by 'them up there'. 'Why
does it exist?' To do anything that its
members want it to do. Because all committees
should be representative of the playgroups,
the playgroups should feel that the SPPA
committees are there to do what they want them
to do, not to tell the playgroups what to do.
'What can I get out of SPPA?' Only as much as
you put in. Meetings do not just happen.
Someone has to arrange them there is
no highly-paid 'them up there' to do it. It is
all done by voluntary people. Let me explain
the structure of SPPA. Representatives from
each playgroup come together and form a SPPA
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Branch. The branch organizes open meetings
speakers services like bulk-
buying helpers talks to
schools forms a united body if one
playgroup is having problems. This sounds like
a big time-consuming job but if every
playgroup pulls its weight .. the job is made
smaller. ... Each branch sends a
representative to the District Committee. What
is its function? To provide services
work with other organizations. But where do
the people come from? They come from YOU. Your
immediate reaction is that you could never
represent SPPA on a committee because you
don't know enough about it - but you ARE it
It's no good relying on other people to
speak up for you - they don't exist
The district committee sends representatives
to the Regional committee. Why does this
exist? To work with the people in local
authority departments who decide how much
grant shall be given where new
nurseries are to be placed. Why should we sit
back and let them decide? .. but with several
hundred playgroups in a region you have to
give a few people the power to do it for you -
but you have to tell them what you want them
to say, through your branches and districts
they can't do it without your help.
The Scottish Executive Committee or SEC ... is
... a bunch of ordinary playgroup people who
have served for a bit on some of their local
SPPA committees and are willing to travel ....
to meet with others from all over Scotland to
decide a national policy. When people ask
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'What can SPPA do for me?' the answer is
'Nothing, unless you are prepared to help ...
find the time and ... people."
IDEOLOGY IN PRACTICE
This relatively brief, and only incidentally incomplete
statement of how SPPA is organized also includes a statement of
the ideology of parental control and reasoned arguments for the
necessity of pyramidal structure of five levels. Stress is laid
on the two-way nature of involvement and participation, and there
is recognition of the fact that the ideology of participatory
involvement works both ways - that though it is a good thing, it
has to be continually worked at or the whole pyramid collapses.
In short, the organization is completely imbued with the basic
ideology outlined earlier - no level makes decisions for any
other level where it could make them itself, and all are
ultimately responsible to individual playgroups and the parents
thereof. The hierarchy is one of responsibility, with a broad
base, rather than one of authority with a narrow apex: and unless
the basic ideology of parents providing their own children with
playgroups is grasped, one will never be able to see how it
works, or come to grips with what the association is really
about.
Similarly, when one looks at the content of SPPA's
activities - what it actually does - there are some facets of
activity which, though central to what SPPA does, can easily be
dismissed as irrelevancies unless their link with ideology and
structure are recognized. Whilst SPPA itself recognizes that it
is primarily distinguished from other kinds of pre-school
provision by the way it provides them, the facets we refer to are
activities unique to SPPA. There are two such areas which SPPA
covers and for which nursery schools, for instance, do not attempt
provide anything, and both are a direct result of the ideology of
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SPPA and directly functional for its structural integrity. One of
these is training, and the other is acting as a grass roots based
pressure group.
As regards training, SPPA recognizes that commitment to
equality in decision-making and participation by all parents in
the running of a playgroup is mere rhetoric unless considerable
effort is put into ensuring that skills are available to all the
members: thousands of mothers each year go on training courses,
and SPPA is thus a major provider of parental training, of adult
education, in its own right. A more commonly given reason for
providing training, and an equally compelling one, is that SPPA
sees itself as providing playgroups as much for parental
education as that of pre-school children: in this respect,
helping on the rota in a playgroup and attending meetings is seen
as an integral, though informal, part of training to be a more
knowledgable parent also. The nursery school which provides
parental training of any sort is still a very rare one: but in
playgroups, training is a direct consequence of the ideology of
parental involvement.
So too is the work of SPPA as a pressure group. If everyone
believes that parents ought to be involved in matters affecting
their children, and if in SPPA they actually are involved, then
there is an automatically conferred legitimacy on the activities
and efforts of SPPA to speak for playgroups, and for parents
generally. A glance at the resolutions of the Annual General
Meetings shows this. In 1977, for example, resolutions included
ones about full use of empty school buildings, about urging the
government to alter its emphasis and to encourage parental
initiatives, as well one on playgroups in Northern Ireland. The
content of SPPA activities is thus far broader than simple child
care, and unless one understands the basis of the legitimation of
these broader activities, it is only too easy to dismiss them, as
some do, as simply mouthings of middle-class busybodies.
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We turn now to the tensions which result from not
appreciating the nature of SPPA - that it is both communal and
associative, and that its ideology, structure and activities are
all intertwined. There are two different areas in which problems
arise: first, inside SPPA itself, and secondly, in relations
between SPPA and external bodies. The first set result from
members of the organization not perceiving its nature correctly,
and the second result from outsiders who can affect SPPA not
appreciating the sort of organization it is. We shall look at the
internal tensions first.
INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Possibly the central internal problem of SPPA is that it is
a permanent group with a temporary membership (we discussed this
earlier). Since the activities are dependent on ideology, that
ideology must be maintained at all costs, or else the
organization will fall apart, and all that will be left is a
service provided for mothers instead of by them. There is a
policy in SPPA of change: temporary membership may lead to
problems, but it is seen also as a source of vitality - so no
member should remain in the same role longer than a year or two.
Consequently, there must be a continual inflow of people to
fulfill tasks at all levels - this concern was of course much in
evidence in the quotation earlier on.
However, it is true to say that many of the mothers who
'send' their children to a playgroup are unaware, in the first
instance, not only of playgroup ideology but also of the
differences between playgroups, nursery schools, nursery classes
in schools, childminders and so on: their concern is primarily to
get their children in somewhere. So the perception of SPPA is
based on an implicit theory drawn from experiences of
organizations through a lifetime - that 'someone up there' runs
them, that there are staff or employees of some sort, that the
individual is essentially a consumer, not a provider or a
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participant. The theory our ideal-typical parent has is obviously
inadequate for the organization as it actually is, and this
misapprehension could be fatal for its own idea of what it wants
to be. Obviously, for SPPA to function effectively, only a small
proportion of parents need to fully participate and involve
themselves beyond the basic level of helping on the rota: but
nevertheless, to obtain both this small level of involvement and
the potential of further participation later on requires that a
lot of time be spent on a sort of resocialization and
reeducation. New playgroup mums may be the salt of the earth, but
they rarely become enthusiasts overnight. And furthermore, a
child is rarely in a playgroup longer than twenty months, and
many three year olds are admitted to nursery classes at four, so
there is sometimes only six months or so for this socialization
to work. Of course, many parents might send more than one child
to playgroup: but again, this might also only happen if they have
'caught the playgroup bug'.
So the central mechanism on which SPPA at all levels
ultimately depends is the effectiveness of the education in
playgroup values which parents receive in the time their child is
there. This education - which is basically learning a new
organizational form - is done through three main channels. First
is basic training, which may be no more than learning on the job,
or may be a more format session for new mums: in both cases the
agents, the educators, are the playleader and the other mums. The
second channel is via playgroup visiting, which consists of
experienced playgroup people from the branch or district, or the
SEC-appointed regional advisor, coming to visit the group and
giving direct external stimulation to the process. The third
channel is the communication network of playgroup literature: the
PPA magazine 'Contact', the SPPA newsletter, the regional and
district newsletters, and the Branch newsletters. All these are
meant to inform the 'just-mums' (as playgroup mothers tend to be
called) of the fact that they are part of a wide-ranging movement
embracing thousands of others,and of the need and opportunity for
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them to help further up the Ladder. At the Least, aLL these
channeLs ensure that the majority of parents pLay their part in
their own group, and for the proportion who are needed to carry
on fiLLing vacant tasks at other LeveLs, more format training
courses and the mere fact of invoLvement heLp to cement the
commitment into pLace.
Even so, some pLaygroups, especiaLLy isoLated ruraL ones, go
through cycLes. It is obvious that if the mechanisms are working
property, they are LikeLy to work for more than just one person.
ConverseLy, when they aren't working property, it is Likety that
they won't work for anyone. So one year there might be many
peopte around who keep the ptaygroup running, and the next year
the bare minimum. These ftuctuations woutd tend to even out at
the district or branch Levet (provided that the district or
branch was working property) since the Law of averages woutd take
effect (if there is such a thing - perhaps the batance of
probabitity is a better, more scientific, term) when a dozen or
more pLaygroups are aggregated together. The odds are that they
won't at L be in a 'down' phase at the same time. Untess, of
course, the Locat branch wasn't working wett.
The branch is possibty the most cruciat of the muttipte
LeveLs of the pLaygroup movement to its character as a mutuaL-aid
group. WhiLst district and regionaL committees acquire new
members by naturaL progression if the LeveL beLow them on the
pyramid is working, the branch has to activeLy recruit. This is
because even if a pLaygroup is working weLL, it might be unaware
of the wider needs of the movement. UnLess there is a branch,
there is no point of contact with the structure of SPPA as a
Living and growing entity: indeed, without a proper branch LeveL,
this probabLy wouLd be the case, as districts find too many
pLaygroups or find them scattered over too wide an area to visit
them a L L_ Without a strong branch, the responsibiLity for
continuing sociaLization and communication rests entirety on the
shouLders of the supervisor, who is not herseLf a mother of one
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of the playgroup children, but an employee of the playgroup: and
education in the basics of mutual aid only works well if the
agent is identifiable as the same sort of person as the mothers.
Many supervisors are in fact not unhappy to run the group
entirely by themselves. Participation and involvement has to be
made to work, and doesn't just happen. In this, the branch is
probably in the most crucial position in the organization.
So the central problem internal to the workings of SPPA as a
communal and associative mutual-aid group is to maintain the
processes of socialization, and keep open channels of
communication: and when the basic unit of a single playgroup
fails in this, the SPPA branch is the most important part of the
organization. It is the branch which has to have the grasp of the
ideas and theory behind the movement to be able to pass them on
to newcomers whose own experience of an organization has resulted
in a different paradigm. This brings us to the second area where
tensions and problems occur - those relating to other groups in
the same area, usually groups which conform to a more rationalist
model. Very often, such groups are solely concerned with the
needs of children in the narrow sense, not with the needs of the
parents, and certainly not with the needs of the organization
which is supplying the means to fulfil those needs.
While we have explained the need of SPPA to have branches as
a necessary and essential part of maintaining its structure, that
need isn't obvious to anyone who is looking at SPPA from a
rationalist point of view and is only concerned with the end
product as they see it - provision of pre-school education. While
the SEC is needed to liase on a national Scottish level, and
while regional and district SPPA committees are clearly useful
tools in talking with the relevant local authorities, and while
the playgroups themselves actually 'do the work', the need for a
branch isn't obvious to the statutory powers: indeed, unless one
values parental involvement as an end in itself and appreciates
the needs of SPPA as an organization, the branch may appear as an
irrelevancy.
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LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND SPPA STRUCTURE
The first few years of Regionalization in Scotland (from
1974 to 1979) provide us with a fascinating instance of how
involvement of a mutual-aid group with a local authority which
isn't at all interested in how it works, but only what it
provides, can affect the functioning of the group. Briefly, the
contrast is between Lothian Region and the rest of Scotland.
Outside Lothian, either the Playgroup movement was ignored, or
helped in a modest way: inside Lothian, the policy was to help
playgroups heavily, but to ignore SPPA almost entirely. Probably
this was done for the best of reasons. The clearest instance
comes in the level of grant to playgroups. In 1977-78, the
average grant from the local authority in Scotland as a whole was
£88: but in Lothian Region it was £533. In the rest of Scotland
excluding Lothian region the average was £30: this one region
accounted for 70% of direct grants to Scottish playgroups. The
same situation held in 1979-80, when Lothian gave an average
grant of £805, and about 67% of the Scottish total. Most of the
extra money received by Lothian playgroups went to reduce fees:
the average fee was 12p per session in Lothian, compared with 25p
over the whole country. In 1979-80, the average fee in Lothian
was 19p as against over 30p for the rest of the country. The
region imposed a 10p maximum fee in a grant-aided group. The rest
of the extra money went in wages: the Scottish average wage for a
playgroup supervisor was £541, but the Lothian average was over
£200 more than this. Lothian, despite its help to individual
playgroups, gave no grant to any SPPA organization at all with
the exception of a grant to the training committee in Lothian (of
which I was the treasurer) with the strict condition it was to be
used directly for playgroup training and nothing else.
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The effects of this on individual playgroups was small but
noticeable. Predictably enough, playleaders in Lothian tended to
stay longer in their playgroups (about six months in both 1977-78
and 79-80). This was no doubt due to being paid more, but the
wage is pretty meagre anyway. Perhaps more significantly, only
14% of Lothian playgroups reported all parents as helping
regularly, compared with an average in the whole of Scotland of
almost 40%. In 1979-80, the Scottish average was again almost
40%, but the percentage in Lothian was again significantly lower
at 18%. In the same year, 20% of Lothian groups reported only a
few parents regularly helping, whereas the Scottish average was
less than 5%: again, 13% of Lothian groups said about half the
parents never helped at all, compared with another 5% for
Scotland as a whole. Yet the structure of playgroups was
remarkably uniform: roughly the same percentage (over 90%) of
Lothian groups had a regular rota, and the same proportion as the
rest of the country, about two-thirds, were run by a committee
consisting entirely of current parents. It was difficult to get
any really reliable indices of the numbers of members who were
absorbing the ideology in Lothian as compared to elsewhere, but
the few there were showed the region as being less successful in
this respect as the rest of the country.
Perhaps more to the point were the subjective impressions of
the members of the various SPPA committees in Lothian. They were
all worried by the lack of branch strength and the scarcity of
bodies to help with regional and district committees. The fact
that they couldn't find a treasurer for the Training committee
when I first arrived tells its own story, and a volunteer to
replace me four years later when it looked as though my student
days were numbered was equally hard to find. During that time,
only one new SPPA member had joined that particular committee,
and this was not for want of trying to find members. The
universally recognized cause of this was the lack of branch
development. It seemed to me at the time, and still does, that
behind this lay the fact that most of the playgroups in Lothian
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were getting fairly large grants from the region, and were fairly
independent. The regional committee and the district ones
received nothing at all, and the infrastructure of SPPA in the
Lothians was thus turned upside down. That this was a deliberate
policy of the local authority there is no doubt: when the SPPA
region pressed for SPPA advisors, the council didn't help but
instead went ahead with a plan to appoint their own staff as
advisors instead, thus undercutting the role of SPPA still
further. The needs of the regional organization for branches and
SPPA visiting were written about by SPPA at some length, but
resources were never made available by the council, and the
possibility of raising the resources by harnessing the efforts of
playgroups was limited by the fact that they tended to look to
the regional council rather than to their own SPPA organization.
Branches were developing slowly, largely due to the establishment
of a Branch Development Officer in Edinburgh, a post funded part-
time by a charitable trust, and in the other districts due to the
hangover of the more enlightened policies of the old county
authorities which existed prior to regionalization, especially as
regarded training.
But the regional council has the sole aim of providing
services, and does not itself adhere to an ideology of
involvement, but to a Seebohm style of professionalism: so it
doesn't accept that the need for branches is a valid one from its
point of view. SPPA is largely dependent on the local authority
for finance: whilst this hasn't always been the case, and a lot
of fundraising is done still at a local playgroup level, the
local contacts and energy available to a playgroup are not as
easy for a wider, remoter and more nebulous network to trap. In
any case, SPPA regions tend to say that they are ratepayers and
taxpayers as well and all they are asking for is the right to
have control over part of the total pre-school budget: playgroups
do cost less than most other types of pre-school provision as far
as a local authority is concerned.
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So it is obvious that whilst the service-providing aspects of
SPPA are supported by the local authority, the communal, non
goal-directed (as far as the council is concerned) aspects are
not. To some extent, the same dichotomy appears over and over
again. For example, Lothian Region Social Work and Education
departments take a narrow view of training, regarding the
informal ways which we have seen to be crucial to the
socialization of SPPA members as being a second rate type of
training, and they prefer to fund formal courses and training
days, which, though valuable, are preaching to the converted.
When the Training subcommittee of Lothian region did manage to
set aside £100 for supporting mothers' meetings in playgroups,
they found that the lack of an adequate branch network made it
impossible for playgroups to take it up - they simply didn't
appreciate what it was about. When, the following year, they
attempted again to get money to help pay the expenses of
playgroup visitors, the fact that they hadn't spent the £100 for
mothers' meetings was thought to show that they didn't need more
resources, and it took rather a long time to convey the true
position. Even then, the need for playgroup visitors was not
accepted.
Once more, the dichotomy appears at the Scottish level in
relation to constitutions. While a constitution and a statement
of aims are a necessary part of an associative organization, a
communal group needs only to agree on a set of mutual definitions
and values, with perhaps a few rules to govern formal interaction
and formal decision making. Originally, the SPPA constitution
stated that SPPA existed to "advance the development of pre¬
school children": but the Income Tax Inspectorate (which in
Scotland fulfils the role of the Charity Commission in England
and Wales) insisted that it be changed to "advance the education
of pre-school children". Again, in the same constitution, the aim
of "encouraging parental involvement" had the words "through
related charitable activity" tacked on the front of them. Both
changes are apparently minor and somewhat petty, but indicate
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that SPPA exists in an organizational environment where goals and
aims are seen to be more important than values and beliefs. The
Income Tax Inspectorate are perfectly willing to regard the
services provided as being essentially charitable aims, but have
an apparent blind spot when asked to accept the values and ideas
which lie behind them as being equally altruistic: they are in
fact seen as too 'political1 and therefore non-charitable.
STATE INSTITUTIONS AND MUTUAL AID
The essential point which we are trying to get over here is
one which we made in the last chapter too. The external bodies
with which SPPA finds it has to deal are rationalistic, goal
oriented organizations: and not only are they oriented solely
towards the specific needs of children, but also see SPPA only in
this context, and require specific statements of purpose from
them. This then becomes the only aspect of SPPA which they
recognize, know and support. The communal aspects, the ideology
of parental control and involvement are just as important a part
of SPPA, and are undoubtedly crucial to its status as a mutual-
aid group and voluntary organization. But they are just not
accorded the same importance by outsiders, and are often seen as
an intrusion on the supposedly value-free processes of policy
formation and administration. The fact that if SPPA ceases to get
parents involved it will also cease to exist doesn't seem to
occur to them: there is a self-imposed blindness to anything
which isn't directly involved with children. So whenever SPPA
comes into contact with such bodies as COSLA (The Convention of
Scottish Local Authorities), local authorities themselves,
central government or the Tax Inspectorate, it has to play down
the ideology of the organization and concentrate on the services.
If these attitudes, which they are forced to adopt in order
to survive, become internalized amongst the members of the SPPA
committees, then they will no longer attempt to put their
ideology into practice, and will regard the administration of
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pre-school play the important reason for their existence: and
ultimately SPPA would become 'incorporated', to become simply
another voluntary service-providing agency and no longer a
mutual-aid group. That this does not happen is probably due
entirely to the fact that the structure and temporary nature of
subcommittee membership means that SPPA committees always have
one eye on their grass roots, and see providing services to them
as being the way of providing play for under-fives. But there is
no doubt that other voluntary organizations which were originally
mutual-aid groups also were forced to see themselves as the
authorities saw them, and lost much of their usefulness to their
members in their attempt to provide tangible social benefits in
terms that outsiders would recognize. This route to incorporation
is entirely due to inappropriate models of organization being
applied to a group.
What we have tried to do in this chapter is to give a brief
but comprehensive overview of SPPA, and the way it fits into the
theory we developed in the first part of the thesis. More than
that, we have begun to use that theory to show up various aspects
of government policy, and how, inadvertently, destructive and
undesirable consequences can arise through the inadequacy of the
theory of organization when applied to mutual-aid groups. This
has involved regarding the belief system of SPPA, along with its
structure, as being fundamental, and showing how problems and
tensions which result could be explained in those terms. The
independence of policies (which are supposed to be arrived at
objectively) and of ideology (which is seen as political, in the
perjorative sense) is the dogma which both gives rise to external
problems and makes their resolution difficult, particularly from
the administrative point of view. The growing tendency to
encourage the growth of voluntary organizations has not, in the
case of mutual-aid groups, always been matched by an acceptance
of the fact that they are communally-based because of their
ideology and because of the common interests of their members.
And whilst the reasons for people in government shying away from
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suspicion of bias are understandable, they are nevertheless
sometimes responsible for the disintegration of community values
in some of the groups which they claim to foster.
Consequently, to enable a mutual-aid group to carry out
government policy must involve an acceptance of the ideology and
an encouragement of the interests of the members as being a
legitimate part of the basis of the group itself. Failure to
realise this may and sometimes does lead to a loss of the
qualities which made the group so attractive in the first place.
At the very least, provision of support on government terms
rather than on the terms of those who are meant to be supported
arouses discontent rather than gratitude.
"For instance, Dial-a-ride is a cheap form of
transport for the disabled in Islington. But
it is not possible to dial-a-ride to 10
Downing Street to join a demo. No council
vehicles may be used for political rallies
Our independence is restricted and we
are denied the possibility of affecting social
and political change Disabled people must
organize their own lives, take their own risks
and make their own mistakes"
(Gurmeet Kasba, in a comment on the Year of
the Disabled in City Limits 10.)
To put it somewhat more starkly, an outside organization
seeking to work with a mutual-aid group must recognize that it is
quite possible for the two parties to want to achieve something
for what are essentially different reasons, and that in the case
of government and such a group, those reasons are as valid for a
mutual-aid group as the meeting of social needs (or whatever) is
for government. Whether any government or government agency can
work on a 'primus inter pares' basis (as first among equals) is
an open question, and does of course bring the political
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theorists among us back to a consideration of what the rights of
such a relationship consist of on both sides. While a pure
anarchist answer is to say that such a relationship is one-sided
and doomed, this may be unduly pessimistic. I would hope it is
possible. Certainly, the ability of SPPA to work with government
is not completely assured, and has in the past depended on the
fact that it is such a broadly based group to survive the
pressures involved. Even in the case of Lothian Region which we
have discussed, the fact that the organization extends beyond the
Lothians and can draw on support and experience on a national
basis helps - as does the peer-group pressure which goes along
with that.
We have now reached our basic conclusions on the effects of
grants, and the functioning of mutual aid groups in the welfare
state. It is an important subject and the Social Science Research
Council did after all pay me for three years and are entitled to
value for money. I think that they have received it. It is also
nice for social administrators to be able to see answers to 'what
should we do about ... 1 type of questions, and for better or for
worse the theories expounded earlier may well have a certain
predictive value, provided they are applied correctly. But for
our last chapter we shall present the results of survey work
carried out from 1978-80 on playgroups in Scotland which serve







This chapter is mostly concerned with the survey of
playgroups in Scotland which I carried out together with the
Research Committee of the SEC during the spring of 1978, and
again in 1980. As was mentioned earlier, I was acting as
treasurer of the Lothian Region Training subcommitee of SPPA, and
in 1977 I was asked by Nita Brown, who was the Senior SPPA
regional advisor, if I would be prepared to help with the
biennial playgroup questionnaire. The main reason for this (apart
from the fact that I am a nice person) was that I could use
the computing facilities at the University. (For those who have
been paying attention, it will be remembered that Bakunin sent
Fanelli to Spain because he was the only comrade with a free
train pass). With the co-operation of the late Professor John
Spencer, who was supervising me at the time, I undertook to do
this.
There were two main benefits to this from the point of view
of the research. Firstly, I had the opportunity of working with
the playgroup organization outside Lothian itself. Not only did
this enable me to see how the SEC functioned, but I was also able
to talk with people from other regions and broaden my view of
SPPA to include more of a national perspective. This could not
fail to be a good thing: in fact, most of the interpretations
presented in all the parts of this thesis which deal with SPPA
were gained from both my work with the Lothian Regional
Committee, as treasurer of the training committee, and with the
SEC, as a sort of social researcher-cum-computer operator. I do
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not think any of this would have been possible had I not had the
chance to actually do something useful in both cases. That the
questionnaire gave me this opportunity was justification enough
for carrying out the work.
Secondly, of course, the data itself was of value. It will
be apparent later on in this chapter that the amount of data
gathered was quite large, and could be analysed in a large
variety of ways. To some extent, I bit off much more than I could
chew, since I am now of the opinion that to do the results of the
questionnaire full justice would have taken an entire thesis in
itself. It is apparent that the main part of this thesis has not
been empirical in the sense that we have at no time sought to
uncover new facts and hitherto undisclosed mysteries about the
inner workings of the social fabric. The real world has served an
illustrative purpose rather than being an end in itself, and we
have been manipulating concepts rather than figures. We shall
carry on with this approach here.
This shouldn't be taken to imply that the data collected
about playgroups isn't worth more attention. Simply, the main
constraint has always been time, and I had to decide whether to
concentrate on presenting an interpretive framework which is
loosely filled in at the important places, or whether to
concentrate on number-crunching the figures to derive meaningful
relationships between possibly unknown phenomena without a sound
theoretical base on which to put them. For better or worse, the
latter option was put aside. It seems that either we can have
sound statistics without proper theory, or a better theory but
with holes in the statistics. It is obviously possible to have
both in an ideal world: but the constraints of time and resources
make this impossible.
To the extent that the theory of mutual-aid groups we have
developed is an acceptable one, the argument would be much
tighter were I never to mention the fact that I had gathered some
data at all. One cannot help being conscious, when looking at the
statistics as presented here, that some interesting relationships
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go unexplored. My mitigating plea is that if there are pointers
for someone else to go to work on, then they should do so: and
that it ought not to be held against postgraduate research that
the time and resources available to it do not allow for the
completeness attainable with better funded research. The
deficiencies, then, are not of methodology or of theory, but
arise simply from the fact that the subject was too big to be
comprehensively dealt with in the institutional context.
PRESENTATION OF FACTS AND FIGURES
Apologia aside, what have we left? The data presented gives
an overall picture of playgroups in Scotland which is
comprehensive and fairly complete. It is the existence of SPPA,
its scope and its nature which is of most relevance here. We
shall see that some of the data does exhibit significant
relationships, which we shall interpret accordingly, and that
other phenomena appear merely as curiosities. Above all, we
shall treat the data as factual in itself, which may be
explainable in terms of our theories, but was not designed either
in its collection or in its analysis to be a test of them. The
questionnaire was financed and designed entirely by the SPPA
research committee, with help from the public relations
subcommittee of the SEC, and I wore my SPPA hat rather than my
student one. Whether or not a questionnaire could have been
designed to fully explore all the ramifications of our theory is
debatable in any case: but since this one was designed by a
committee which had merely a contingent interest in the sociology
of mutual-aid groups in the welfare state, this is academic (in
the sense that it is speculative). The questionnaire itself is
reproduced in Appendix 1 to this chapter.Tables 1, 2,
3, and 4, which appear here, were originally produced in one
large table for mass distribution within SPPA, and the facts and
figures reflect the preoccupations of the organization as to what
were the most important facts to them. Consequently, it gives an
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excellent guide to SPPA nationally, since the facts reflect the
concerns of the members.
The tables give breakdowns of playgroup income and
expenditure, size, staff, and some indicators of parental
involvement according to area type, region, and a couple of other
factors. The criteria for selecting which figures to report were
broadly the same as were used to decide which questions to ask in
the first place, but were complicated by many factors. Particular
problems were caused by the imbalance of responses in certain key
areas (key from our point of view), which made the extraction of
basic relationships quite difficult. The fact is that the
majority of groups are remarkably si milar . It is clearly
difficult, when over 95% of playgroups report that they are
managed by parent committees, to come up with significant
differences between playgroups which are run by committees and
those which aren't. As a result, I had to give results for
playgroups managed solely by current parents and those which were
managed in all other ways, including mixtures of past and current
parents. This is because there was no other way of presenting
figures which would make sense when compared with Scotland as a
whole.
I really don't have much of an idea of how to interpret this
figure. There are many reasons for including at least some
parents of children who have left the playgroup on the committee,
if they are willing, and far from detracting from the nature of a
mutual-aid group, such participation could well improve it. In
fact, one might suppose that a playgroup unable to retain at
least one of its old committee would be less effective at
transmitting ideas and training new members than one which can
retain them. On the other hand, the possibility of the playgroup
being run by a clique of a few people who never retire from
office would certainly be no good thing. So there can be no clear
statement of what the figures mean.
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For example, we can see from Table 4 that 60% of groups said
they were managed solely by current parents, with 40% being
managed in all other ways. This 60-40 split obviously is better
statistically than the 95-5 split between any type of parental
committee and other forms of management. However, when we observe
that compared with a Scottish average of 39%, 43% of the ones
which had only current parents on the committee but only 26% of
the other types of committee reported all parents helped
regularly, I confess to not knowing what this may mean. (If an
interested party comes forth who doesn't mind fishing in the
data, and if ERCC can be persuaded not to wipe the files, and if
SPPA find someone to not only do the 1982 questionnaire, but also
integrate the results with the 1978 and 1980 questionnaires for a
bit of time-series analysis, some light may be shed on these
figures.)
CATEGORIES IN THE TABLES
Perhaps the most useful thing at this stage would be to
simply elucidate in more detail the categories in the tables, so
that the picture presented of SPPA will be that much clearer. The
horizontal ones are the same for all of the tables 1-4. Reference
to the text of the questionnaire will help with most of them: the
Regional categories are self explanatory, and so are the
urban/rural ones. Within the urban playgroups, however, I renamed
the answers to question 7. I called the 'executive and
professional' groups 'middle-class' and the 'skilled/manual'
group 'working-class'. Most playgroups laid claim to some sort of
mixed status - out of the 44% urban groups, it can be seen that
only a third (15% of the total) admitted to one of the clearer
categories. This whole area was one of the most controversial of
the questionnaire, as not a few groups felt it to be none of our
business. At the same time, SPPA is and has historically been put
in the position where class is important. The accusation of being
entirely middle class has been made by many people (including the
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Wolfenden Report on voluntary organizations), usually as an
attack on the playgroup movement. Unsurprisingly, the most
persistent criticism of this type has come from unions, who see
voluntary groups taking jobs away from their members. However,
the popular image of playgroups as middle-class is one which SPPA
are always fighting.
We can see that assuming the reclassification is acceptable,
working-class groups are on average poorer, pay less wages, have
lower fees, higher grants, fundraise less, are slightly smaller,
and are more likely not to receive help from every parent. This
last is probably because of a higher proportion of working mums,
and we can see that where parents do help they help more often in
working class groups. None of the differences are dramatic,
though: as a matter of fact, only the ones concerning finance
were at all significant on an analysis of variance. This is
hardly surprising. From the point of view of our thesis here, the
only important point is how similar the two groups are. The fact
that working class groups and middle class groups, despite the
difference in resources, are broadly similar in most other
respects would seem to indicate that ability to organize a
mutual-aid group isn't a prerogative of either the middle classes
(who are usually credited with the facility for organization) or
the working classs (who, according to same mythology, have held
on longer to a sense of community).
The same conclusions apply to the urban/rural divide:
despite marked differences, we can see that rural groups are
broadly similar- It is interesting that a rural group, though it
tends to be poorer, spends more per child than urban groups and
less on wages. Isolated playgroups, unsurprisingly, were at one
extreme, having only one-third the income of middle-class urban




The regional differences were the ones which excited the
most interest within SPPA. We have briefly discussed Lothians,
and a glance at tables 1-4 will show that the single biggest
feature in the regional breakdowns is due to the Lothian grant
policy. It is also noteworthy that in Highland Region, over 80%
of groups received no grant at all, while in the Dumbarton
division of Strathclyde, every group received one. The mere fact
of receiving a grant would seem to be of less impact than the
amount of grant and the way it is given. Dumbarton, incidentally,
is where the first Scottish groups began, and has highly
effective branches. In Strathclyde generally, the Regional grants
to playgroups are distributed through the playgroup movement
rather than directly: this appears to strengthen the networks in
Strathclyde.
The other region which is interesting is Fife. Nearly all
groups receive grants, though only one-tenth of the amount in
Lothian. Fife groups would seem to be the best-off in Scotland:
they also raise the most funds and have the highest session fee.
Most groups in Fife were rural ones (which isn't on the table
anywhere). All the branches, however, received grants from the
region.There was a separate branch questionnaire in 1978, which
was somewhat inconclusive owing to lack of response: however, the
average branch covered 14 playgroups and had two fieldworkers,
for whose expenses an average grant of around £250 was given. As
we have seen, no branches in Lothian received grants. All four
branches in Fife were funded.
PARENTAL HELP
The two categories in parental help related to question 24.
About 87% of all playgroups reported either all or most
parents helping, and a further 8% said about half helped
regularly. In order to avoid the figures becoming statistically
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insignificant, I was forced to take the 38% of playgroups where
all parents helped and compare it with all others. So when we see
that the average grant for these groups was less than half of the
average for groups where not all the parents helped, we mustn't
forget that 75% of the latter group had most parents helping. The
differences, though significant, aren't that easy to interpret:
it would seem that if not all the parents help, a group
fundraises more. I cannot think why this should be so. To
manufacture an explanation is not difficult. Possibly parents who
cannot help regularly (remember we cannot distinguish between
parents who can't help and those who just don't) feel so guilty
that they go out and fundraise instead. However plausible such an
explanation may be, it adds nothing to our picture or to the
argument.
Incidentally, more sophisticated statistical techniques were
used, but were inconclusive. Neither multiple regressions nor
factor analysis gave any unequivocal results when trying to
disentangle the effects of different variables, and a composite
'mutual-aid' or involvement factor did not readily materialize.
When I chose to present the results as a picture of SPPA, rather
than as statistical evidence for a theory, it wasn't because I
hadn't tried to extract meaningful constructs, but because they
didn't seem to be there. I spent rather a long time trying to
find a strong definite relationship which showed something
unequivocally, but failed. Essentially this was for the very good
statistical reason that all the groups were too similar , and the
questions were not sensitive enough. When around 90% of the
respondents have rotas, parental management and high involvement,
it is naturally more difficult to find causal relationships than
when the split is 50-50. Paradoxically enough, the success of
SPPA as a mutual aid network made it impossible to isolate the
reasons for it with a simple survey.
We have already discussed the division of current parent
management versus other forms: it is the most striking example of
the homogeneity of SPPA leading to artificial distinctions being
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drawn. Purely as a matter of interest, over 94% of all playgroups
in the survey had parental committees of some sort, and over 85%
were managed solely by parents (they answered a or b on question
22).
TRAINING AND GRANTS
The figures reported on training courses were from question
38: it was hoped that since training plays such a large part in
SPPA thought, the more trained groups might show some
differences. However, it can be seen that the number of parents
going on training courses, given our limited dichotomy of more
than one or not, is related to size of playgroup and little else.
The playgroups reporting more trained parents were simply bigger,
so there were more parents to go. This doesn't include informal
training in a playgroup, though. It cannot be said with any
certainty whether going outside the group for training is related
to inadequacy of resources inside the group (including branch
visitors) or related to keenness on the part of the participants.
So to take the simple set of figures presented here as showing
something is premature. The questions were not sufficiently
penetrating to answer our subsequent need.
The final category of analysis on the vertical axis common to
tables 1-4 was whether or not the group received a grant. Ar«
examination of these figures (from question 14 of the survey)
shows that there is indeed some differences between playgroups
which do and do not receive grants. The income and expenditure
was roughly the same in both groups, but a higher proportion of
expenses were on children and a lower proportion on wages in the
groups which receive some grant. Additionally, groups which were
grant-aided had a lower proportion of untrained staff. The latter
point is probably due to the inevitable responsibility the grant-
giving body would have to raising standards in the groups it was
helping and is almost certainly a wholly beneficial effect.
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When we compare the groups which do receive a grant in
Scotland as a whole with the groups in Lothian, which we looked
at earlier, the picture is more complex. The average spent per
child on wages in 1977 was approximately £20 in the playgroups
with no grant, falls to £14 in the groups with some grant, but in
Lothian, where the grants are comparatively enormous, the figure
was £28 per child per year. The average spent on children in
Lothian was only slightly higher at £8.24p compared with £7.05 in
all grant aided groups. Now my own experience was entirely of the
Lothian situation, which is clearly one of the most anomalous in
the country as a whole, so I cannot offer a proper explanation of
the figures overall. However we can conclude that the effect of
grant aid on a playgroup is not a uniform thing. I would say that
the other policies of Lothian, which we discussed earlier, are
more directly linked to differences in Lothian groups than the
level of grant. To repeat the point: we cannot distinguish
between the effect of a grant as such, and the contingent effect
of the other policies of a grant-giving body, and there are good
theoretical reasons for supposing the latter to be important and
the mere fact of grant largely irrelevant.
Incidentally, it may be noticed that we asked in question 14
where the grant came from. I became suspicious of the answers
when I noticed that playgroups in the same region, with identical
grants, attributed the source to different bodies. Enquiries
showed that a grant reported as coming from, say, the local SPPA
district was in fact merely distributed by them for the Social
Work department: and that the knowledge of most playgroup people
about Scottish local government was not sufficient for them to
accurately report the source of a grant they may have received.
So I had to leave that analysis out. This was a shame, for I had
reason to think that grants from community education departments
carried less strings than grants from social work departments.
This is obviously because a community education department is
more likely to be interested in the organization while a social
work department would be more interested in the need being met. I
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would have liked to be able to show this: it is likely that even
if the source of grant were reliably obtained, the bluntness of
any indicators of 'strings' would have been as much of a barrier.
It should also be realized that the differences, if any, would
probably show more strongly at branch level.
The above categories are all used as categories to analyse
playgroup expenditure in table one, and income in table two. The
figures for both income and expenditure are not, strictly
speaking, to be taken as accurate. They are intended as a guide
to the proportions spent or received on various items, and as a
guide to the differences between the vertical categories used in
the breakdowns. There is no reason to suppose that they are
inaccurate in this respect, as the errors in the collection apply
equally across the board.
The errors are accounting ones rather than sociological
ones. For example, the estimated average income per playgroup
minus the estimated average expenditure should give us the
estimated annual profit. According to our figures, this is over
£150 profit per playgroup. Do not be misled: we asked for some
figures for the current year, and some for the previous one. On
the income side, we asked for the current session fee in question
11, and calculated the total income from fees using this figure
and the figures from question 10 for attendance each week. The
grant figure was also the current year's grant. However, the
total amount fundraised from question 19 was for the previous
year, since no group could know how much it was going to raise in
the current year. Similarly, all the playgroup expenditure
figures had to be taken for the last year, as estimates would be
impossible to use or make: the rent was an exception however,
since a group would know how much it was going to spend on rent.
Overall, most of the expenditure figures are for one year earlier
than income figures, so given that inflation takes its toll, we
would expect more income than expenditure, and hence a profit.
Interestingly, were we to take the percentage profit as an
indicator of the inflation rate from 1977 to 1978 it comes out at
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around 15%, which is not far off par for the government index.
However, not only is the profit misleading, but the fact that
within the income and expenditure sides we have had to mix
figures from different years (fundraising from an earlier year
than the other income figures, rent a year later than the other
expenses) means that the composite figures are indeed estimated.
But since the figures are collected on the same basis for each
playgroup, I do not think it wildly wrong to use them as a basis
for comparison between playgroups. It may well be bad accounting,
but it is not necessarily inaccurate for comparative patterns.
The figures for rent and wages were taken from questions 17
and 20 respectively: while the items in question 18 are
aggregated for the amount spent on children. This was done for
two reasons: firstly, because a number of groups could only
report a composite amount, and secondly because the comparison
between wages and the sums spent directly on children make an
interesting comparison. We shall look at these figures in
particular detail, and report the statistics in much more
comprehensive form than the other figures. To do this for
everything would be boring in the extreme, and a look at two of
our figures in detail will show that the exercise isn't only
boring but meaningless also.
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
We begin with a look at response rates. There were
questionnaires circulated to 1316 playgroups in Scotland, and 476
were returned in varying degrees of completion: this is a
response rate of 36%. The only percentages on response rates
obtainable were on a regional basis. These figures are presented
in table five. Clearly, we knew in advance the percentage of
groups in each region, but there was no way of knowing in advance
the figures for, say, groups of a certain management structure.
This makes estimates of bias in the response rate difficult.
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The only independent guide to this I ever had was at an SPPA
training day run by the SEC Public Relations Sub-committee. I was
a sort of coopted member of this, as the facts and figures
person, and I handed round my membership lists on which I had
ticked all playgroups sending back their questionnaires. The
people at the day were from district and regional committees, and
knew their areas pretty well. Typically, they whizzed through the
list, saying things like 'well, I'm not surprised they didn't
respond' and 'I know her, she never answers anything'.
Occasionally, there was a snort of 'I'll go and give them a good
talking to!'. Quite clearly, people who knew their own areas had
an instinctive or intuitive expectation of which groups would
send the questionnaire back. I never was able to isolate this
'feel' for a group, but it seems that the groups that were
expected to respond were the ones where the participants in the
day had a positive personal contact: someone they knew and
considered a reliable playgroup person. Since the majority of
groups, respondents and non respondents, were not found
surprising by the women at the training day, I was tempted to
conclude that if there is a bias, it is the playgroups who don't
know other playgroups who didn't respond: the ones isolated from
SPPA structures. I have no objective evidence supporting this:
and since a sample of 476 groups is a pretty big one anyway, I
don't think it invalidates the figures. But the homogeneity we
observed earlier may well be a result of biased response. It
could be said that playgroups interested in answering a
questionnaire have other things in common to, over and above a
greater likelihood that someone in the regional committee knows
of them. What that something might be, there is no way of
telling. The only information I have on playgroups who didn't
respond is what region they were in.
This information is presented in Table 5, together with the
percentages of those who did send the questionnaires back for
certain key questions. As is usual in postal surveys, not all
questions were answered, and not all answers were usable. Table
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five shows that as far as can be ascertained, this internal non-
response rate is insignificant. The figures for regional
responses also show that there is no discernable regional pattern
to non-respondents. I can see no reason for not taking the
figures collected as presenting a true and accurate picture of
SPPA and how it functions (as an auditor would put it).
THE MAIN PICTURE
Let us hit the high spots from the questionnaire (including
some figures not in the tables given), and present an overall
picture of Scottish playgroups. The average playgroup
(statistically speaking) has 36 children on its register, which
means that over 45,000 Scottish children attend playgroups.
However, the group can provide places for only 23 of them: in
other words, each child can attend only some sessions. This gap
between children and places is widest in small towns, where an
average 45 children have to share 22 places between them. In
Glasgow there was a balance between places and children. 58% of
groups had a waiting list, with an average of 26 children on the
list - that probably means over 20,000 children were waiting to
go to playgroups. At least one-third of these were over three
years old, so certainly would have gone had there been places
available. Some of the others were no doubt put down by their
parents in advance.
Playgroups meet for sessions, each of which lasts for about
two and a half hours, and is usually a morning event. A quarter
of groups also meet in the afternoon, but for shorter sessions of
about two hours. The average number of sessions per week is four,
with 62% of all children attending twice each week. Only 10% go
once a week. This means that there are well over five thousand
sessions in Scotlandeach week- about 13,500 hours, which works
out at nearly half a million sessions per year, and over a
million playgroup hours. We estimated over twenty-seven million
child-hours each year in the whole country.
292
 


























units £. . p £. . p
whole of Scotland
total estimated 1164178 168211 925440 280273
average 882 127 541 212 6.92 15.45
urban: all 948 138 626 206 6.54 18.41
"middle class" 1118 161 847 189 6.60 33.37
"working class" 710 82 456 178 6.60 15.69
rural: all 837 117 472 217 7.22 13.00
small town 1008 134 629 265 6.59 13.86
village 827 129 420 215 7.11 12.68






g r am pian
highlands





a rgy I I
ay r
dumb ar ton
g I a sgow
Lanark
renf rew
635 55 545 234 6.89 1 0.93
879 154 455 203 6.47 12.16
759 107 533 1 45 4.31 11.81
1 067 1 98 616 234 7.48 17.45
821 79 454 1 99 6.77 12.63
703 129 362 225 8.89 1 1 .00
1002 170 746 240 8.24 28.55
875 1 20 526 21 5 6.47 13.47
829 1 29 484 1 77 6.79 14.73

















5 . 82 12.39
5.75 1 5.46
parental help
all help 720 128 41 8 1 84 7.24 13.43
not all help 983 1 37 616 228 6.72 16.66
management
current parents 859 132 502 205 6.92 14.15
all other types 91 9 1 20 605 234 6.99 17.54
training
one or less 833 11 9 508 1 88 6.86 17.18
more than one 923 135 569 230 6.97 13.97
no grant 91 5 1 1 5 658 1 98 6.58 20.05
some grant 871 132 507 21 6 7.05 14.16
































units £ £ £ £ pence £ £
total estimated 1 363297 1 1 391 5 948869 267148
average 1 035 88 721 203 25 7 30
urban: all 11 01 11 9 794 1 92 24 6 31
"middle CLASS" 1 1 92 33 900 200 29 6 32
"working class" 926 225 451 1 62 1 8 6 34
rural: all 979 62 659 208 25 7 30
small town 11 89 64 854 228 25 6 27
village 1 000 60 654 213 26 7 31
isolated 508 40 319 154 24 1 0 34
.
borders 835 21 546 1 90 23 6 22
central 990 27 799 178 28 6 30
dumf ries 888 1 4 723 148 27 7 26
fife 1255 53 979 231 31 7 36
g r ampian 1 070 35 794 1 80 26 6 30
highlands 833 <1 559 1 87 24 8 27
Io t hian s 1223 533 455 1 89 1 2 6 39
strathclyde 1 048 31 761 223 26 7 28
t ay side 850 32 645 1 82 28 7 31
islands 454 25 727 1 20 23 8 30
a rgy I I 782 1 8 498 1 93 22 1 0 46
ay r 1138 26 875 1 86 25 5 24
dumbarton 1 247 39 867 295 26 8 28
gI a sgow 737 21 558 1 76 23 9 32
Lanark 1 122 46 801 265 24 7 23
renf rew 941 25 758 1 76 32 6 31
parental help
all help 940 50 653 188 26 8 32
not all help 1099 1 1 2 765 212 25 6 29
lanagement
current parents 995 80 694 1 93 26 7 31
all other types 1 096 96 681 219 24 7 30
: raining
one or less 929 78 631 1 86 25 7 31
more than one 1112 95 797 215 25 7 30
no grant 1032 0 804 203 27 7 27
some grant 1 035 1 23 687 201 25 7 31
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percentage of percentage of
parental involvement groups with all groups
no grant answering
percentage of average number percentage of percentage of
groups in which of times each playgroups with groups with some
all parents help parent helps per committee only of help from
regularly year current parents fathers
units % % % %
whole of scot I and
total estimated 39 28 100
average 14 62 72
urban: all 45 1 4 54 70 27 44
"middle CLASS" 46 1 2 54 23 8
"working class" 28 16 50 1 4 7
rural: all 53 13 67 73 30 56
small town 26 11 57 34 1 8
village 41 1 4 75 24 26
isolated 56 14 67 35 1 0
regions
borders 53 11 62 71 1 3 4
central 43 1 5 70 76 43 5
dumfries 23 9 67 95 60 4
fife 23 11 55 79 3 8
grampian 53 1 2 70 63 32 10
highlands 48 1 6 56 72 86 6
lothians 1 4 16 51 64 13 1 1
strathclyde 44 1 5 63 71 1 4 41
t ay sid e 33 1 1 72 73 48 9
islands 57 1 4 25 75 25 2
scratnciyae aivs.--------
a r g y I I 36 1 5 54 72 1 8 2
ay r 48 1 4 77 77 1 8 8
dumbarton 47 1 4 63 85 0 8
g I asgow 50 21 44 51 1 1 7
Lanark 1 5 16 55 73 1 7 9
r e n f r e w 67 1 2 77 64 23 7
parental help
all help 1 4 77 73 38
not all help 1 4 56 74 62
management
current parents 43 1 4 74 60
all other types 26 14 73 40
training
one or less 13 73 46









Table 5: This gives the response rate for Scotland as a whole, and for various key questions, gives the number
responding to that question, with the percentage of those who sent the questionnnaire back. It can be seen that
there isn't any clear pattern of non-response to any one question. The final figure is the number who responded
to all the questions relating to children, fees, sessions and accounts. The differences are not remarkable, with
the exception of Borders (20% fewer than anywhere else) which is hardly significant given the small number
involved, and Fife (20% more than anywhere else). It can be seen that 100% response rates to questions for Fife
playgroups were not uncommon, and since there is a buildup of non-respondents over each question for the last
category, this again is unsurprising.
RESPONSE RATES
TOT RET % Q 7 % Q 8 % Q1 4 % Q 2 2 % Q 2 3 % Q 2 4 % Q 1 1 % Q1 9 % Q 20 % Q 2 7 % ALL
C T C 1 1
%
BORDERS 47 17 36 17 100 16 94 1 5 88 16 94 16 94 1 5 88 16 94 13 76 1 1 65 13 76
r 1 bu
4 24
DUMFRIES 54 21 39 21 100 20 95 20 95 21 1 00 21 100 21 1 00 1 9 90 20 95 1 7 81 1 9 90 1 2 57
CENTRAL 86 25 29 24 96 23 92 21 84 23 92 23 92 23 92 22 88 22 88 22 88 1 8 72 14 56
FIFE 94 38 40 38 1 00 38 1 00 36 95 38 1 00 38 1 00 38 1 00 37 97 36 95 38 1 00 35 92 29 76
GRAMPIAN 1 30 46 35 44 96 43 93 40 87 44 96 44 96 43 93 37 80 35 76 36 78 37 80 22 48
HIGHLANDS 93 29 31 29 1 00 28 97 28 97 27 93 28 97 27 93 25 86 23 79 20 69 22 76 1 2 41
LOTHIAN 151 54 36 53 98 52 96 52 96 51 94 51 94 50 93 49 91 44 81 49 91 43 80 34 63
STRATHCLYDE 540 1 96 36 1 91 97 1 92 98 1 89 96 1 93 98 1 93 98 1 93 98 1 85 94 173 88 1 70 87 169 86 1 20 61
TAYSIDE & 121 51 42 49 96 48 94 47 92 47 92 47 92 46 90 39 76 41 80 33 65 38 75 22 43
ISLANDS
TOTAL 1316 477 36 466 98 460 96 448 94 460 96 461 97 456 96 429 90 407 85 396 83 394 83 269 56
URBAN 21 5 215 100 206 96 202 94 205 95 206 96 206 96 1 95 382 1 86 87 1 81 84 169 79 1 27 59
RURAL 251 251 100 246 98 239 95 241 96 245 98 242 96 226 443 216 86 209 83 221 88 138 55
(The object of presenting these figures is, indeed, to
impress: the scope and size of the co-ordinated voluntary effort
is pretty staggering, and would be a major achievement for any
conventional organization to hold together, let alone a voluntary
one with unpaid part-time short-term management. Yet is has
worked for years. It is surety about time we thought about how it
does so. Which is what this thesis is all about.)
Over 65% of Scottish groups have the same constitution - the
model one produced by SPPA, and all are autonomous entities in
their own right. Over three-quarters have charitable status.
Apart from the parental help - which we shall come to later
- the ratio of staff to children is one to ten. Playgroup staff
are called, variously, supervisors or playleaders, and are
employed by the playgroup, and paid a wage, which is pretty
pitiful - in 1976 it was less than £250 per year, which is lousy
even for part-time work. Over 80% of the playleaders are trained
for the work, usually by SPPA regional or district courses - the
average playleader has been on three of these. Their job is to
provide skill, continuity and permanence for the parents and
children involved. Each group has two or three such people, the
most senior being with the group some three and a half years.
Parents are involved in two ways: in the managing of the
group, and in helping at sessions. 94% of playgroups have parents
on the committee, and 93% have a regular rota for parental help.
Only 3% have no parental help at all (presumably they are
hospital, church or other type of wholly-sponsored group). 39% of
groups have regular involvement from every single parent - in an
additional 48%, most parents help regularly. In over half the
groups, there are no parents who never help. On average, parental
help at sessions would involve fourteen sessions per year. SPPA
estimate over one million hours worked by parents in 1977-78.
Question 25 on the survey asked about the proportion of parents
who never help. Out of 336 who answered the question, 174 said no
parents never helped, and 162 reported some parents who never
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helped. The former group were on average 25% smaller (11 children
fewer), received on average £47 less grant, and spent £183 less
on wages but £4 more on children per year. They do have a smaller
ratio of staff to children. These figures were significant, but
causation is as usual difficult to infer. In any event, we have
said that our aim is primarily to present a picture of how
playgroups run rather than use the figures as inferential
evidence, and the overall picture of near-universal mutual-aid in
Scottish playgroups is an impressive fact in its own right,
irrespective of any conclusions.
When we look at playgroup finances, we should remember that
though the total of income for individual groups was estimated at
some £1.3 million, unpaid work by parents would have been worth
at least that had it been paid. Of that £1.3 million, the lion's
share, around £950,000 came from session fees and a further
£250,000 was fundraised by parents. Only £113,000 was given in
support by government - and whatever theoretical views one may on
the benefits of grant-aid or otherwise, this low amount was not
for lack of playgroups asking. And whatever views we come to
about government help for mutual-aid groups being double-edged, I
didn't hear in nearly three years of knowing playgroup people of
one instance of grant being refused to a group for 'their own
good' - in other words, the lack of government grants to
playgroups in Scotland was not a deliberate policy designed to
strengthen the playgroup movement.
The three main areas of expenditure were wages, rent and
children - this latter covers milk, equipment and so on. Some
£925,000 was spent on wages, with £250,000 on children and the
rest on rent. The small wages paid to playleaders were not a
result of meanness, but of poverty. Put another way - the average
playgroup session cost 39p per child in 1978-79. 25p of this was
the session fee and only 3.25p is from a subsidy: the gap has to
be fundraised. The 39p is spent with 26p on wages, 8p on children
and 5p on rent. Bear in mind also that though there is an average
grant of £88, 28% of groups got nothing, and a further 48% got
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Less than £50. Only 9% got over £100. And as we observed in the
last chapter, 70% of all the grant came in Lothian - if the
Lothians are excluded, the average goes down to £30.
Oddly enough, a playgroup with a grant spends £4 more per
year on children, and £150 per year less on wages. That they have
fewer untrained staff is expected.
On training, in the two years previous to the survey, around
5000 mothers went on training courses - that's between two and
three per group. 70% of these were also on the committee (which
bears out the remarks earlier about the pattern of recruitment
and commitment). Interestingly, the usually negative correlation
(-.3) between size and amount spent on children is absent when
training is also considered. Playgroups with at least two trained
mothers were larger (expected) by 39 to 31, but they spent around
£50 more on children per year. They also had more parental help
at sessions - an average of two extra sessions help per parent.
Bearing in mind that this survey has been entirely concerned
with the individual groups rather than the SPPA organization, we
can mention that 30% of groups reported someone as going to the
SPPA A.G.M. in the past two years - this is a pretty high
proportion for mothers with children at a weekend conference in a
country like Scotland. On any reckoning, the support between
individual playgroups and the local, regional and national groups
must be mutual.
The figures of most interest to playgroups themselves were
the regional differences. In this they probably show more sense
than those of us who look for less tangible and intuitively
meaningful statistics. Most of the regional figures are in tables
1 to 4, but some extremes that didn't get into the charts follow.
Many playgroups have mother and toddler groups for under threes
attached - the average for the country was 14%, but in Highlands
it was double this at 28%. Overall, the number of children in
playgroups is on the increase slightly: but over 80% of groups in
the Borders were larger whereas a similar proportion in the
Argyll division of Strathclyde were smaller. We asked whether
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groups gave reduced fees for siblings at the same playgroup - 37%
overall did so nationally, and 85% of groups in the Highlands did
so, but only 18% in Lothian. Over half the groups in Highland
reported larger grants, whilst over half the groups in Fife and
Lothians reported smaller grants but then Highland had the
smallest grants and Lothians and Fife the largest, so this would
be equitable were it a redistribution. The practice of paying a
larger fee to get out of doing rota duty was only present in 11%
of groups - only in Highlands was it absent, whilst 33% of groups
in Central Region thought it a good idea to implement. The figure
of three and a half years for the time the senior playleader had
been with the group went up to over four years in Lothians, where
the best wages were paid.
More miscellanea Highland Region playleaders were the
best trained, having been on an average of 4.25 courses each,
compared with a Scottish average of 2.85. The average waiting
list was 9 in Borders, 12 in Tayside, 34 in Grampian and 37 in
the Islands. All other regions were between 22 and 28 children on
the list. Nationally, one-third of these children were over
three, but this rose to 71% in the Borders and fell to 16% in
Cen tral.
We also collected figures on rent and premises. The average
rent was £127 per year, but 30% of groups have free premises. 25%
have free heating. The most common type of place to meet was a
church hall - over 30% of all groups met there, but they paid an
average £159 and only 17% got in free. So much for the Church.
32% met in various types of local authority premises , with well
over half paying no rent or heating. 63% of groups with free
premises also received grants, but the grant was around £45 less
than the average for all groups. Schoolchildren helping at
sessions was a widespread practice - about a third of all groups
involved schools. 15%, at the other end, had help from old age
pensioners.
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We could go on and on, but the overall picture of Scottish
playgroups is a pretty clear one by now - despite the variety in
the details, the homogeneity is remarkable. All groups are
constructed on the same model, replicated throughout Scotland.
This model perpetuates itself year after year, with continually
changing membership and only temporary, part-time, and either
unpaid or badly paid help. Each playgroup is autonomous and
responsible for its own affairs, run, controlled and staffed and
funded almost entirely by the parents of the children involved.
These individual groups band together in branches, in districts,
in regions and nationally for mutual support, help, training and
pooling of knowledge and experience. The evidence here is
conelusive.
RECAPITULATION
We are now at the end of this treatise. But before we close,
we'll review the position we have reached and the major steps we
have taken on the way.
We began with a discussion of the concept of organizational
form. This, it will be remembered, refers to the way that people
in an organization are organized. We distinguished hierarchical
forms of organization in which the main concerns are with
control, authority and discipline, from voluntary forms of
organization, in which the main concerns are with agreement and
co-operation. We said that we would refer to the latter as
mutual-aid groups. It will also be remembered that we said at
that time that any organization could be analysed in either way,
and the way we chose to analyse it depended on whether we were
interested in one or the other set of attributes. If we are
interested in co-operative action and voluntary agreements in any
organization we could look on it as a mutual-aid group, while it
may be equally fruitful to look at authority and discipline in
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even the most voluntary group. The approach is rather like that
of quantum theory in physics, in which light is looked on
sometimes as if it were a wave, sometimes as if it were a
particle, depending entirely on the interest of the researcher
and the explanatory value of the framework.
We started from the premise that in fact there are some
groups which would by most criteria be regarded as voluntary
organizations in the mutual-aid group sense, and observed that
the commonly accepted paradigm of an organization is in fact a
hierarchical one, which doesn't really aid our understanding of
how they work. To find a model of organization which was more
appropriate, we turned to anarchist writings on organization.
With their emphasis on mutualism and federalism, anarchist
organizational models were much more useful than orthodox ones.
We furthered our understanding of this anarchist model with a
short history of anarchist organization in Spain, as being one of
the few large-scale models we could draw on.
The perspective then shifted to sociology and to the way the
two concepts of community and organization developed (from the
work of Tonnies and Weber respectively) as disjunctives.
Organization is seen as rational and explainable, whilst
community is seen as irrational and inherently inexplicable, and
this hardly aided the development of a theory of mutual-aid
groups. We then developed such a theory by starting with the aim
of seeing a pattern in the way people in groups interacted, and
put that pattern together in a sort of reverse order by analysing
the concepts it had to embrace. We saw the ambiguities in our
concepts of authority and rules, and by observing the results of
assuming that people acted economically rationally, drew the
conclusion that people in mutual-aid groups did not behave like
that. Furthermore, we developed the principle that people in
mutual-aid groups suspend their rational self-interest, and
called this a group ethic. Our two other principles emerged as
feelings of belonging and co-operative action, and we observed
that it was in the interaction between this three areas of
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belief, feeling and action that the pattern of activity in a
mutual-aid group was to be found.By integrating this with the
critical theory of Habermas, and some writings from the women's
movement, we came to see both the necessity for democracy and
equality and also the pitfalls in getting there. Our final
theoretical step was to knock down a common paradigm of mutual
aid and voluntary organization, based on Michels' Iron Law of
Oligarchy, and Weber's theory of the routinization of charisma.
We then continued our development of the theory of mutual-aid
groups with a review of the different types of groups that
existed -temporary and permanent groups, with temporary or
permanent members, which were either open or closed - and
illustrated the usefulness of the way we had developed for
looking at the way they worked by examining a few cases from the
literature. We continued our empirical explorations with a look
at the way mutual aid groups function in and with the welfare
state.
We then turned to a lengthy study the Scottish Pre-School
Playgroups Association as an example of not just how a mutual-aid
group worked in practise, but also of how it did so successfully.
The account was descriptive rather than analytical, concentrating
on the way SPPA worked and some of the problems it faced,
including the case of Lothian Region. We looked lastly at the
survey of playgroups in 1977-78. This study of SPPA served to
illustrate that we have not been theorizing in a vacuum, that the
anarchist organizational model isn't something existing only in
history books, and that our subject matter and our ideas have a
great deal of substance to them. Once again, this is like the
quantum theory - it was developed long before any theoretical
proof was found that confirmed the existence of the constructs
that it postulated.
When we compare the structure of SPPA with the suggestions
of the Spanish Anarchists about organization which we quoted and
discussed at some length early on, the parallels we can draw are
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remarkable, and not to be laid down at the door of coincidence.
No conventional theory of organization can even adequately begin
to encompass the playgroup movement in its analysis, but
anarchist theory can do so. Now I'm not suggesting that there
exists a fifth column of anarchist mums, waiting in their tens of
thousands in the wings for the collapse of the authoritarian
state to self-organize society, meanwhile practising on their
little kids. (Though the fantasy is one I find cheering). What
both playgroups and the Spanish Anarchist have discovered
independently (and the Spanish were probably not the first -
Kropotkin and co. go on at great length about free cities and
medieval autonomous groups, and in the seventeenth century in
England many of these ideas found a pretty full expression in the
activities of the many radical groups which flourished when the
English State broke down temporarily) is a method of coordinating
independent groups into a large force without losing the vitality
and commitment that comes from individuals who work in small
groups they can control and run themselves.
The articulation of the ideas of federation and mutual aid
from both the anarchist and playgroup movement is remarkably
similar. The ideas worked in Spain for sixty years and have
worked in Scotland, in different circumstances, for 15 years so
far - but there can be no doubt from looking at the published
comments in the participants in both that the principles of
federation are the same. The conclusion that there is something
that works, and works powerfully and well, is not a difficult one
to draw. And given the right grass-roots mutual-aid groups to
build on, it should work anywhere.
In a sense, we have come full circle, for one of the things
we originally wanted to show was that the anarchist alternative
is in fact a viable one. We have seen this to be the case in both
theory and practice. But to say "I told you so" is not the best
way of ending, however true it may be. For voluntary organization
and mutual aid are not a luxury or a dream in the age we live in,
but a matter of survival. As Chomsky said of anarchism, "it is
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the problem of survival, not revolution, that has obsessed us".
The significance, if there is any, of everything that we have
argued and demonstrated here, is that a better understanding of
the way that we can organize together voluntarily might help us
to do so. And if we succeed in that, the human race race will be




TEXT OF THE 1978 PLAYGROUP QUESTIONNAIRE
This is the questionnaire as it was sent out to all playgroups,
minus the preambe at the beginning. This explained what the
information was needed for, how to fill the boxes in, and
included an exhortation to send the thing back. As can be seen
from the chart, 36% responded out of over 1300.
This text doesn't reproduce the physical layout of the
questionnaire, or show what the boxes looked like: it is intended
purely as a reference for interpretation of the results.
Glossary: 'CONTACT' is the name of the playgroup magazine, sent
out free to all members every month.
MEMBERSHIP
1)What is the name of your group?
Please give the name of your group's
a) Branch (if any)
b) District/Division
c) Region
FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOXES
2)Which of the following does your membership cover?
a) Playgroup 3-5 years
b) Mother and Toddler group only
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c) Playgroup and Mother and toddler group
d) 0-5 years group
e) Other (specify)
3)What type of SPPA membership do you have ?
a) Full membership
b) Sponsored full membership
c) Associate membership
4) Does any member of your group also have an SPPA individual
membership? (No)




5) If a mother and toddler group and a playgroup,
a) Do you share the same equipment? (yes/no)
b) Do you share the same room? (yes/no)
6) Please indicate what kind of constitution your group has by
ticking one of the following:
a) Playgroup constitution agreed on at the 1976 Inverness AGM
b) Other constitution
c) No constitution at all
7) If your group has charitable status, please give the year in
which you registered with the Inland revenue (19..)
If you don't know, tick here.










Isolated (small village, scattered houses)
8) If you admit 2 1/2 to 3 year old children to your playgroup,
how many are on the group's register at the moment?
If you are a mother and toddler group only, you can stop now: but
if you are a playgroup, carry on, but answer the questions ONLY
FOR THE 3-5 YEAR OLD CHILDREN IN THE PLAYGROUP.
GROWTH, SIZE AND FINANCE
8) What is the total number of children actually on your group's
register at the moment?
Please insert the figures in the boxes.
Is this number larger or smaller than Last year? (please tick)
(larger,smaller)
By how much? (numbers in boxes)
9) How many morning sessions are there each week?
How long does each morning session last? (hrs, mins)
How many afternoon sessions are there each week?
How long does each afternoon session last? (hrs, mins)
What is the total number of places offered for children each
play session? (numbers in boxes)
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Three times a week
Four times a week
Five times a week
More often than five
11) What is the fee charged for each play session? (in pence)
If more than one child in the same family attends playgroup,
is there a reduced fee for the younger brother or sister?
(Yes/no)
12) If the group has a waiting list, please give the number of children on it.
How many of these are over three years old?









b)If you pay rent (including heating charges, donation etc.)
what is the current rent/donation per year (to nearest pound)
14) Please tick one of the following to show what kind of a grant you receive:
No grant
Grant from Social Work Department
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Grant from Education Department
Grant from Church
Other (specify)
What was the amount received this year to the nearest ound?
15) If you received a grant Last year (1976-77) was it
a) Larger
b) Smaller
c) about the same
Tick here if you received no grant last year
16) Do you intend to apply for a grant next year? (1978-79) (Yes/no)





18) How much did you spend on equipment last year (1976-77) e.g.
sandtrays
How much did you spend on last year on expendable materials,
e.g. glue, paint, sand etc.
How much did yopu spend last year on sundries (excluding milk)?
(please give answers to the nearest pound)
19) To the nearest pound, how much did you manage to fundraise
last year 1976-77?
20) How many playgroup staff did you have last year? (full time and part time)
What was the total wage bill last year (1976-77) to nearest pound?








22) How is your group managed? (please tick one box)
a) Solely by elected current parents' committee
b) Solely by elected committee of current and past parents
c) by parents' representatives and representatives of other
organization (e.g. Church elder)
d) one person, or partnership
e) by an institution
f) other (specify)




Tick here if parents aren't expected to help at all
Are parents allowed to opt out of rota duty by paying an extra fee? (yes/no)




















27) How many times, on average, did each parent help last term? (Aug-Dec 1977)











Others including OAPs (specify)
CONTACT
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30) Do you reciev/e contact?
31) How many people usually read the groups' copy?
32) Is it displayed at the playgroup?
















36) Do you keep old Contacts for reference? (yes/no)
TRAINING
37) How many committee members have taken a playgroup training
course since 1976?
38) How many parents (other than committee) have taken any playgroup training c
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How Long has your most senior playleader been working with
the group (to nearest year)?
39) For each present playleader, state number of playgroup







40) How many staff in your group have recieved NO playgroup
training at all ?
41) Please tick to show if any member or playleader has attended
any of the following since 1976 (Member)CLeader)
Playgroup Training Day
Day conference
Mother/helper course in playgroup
Mother/helper playgroup workshop held locally
SPPA A.G.M. or conference
42) Please show who has filled in this questionnaire by ticking




Other single committee member
Other
Thankyou for your help.
NOTE: There was no question 34 on the original due to a typing
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(The object of presenting these figures is, indeed, to
impress: the scope and size of the co-ordinated voluntary effort
is pretty staggering, and would be a major achievement for any
conventional organization to hold together, let alone a voluntary
one with unpaid part-time short-term management. Yet is has
worked for years. It is surely about time we thought about how it
does so. Which is what this thesis is all about.)
Over 65% of Scottish groups have the same constitution - the
model one produced by SPPA, and all are autonomous entities in
their own right. Over three-quarters have charitable status.
Apart from the parental help - which we shall come to later
- the ratio of staff to children is one to ten. Playgroup staff
are called, variously, supervisors or playleaders, and are
employed by the playgroup, and paid a wage, which is pretty
pitiful - in 1976 it was less than £250 per year, which is lousy
even for part-time work. Over 80% of the playleaders are trained
for the work, usually by SPPA regional or district courses - the
average playleader has been on three of these. Their job is to
provide skill, continuity and permanence for the parents and
children involved. Each group has two or three such people, the
most senior being with the group some three and a half years.
Parents are involved in two ways: in the managing of the
group, and in helping at sessions. 94% of playgroups have parents
on the committee, and 93% have a regular rota for parental help.
Only 3% have no parental help at all (presumably they are
hospital, church or other type of wholly-sponsored group). 39% of
groups have regular involvement from every single parent - in an
additional 48%, most parents help regularly. In over half the
groups, there are no parents who never help. On average, parental
help at sessions would involve fourteen sessions per year. SPPA
estimate over one million hours worked by parents in 1977-78.
Question 25 on the survey asked about the proportion of parents
who never help. Out of 336 who answered the question, 174 said no
parents never helped, and 162 reported some parents who never
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helped. The former group were on average 25% smaller (11 children
fewer), received on average £47 less grant, and spent £183 less
on wages but £4 more on children per year. They do have a smaller
ratio of staff to children. These figures were significant, but
causation is as usual difficult to infer. In any event, we have
said that our aim is primarily to present a picture of how
playgroups run rather than use the figures as inferential
evidence, and the overall picture of near-universal mutual-aid in
Scottish playgroups is an impressive fact in its own right,
irrespective of any conclusions.
When we look at playgroup finances, we should remember that
though the total of income for individual groups was estimated at
some £1.3 million, unpaid work by parents would have been worth
at least that had it been paid. Of that £1.3 million, the lion's
share, around £950,000 came from session fees and a further
£250,000 was fundraised by parents. Only £113,000 was given in
support by government - and whatever theoretical views one may on
the benefits of grant-aid or otherwise, this low amount was not
for lack of playgroups asking. And whatever views we come to
about government help for mutual-aid groups being double-edged, I
didn't hear in nearly three years of knowing playgroup people of
one instance of grant being refused to a group for 'their own
good' - in other words, the lack of government grants to
playgroups in Scotland was not a deliberate policy designed to
strengthen the playgroup movement.
The three main areas of expenditure were wages, rent and
children - this latter covers milk, equipment and so on. Some
£925,000 was spent on wages, with £250,000 on children and the
rest on rent. The smalt wages paid to playleaders were not a
result of meanness, but of poverty. Put another way - the average
playgroup session cost 39p per child in /l978-79. 25p of this was
the session fee and only 3.25p is from a subsidy: the gap has to
be fundraised. The 39p is spent with 26p on wages, 8p on children
and 5p on rent. Bear in mind also that though there is an average
grant of £88, 28% of groups got nothing, and a further 48% got
